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1
Introduction
Edward W. (Ned) Hill
Cleveland State University

For many years, members of the faculty and research staff in the
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State
University have paid keen attention to the problems and issues faced
by midwestern industrial cities. As part of a university community, we
joined with colleagues across campus to think about how to respond to
disruptive change in the regional economies of twentieth century industrial cities and regions.
There is no one, simple recipe for renewing prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. But virtually all of the partial answers that
emerged from our investigations recognize in one way or another that
the greatest hopes and assets in these cities reside in the talent and
energy of the people who live and work within them. In times of difﬁculty, individuals and groups discover unsuspected strengths and reveal
qualities and capabilities that had not previously been seen. How can
the huge reserve of human possibilities within midwestern industrial
cities be released?
The chapters in this book do not contain a single, complete, and
satisfying answer to the question of how to rekindle prosperity in these
cities. They contain no silver bullets, but together they may be silver
buckshot. They provide valuable ideas to generate prosperity.
We commissioned chapters in which each author looks at the prospects of renewal through the lens of his or her own specialty and experience. The chapters are all scholarly in nature, but they have been written
for an audience that appreciates a style that is less formal than is usually
found in purely academic writing. Some of the chapters are predicated
upon the commonly shared point of view that the role of markets in
these cities is often either misunderstood or insufﬁciently understood.
Most share the perspective that one of the keys to renewed prosperity is

1
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found in an increased appreciation of markets and the institutions that
enable, support, and constrain them.
Historically, most city leaders work in the here and now and with
the expectation that change will be gradual. Today’s reality is vastly
different; the pace of change has vastly accelerated. Changes that range
from shorter product cycles and globalization of markets to the impact
of transportation systems on sprawl require ideas and continual efforts
to promote prosperity.
The next chapter, by William M. Bowen and Kelly Kinahan, provides an overview of the book’s theme that we are in a time of economic
transition. The world order that prevailed in the early-to-mid-twentieth
century, during which time midwestern industrial cities were in their
heyday, has been replaced by a different kind of global economy, one
that is continuing to change. As the inﬂuence of China and India continues to grow, the U.S. economic system in general, and the regional
economic systems of midwestern industrial cities in particular, will play
a less dominant role. At the same time, however, much of the anxiety this transition brings about is unnecessary. While the global market
dominance of midwestern cities has eclipsed, new opportunities await.
Urban and regional economies can attain high levels of prosperity without economic dominance.
This is followed by a chapter written by Benjamin Y. Clark, in
which he asks the question: Why do some older industrial cities continue to thrive economically while others sputter and decline? In this
context, are success and failure dependent on luck, or is there something more profound at play? While there are many ways to address the
issue, and certainly many factors that contribute to the success or failure
of cities, this chapter examines one part of that question: Can tax expenditures play a role in stimulating the growth of these cities? The focus
is on how and why state and local governments use tax expenditures to
attempt to improve the conditions of their communities. The chapter
seeks to demonstrate that tax expenditure policy is highly inconsistent.
Local governments are at the mercy of a macroeconomic environment
over which they have little inﬂuence. This lack of control leaves local
governments with few tools at their disposal to create positive change
in their communities. The devices that these governments often turn to
are tax expenditures. Unfortunately, tax expenditures play little or no
role in positive economic development. Despite the evidence, politi-
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cians continue to see tax expenditures as one of the most important
options available to them. To understand this, and to act accordingly, is
an important step in renewing prosperity in midwestern industrial cities.
Haifeng Qian, in Chapter 4, starts by surveying the literature on
the evolution of industrial clusters and explores its implications for the
revival of U.S. cities such as Detroit, Michigan, and Cleveland, Ohio.
These old industrial cities feature declining or declined clusters and are
struggling to invigorate their economies. The chapter reviews various
deﬁnitions and typologies of clusters. Next, it summarizes four streams
of literature discussing the evolution of clusters, in the process identifying some major forces behind the dynamics of clusters based on the
limited research available. The chapter does not solely address clusters
manifested in old industrial cities, since one type of cluster may evolve
into another type. It examines cluster development in the industrial
Midwest using Cleveland as an example, and explores the implications
of clusters’ evolution paths for the restoration of old industrial cities.
In the ﬁfth chapter, Joel A. Elvery begins by describing a “bucket”
or “shoveling” analogy for the labor force. The labor market for each
skill group is a bucket. The bucket for the lowest skills is large, but it is
completely full and shrinking relative to the other buckets. Elvery suggests that workforce development policy over the last 45 years has been
analogous to efforts to keep shoveling people into the lowest-skilled
labor market. While a lucky few ﬁnd a way to stay in that labor market
segment, most spill over the side. This discourages the unlucky who
remain unemployed, and it wastes public workforce training resources.
Thus, workforce development policies as presently constituted have
had limited success. The chapter suggests that the workforce development system needs to refocus on advancement and describes policies
and programs that ﬁt this orientation.
The sixth chapter is written by Gregory M. Sadlek and Joan Chase.
Academics have not typically made a very good case that the arts and
humanities have contributed tangibly to regional prosperity. This chapter attempts to help remedy this shortcoming, largely through a focus
on Cleveland as an example of cities throughout the Rust Belt in which
the question of how to regain lost status and former success has become
fundamental. For many, prosperity is linked only to strong and vital
economic activity. This chapter takes a different view. While Sadlek
and Chase recognize that wealth is fundamental to civic well-being, the
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arts and humanities also play a vital role. Their view is based upon the
recognition that the word “prosperity,” derived from our verb “prosper,” ultimately comes from the Latin terms pro and spes, or, literally,
“for the sake of hope.” It shows how the building blocks of prosperity
suggest something more than just having a strong economy. Indeed, the
road to prosperity for people in midwestern industrial cities may well
be the path to a broad increase in hope in the prospects for a stronger
regional economy, for clean, safe, and interesting places to live, for
higher levels of personal fulﬁllment, and for a community that once
again takes pride in itself and what it can offer to the world. This chapter explores how Cleveland’s traditionally solid base in the arts and
culture can be a major part of the journey. It argues that the road to
prosperity must involve increased quality of life in all facets.
Chapter 7 is written by Andrew R. Thomas, who has for many years
worked as a geophysicist and attorney in the energy arena. Thomas
draws on a wide range of sources to argue that some energy policies
and practices have had a material and adverse impact on cities in general and speciﬁcally on midwestern cities. Thomas argues for a range of
energy policies that would help renew prosperity in these cities. Current
energy policies that have had negative effects include low-cost gasoline, which has encouraged sprawl; public policies designed to encourage rural electriﬁcation, which have caused urban electric rates to be
artiﬁcially high; public policies that have discouraged cogeneration and
distributed generation, which have created an artiﬁcially high-cost electrical energy grid in urban areas; promotion of trucking over railroads
and waterways, which has decreased the natural advantage of Great
Lakes cities as centers of transportation; and failure to adjust rapidly
enough to changing technologies and circumstances. The general reason given for this inertia is the mighty resistance to change put up by
the trillion-dollar-a-year energy business. Alterations that may be good
for society in general may not be good for this particularly inﬂuential
industry. In a society where policy is set by competing advocacy groups,
alignment with the status quo has a signiﬁcant advantage. Energy policies that can help to renew prosperity in these cities include those that
encourage distributed generation. In addition, exploitation of natural
gas from shale formations will enable near-term growth and provide a
bridge to renewable generation, and policies that reﬂect the actual costs
of producing and delivering energy will encourage development of the
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traditional central city. Midwestern cities must also develop an energy
infrastructure that makes urban life easier and more attractive, such as
faster and more comfortable public transportation systems.
Chapter 8, written by Chieh-Chen Bowen, begins by recognizing that, throughout the twentieth century, no single nation or block
of nations had nearly as much economic power and inﬂuence as the
United States. However, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, total U.S. world
supremacy is ending. China is on the rise and will one day soon—probably in the next decade—become the largest economy in the world.
Indeed, at current growth rates, China’s economy is doubling in real
terms every seven or eight years. For industry in midwestern cities, this
newly emerging economic power means, among other things, that the
renewal of prosperity depends in essential ways on how well American
entrepreneurs and ﬁrms can penetrate Chinese markets. This effort, in
turn, demands knowledge and understanding of what Bowen calls “the
basic Chinese social mechanism.” The old saw that one can buy in one’s
own language and culture but must sell in the language and culture
of the buyer is especially important when contemplating doing business with Chinese customers. This chapter describes and gives practical
advice regarding the environments one must know about in order to
successfully export to and invest in Chinese markets. The implications
of understanding these environments are illustrated by the failure of
Google when it was forced to pull its operation out of mainland China
in 2010, and by the success of Rupert Murdoch when the Chinese government granted him the ﬁrst “landing rights” to sell foreign programs
to cable system prime-time slots, then later, rights to provide media
content to its mobile users.
Chapter 9, by Ziona Austrian and Merissa C. Piazza, links public
policy with stimulating entrepreneurship in regions that, because of
their industrial legacy, have fallen behind. Using examples, the authors
discuss the role of the nonproﬁt and public sectors in encouraging the
development of a locally based entrepreneurial culture to increase the
number of private sector start-up companies that are a critical component of the economic future of any region.
In Chapter 10, William M. Bowen and Chang-Shik Song begin by
deﬁning local economic development initiatives as public policies that
involve the exercise of public authority to claim and allocate taxing
power for social and economic purposes. These decisions are intended
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to affect consumer or ﬁrm behavior, or both. Generally, the policies
involve tax abatements or public expenditures in order to provide private beneﬁts within the urban or regional economic system. They cover
a range of public subsidies and direct cash aid for businesses, such as
ﬁnancial incentives for branch plant recruitment, capital market programs, information and education programs, export assistance, and
centers for business-related research. The policies frequently consist of
public ﬁnancial support with the goal of increasing levels of local consumption spending on items such as tourism and art facilities, sports
stadiums and teams, casinos, and outdoor recreation activities. The
chapter considers some criticisms of these initiatives and the rationales
behind them. The authors conclude that while it may be within the
power of local governments to help stem the tide of decline in midwestern industrial cities, the automatic and uncritical use of local economic
development initiatives is not necessarily always the best way to do so.
Finally, in Chapter 11, David R. Elkins investigates whether or
not the widely held impression that the Great Lakes region has lost
its entrepreneurial dynamic is based on any sort of empirical reality.
The chapter ﬁrst explores the nature of entrepreneurship and what it
means for an economy. Next, it presents descriptive evidence about the
hypothesis that the Great Lakes region has lost its entrepreneurial vigor.
Finally, statistical tests are performed to examine whether the Great
Lakes region has, indeed, lost a step. The short answer is that it largely
depends on how entrepreneurship is measured. In one sense, the Great
Lakes region has, indeed, lost a step. However, like many seasoned
athletes, it remains in the game and competitive.
My hope is that this book can contribute to setting in motion processes for renewal and energies that have been imprisoned by outdated
ideas, policies, and habits of thought.
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2
Midwestern Urban and
Regional Responses to Global
Economic Transition
William M. Bowen
Kelly L. Kinahan
Cleveland State University

Midwestern industrial cities continue to cede ground to low-cost,
overseas competitors in the increasingly global economy. Yet transitions present opportunities and Rust Belt regions can experience
prosperity despite losing the market dominance in manufacturing
that they once enjoyed.

Human urban and regional settlements have existed within a system of economic expansion and contraction that may be traced back
continuously at least to the development of Afro-Eurasian interregional
trade in the Bronze Age (Frank and Thompson 2005; Smith 2009). The
characteristic structure and cycles of this system have included coreperiphery divisions of labor, alternating periods of rivalry and hegemony, and economic periods of upswing and downswing. The characteristics of the total system at any given time have strongly inﬂuenced
local economic activities and overall levels of prosperity (Frank 1993).
Today’s midwestern industrial cities are in some ways similar to
other cities throughout history. Their local economies are parts of a
larger, continuous system of economic expansion and contraction. They
are driven by forces of innovation and entrepreneurship, capital accumulation, division and specialization of labor, and changes in demand
and market sizes. Yet they are somewhat different from many other cities in that they originated roughly during the latter part of the industrial
revolution and came to economic preeminence during the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century, at which time the population not only in the United
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States but in the world was larger than ever. These cities developed
when transportation and communication technologies were advancing
to previously unimaginable power and inﬂuence. Today, midwestern
industrial cities face a new economic world order, with more competition from around the globe than ever before (Bair 2005; Ducruet and
Notteboom 2012; Gerefﬁ, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; Henderson
and Nadvi 2011; Henderson et al. 2002; Winters and Yusuf 2007).
To understand any system, one must understand the larger one within
which it is embedded. Thus, this chapter starts with a brief overview of
the evolution of the economic world system within which midwestern
industrial cities attained world-scale economic dominance in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This gives perspective on why
these cities achieved such preeminence, and helps provide insight as
to why they cannot reasonably expect to reclaim it today. Next, the
chapter brieﬂy reviews some recent scholarly literature describing the
technological, industrial, and political-economic changes during the
early twenty-ﬁrst century. These shifts seem likely to continue and possibly even to accelerate the long-term evolutionary trends from smallerscale, simpler sociotechnical and trade systems to larger-scale and more
complex ones. The chapter then considers some of the implications of
these trends for the renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. We conclude by suggesting that the idea of prosperity needs to be
reframed relative to the previous concept, which was centered on economic world dominance. However, on the basis of the reframed idea,
renewed prosperity is well within reach for large segments of the population in midwestern industrial cities.

MIDWESTERN INDUSTRIAL CITIES WITHIN THE
ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER THROUGH THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Trade and investment across borders began long before the rise of
modern capitalism (Muller 2009). However, there is little doubt that
global economic transition intensiﬁed during and after the Industrial
Revolution (More 2000). Some of the major underlying factors included
the use of fossil fuels, the development of textile technology, the factory

Bowen.indb 8

12/16/2013 2:13:36 PM

Midwestern Urban and Regional Responses 9

system, the growth of the human population and its concentration in
urban areas, and the modernization of agricultural, mining, and metallurgical production processes. Other factors driving intensiﬁcation and
diffusion included the expansion of transportation through newly created and developed railroads, canals, macadamized roads, steamships,
and refrigerated railway cars. Much was also promoted institutionally
by radically reduced tariffs, designed to induce international trade, and
the practice of pegging national currencies to gold, so as to have a common unit of exchange, especially in Europe.
Industrial Growth in the Midwest
As the Industrial Revolution diffused from Great Britain and Europe
to the United States, midwestern cities were well-poised to take advantage of the newly developed methods of production. By the turn of the
twentieth century, advantageous locations along prominent waterways,
agricultural surplus, abundant and fertile land, availability of natural
resources, and high levels of immigration resulted in ﬂourishing manufacturing sectors throughout midwestern industrial cities and helped
catapult them to the ﬁrst rank of worldwide competitiveness. This dominance was achieved through mass production driven by fossil fuels,
blue-collar labor forces and mechanization, and national consumption
of goods at historically unprecedented rates, allowing relatively large
segments of the populations within midwestern industrial cities to enjoy
great prosperity.
These cities continued to grow through the early twentieth century,
along with the entire American economy, arguably because of previously unparalleled opportunities to achieve scale economies offered by
the exceptionally large U.S. domestic market (Hannah 2008). Between
1900 and 1920, the U.S. population increased 40 percent, from 76.1 to
106.5 million, while real gross domestic product rose 63 percent, from
$422.8 to $687.7 billion.1 Midwestern industrial cities thrived primarily
on trade with other U.S. markets, taking advantage of railroads, waterways, and Great Lakes shipping routes. Furthermore, labor needs continued to be met through great international in-migratory ﬂows, all but
guaranteeing continued economic growth and development.
The period between World War I and World War II brought further
ascendency of midwestern industrial cities. Partially this was attribut-
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able to events in other parts of the world with respect to which nobody
in these U.S. cities had much if any control. Russia became the Soviet
Union and closed itself off economically from competing with the rest
of the world. Similarly, amidst the turmoil of the Weimar Republic’s
efforts to recover from the devastation of World War I, the Germans
sought complete economic self-reliance. At least partially in consequence of the rapidly diffusing European retreat from international
trade along with the stock market crash of 1929, widespread bank
failures, and a precipitous decrease in demand for manufactured and
other products, the world economy went into a deep depression in the
1930s. The closing of national borders to international trade contributed to mass unemployment, social upheaval, and the rise of fascism,
all of which laid the foundation for World War II. The Great Depression induced widespread protectionism in an effort to shore up national
economies around the world. For example, in the United States, the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was signed into law on June 17, 1930,
with the purpose of raising U.S. tariffs to record levels on over 20,000
imported goods. U.S. markets were generally large enough to consume
the products coming out of midwestern industrial cities, and the widespread retreat from international trade reduced supplier competition for
such products, indirectly contributing to the success of these cities.
At the end of World War II, the standing of midwestern industrial
cities was nearing its peak. At the same time, American policymakers
and most global leaders were convinced that the protectionist policies
and trade policies in place after the First World War were an economic
disaster and tended to result in antagonism and conﬂict. This led to
efforts, spearheaded by the United States, to begin laying the institutional groundwork necessary for expanding international trade (e.g.,
lower U.S. tariffs). The results of these initiatives were manifold: the
World Bank was created to help fund infrastructure in war-ravaged
Europe; the International Monetary Fund took on the task of stabilizing
the currencies of troubled economies; and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to reduce trade barriers and
provide a forum for discussion of further reductions.2
While the United States and most European countries were working to bolster international trade, the communist countries, led by the
Soviet Union and China, remained inwardly focused and did not participate. The centrally planned and controlled Soviet government’s policy
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was to ensure that the bulk of the country’s production was traded and
consumed exclusively within the Eastern European block of communist countries. International trade by the Chinese was largely precluded,
not only by communist economic policies of centralized control, but
because of the protracted civil war they had fought since the 1920s and
the subsequent conﬂict with the Japanese during World War II. China
had very little industry, high unemployment, and massive food shortages. In the United States in general and midwestern industrial cities in
particular, widespread fear of communism stimulated industrial production for the manufactured goods and services needed to support the Cold
War. The inﬂuence of communism also had the largely salutary indirect
effect that communist countries did not provide supply-side economic
competition for the goods produced by midwestern manufacturers.
The Impact of Globalization
Communism notwithstanding, the period between the 1950s and
the 1970s brought an enormous overall increase in international trade.
Perhaps most importantly, it was at this time that Japan and the “EastAsian Tigers”—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea—
began large-scale export-oriented industrialization. The rise of industrial production, especially in the Far East, created new competition for
midwestern industry in downstream markets for ﬁnished goods. Japanese production, in particular, began to compete seriously in the United
States, at ﬁrst with small, inexpensive trinkets, toys, and baubles of low
quality, and later with high-quality motorcycles and vehicles such as
automobiles, as well as ofﬁce machinery, scientiﬁc and optical equipment, semiconductors, and other electronic components. U.S. ﬁrms had
no choice but to participate in increasingly globalized markets, either
by inclusion or exclusion.
Early signs of the decline of midwestern industrial cities—the rise
of the Rust Belt—began to appear in the 1960s, as both the concept and
processes of globalization began to take new root. The word “globalize” began to show up in the academic literature in the 1960s and in
the mainstream press in the 1980s, roughly meaning to make global in
scope (Liu, Hong, and Liu 2012; Oner et al. 2010; Oswick, Jones and
Lockwood 2009). Greater numbers of people than ever before started
to move around the world; more places were involved in the global
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economy; and ﬂows of international goods and investments increased
signiﬁcantly. A greater reliance on international markets occurred universally, except in the communist regimes, and competition increased
acutely in markets that had been essentially dominated by midwestern
industry.
U.S. Socioeconomic Trends
Economic decline beginning in the 1950s in midwestern cities was
additionally caused by a mix of factors, foremost amongst which may
have been the widespread preferences of individuals to move to places
with mild winters, along with increased incomes that made it possible
to act upon these preferences, and the mass production of affordable airconditioning technology (Rappoport 2003). Another major contributor
was the rapidly changing industrial composition of U.S. employment.
At the end of World War II, service industries accounted for 10 percent
of nonfarm employment compared to 38 percent for manufacturing. By
1996, service industries accounted for 29 percent of nonfarm employment compared to 15 percent for manufacturing (Meisenheimer 1998).
The changing composition of industry meant a shift from heavy manufacturing of such goods as steel and automobiles, which were concentrated in midwestern cities, to service industries, which were freer to
locate throughout the country. Moreover, the cost of labor in the heavily
unionized northern and midwestern cities was higher than the cost of
labor in the largely union-free South and West. These factors played a
signiﬁcant role in the massive population migrations that occurred from
the North and Midwest to the South and West (Greenwood 1997; Hobbs
and Stoops 2002). To make matters worse for the inner cities, a shift
occurred in the population of metropolitan areas, from cities to suburbs,
brought on by widespread adoption of the automobile starting during
the mid-twentieth century, along with massive investment in highway
and road construction. As described in Box 1.1, the result of such trends
can have dire consequences.
Economic Change in China
As the twentieth century came to a close, by far the most signiﬁcant systemic alteration in world markets affecting midwestern indus-

Bowen.indb 12

12/16/2013 2:13:37 PM

Midwestern Urban and Regional Responses 13

Box 1.1 Economic Decline in Formerly Preeminent Cities:
Detroit’s Bankruptcy
On July 18, 2013 the city of Detroit ﬁled for Chapter 9 bankruptcy
protection. As the 11th largest city in the U.S., Detroit’s bankruptcy
stands as a dubious marker in the urban history of a city once considered
the icon of American industry. While Detroit had been suffering from
severe ﬁscal stress since at least 2002 (Scorsone and Bateson 2012),
the possibility of bankruptcy became all but imminent with the appointment of Kevyn Orr as Emergency Manager in March 2013.a The city’s
debt has been estimated to be somewhere between $18 and $20 billion
(Davey and Walsh 2013), with the city’s pension fund being its largest creditor (Renaud-Komiya 2013). While some pin Detroit’s failures
squarely on the backs of a corrupt local government that completely
failed at managing the city’s ﬁnances (Marotta 2013; Auslin 2013), others see the bankruptcy as an outcome of not only this ﬁnancial mismanagement, but also a set of multifaceted and complex issues plaguing the
city for decades, including deindustrialization; globalization; suburban
sprawl, which reduced the city’s tax base; ﬁscal stress in the form of
annual operating deﬁcits; burdensome health care and pension costs;
city services stymied by outdated technology and poor service delivery;
and clear race and class separation between the city and surrounding
region (Florida 2013; Davey and Walsh 2013).
As the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, there is keen
interest in how Detroit will navigate these somewhat uncharted waters—
less than 500 municipalities have sought Chapter 9 protection since its
inception in the 1930s (U.S. Courts, n.d.). Many municipalities are
experiencing greater ﬁscal stress since the Great Recession, and legacy
costs (i.e., pension and other retiree beneﬁts) are of particular concern
to many midwestern industrial cities as many of these cities face similarly steep contribution requirements (Scorsone and Bateson 2012). In
a 2012 report that evaluated merits of Chapter 9 bankruptcy for the city
of Detroit, Scorsone and Bateson (2012) note that the primary advantage
of bankruptcy is cost containment, speciﬁcally in regard to reduction of
legacy costs, as well as improvements in cash ﬂow.
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Box 1.1 (continued)
The impact on residents and the existing assets of the Detroit is also a
key concern. Both residents and city workers have been assured that city
services will continue uninterrupted (Davey and Walsh 2013), but certainly changes lie ahead. Furthermore, although the liquidation of local
assets is not allowed under Chapter 9, creditors have still requested and
received appraisals of artwork at the Detroit Institute of Art. Kevyn Orr
has stated that the sale of artwork was not in the city’s plans (Haskell
2013).
Florida (2013) argues that bankruptcy may be the reset Detroit needs
and that it may help bolster the city’s nascent revitalization efforts by
stabilizing its ﬁscal management, spurring greater regional cooperation,
and highlighting the need for more equitable and inclusive urban revitalization models. Thus, many questions remain about Detroit’s ﬁscal and
economic future, and both the Rust Belt and the nation will be keenly
observing its progress through bankruptcy, whether it helps propel the
city’s revitalization prospects, and the impact on residents, employees,
and governance structure.
a

Fiscal stress “refers to [ﬁnancial] indicators that merit further attention [and]
may be indicated by budget shortfalls, decreasing cash balances, or increasing
debt loads” (Scorsone and Bateson 2012, p. 2). As Emergency Manager, Orr is
the primary decision-maker and has the power to remove both the Mayor and
Detroit City Council, through both Orr and local ofﬁcials have been working
cooperatively to this point.

trial cities was the end of communist economic ideology in China. The
accession to power of Deng Xiaoping upon the death of Mao Zedong in
1976 gave rise to the so-called Chinese economic miracle, and changed
the future of supremacy within the economic world system (Rodriguez
2011). Whereas previously it had been feasible for a relatively wide
range of midwestern industries to achieve world-level preeminence,
the ascendency of China on global markets placed constraints on the
options for midwestern ﬁrms. Substantial Chinese penetration began in
markets that had been virtually the exclusive domain of U.S. manufacturing. China’s export bundle increasingly overlapped with that of U.S.
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production, and did so at progressively low relative prices. In 1972,
Chinese products were present in only 9 percent of manufacturing product categories, but by 2005 they were present in 85 percent (Schott
2008). With China’s huge and inexpensive labor force, high savings
rates, and investment in infrastructure, its industry began to pose new
and daunting levels of competition for the United States and for other
countries.
The Chinese economic transformation can generally be explained
by microeconomic and institutional reforms based on decentralization,
privatization, and the development of markets (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996),
and by newly adopted macroeconomic policies favoring openness
through increased international trade, direct investment, and integration
into global production networks (Chai 1998; Lardy 2003; Lie, Romilly,
and Song 1997). In the big picture, the macroeconomic openness side
probably has had a larger, more direct impact upon midwestern industrial cities. However, the reform side is in some ways more instructive
for those interested in the renewal of these cities, in that it illustrates
the tremendous economic power that can be unleashed by the proper
market incentives for self-initiative and responsibility.
The reforms were born of the revival of private enterprise following massive state spending on industrialization under Mao, along with
the unimaginable catastrophes brought on by the Great Leap Forward
in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In the aftermath of Mao’s
death, confusion over leadership and the control of political power at
the national level brought opportunities for brave regional governments,
including the well-known Anhui province in eastern China, to establish
some elementary private ownership arrangements. There, for the ﬁrst
time since the rise of centralized communist economic control, farmers
were allowed to meet their quotas and to keep excess production to sell
in markets. This gave farmers the incentives to take risk and to use their
intelligence to improve agricultural productivity.
Optimism for a better future grew massively along with the increases
in agricultural productivity. The gains in productivity in turn stimulated
the development and diffusion of the township and village enterprises
in Anhui province and elsewhere. These enterprises produced a wide
variety of goods and services, such as clothing and other consumer
items. Production decisions began to be made by local actors with
information about area conditions and markets, rather than by commu-
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nist party chiefs in Beijing. Although these local actors did not at ﬁrst
have formal property and ownership rights over their products, they
continued to follow the established Anhui province model, allowing the
participants in township and village enterprises to be residual claimants
on the output of their labor.
Soon, people all over the country were allowed to act as if they
were the owners of any products they created in excess of the minimum
amount set for them by the local leadership. Individuals throughout the
vast Chinese population were thereby incentivized to produce and to
begin saving and investing in their land and themselves. The economic
miracle was thus born of a newfound freedom for the Chinese people to
respond to market incentives, which created a sense of hope for changing some of the stagnant economic conditions created by the past mistakes of communism.
Today’s economic world order provides new and daunting challenges and opportunities in midwestern industrial cities. Looming large
among these challenges is economic competition by the Chinese, as
well as by other newly emerging global economic competitors. Households, ﬁrms, and policymakers within the region will need to recognize
and to act upon the conditions of the twenty-ﬁrst century, not those of
the past period of midwestern industrial dominance.

MIDWESTERN INDUSTRIAL CITIES WITHIN TODAY’S
CHANGING ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER
The post–World War II economy was transformed not only by systemic changes in global-level competition but also, especially of late,
by a combination of population growth and advancements in information and communication technologies. Attendant increases in interdependence throughout social systems have brought new difﬁculties in
understanding the substantive aspects of problems such as the renewal
of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. Population growth brings
greater demand for food, shelter, and other resources. Starting with the
Industrial Revolution in the 1700s, advanced societies have met these
demands by increasing the intensity and scale of production, leading to
higher levels of output, driven primarily by fossil fuels. In turn, indus-
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trialization has had major geopolitical, strategic, economic, and social
implications, some of which bear directly on the prospects for midwestern industrial cities, and some of which could hamper the ability of
the United States and its allies to maintain security (Jackson and Howe
2008).
To be clear, the United States and indeed the entire world is larger
than ever before and still growing. At the turn of the twentieth century,
when midwestern industrial cities were being formed, the population
of the United States was 76 million and the world population was 1.7
billion. Today, the U.S. population is 309 million and the world population is just over 7 billion. According to midrange projections for 2050,
the U.S. population will be 400 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2013)
and the world population will be 9.5 billion (United Nations 2012). All
the additional people will need food, water, clothing, shelter, and other
subsistence items. They will want electricity and public infrastructure
for sewerage and transportation. If and when they become wealthy,
they will also demand luxury goods, sometimes lots of them. All of this
requires resources from nature. Thus, these unprecedented population
sizes pose new risks of resource depletion, problems of resource competition, and increased pressures for interregional trade. Johnson and
Earle (2000, p. 301) also argue that increased population size almost
invariably brings greater opportunities and pressures for increasingly
centralized political and economic control of the means of subsistence,
largely because of risk management, technological complexity, and
trade considerations.
Population Growth, Technology, and the Exploitation of Resources
Growth in population has historically been interdependent with
technological innovation. As populations have continued to increase,
greater levels of industrial production have been required to meet the
sustenance needs of households. This has tended to add to the demand
for agricultural products and for energy and other upstream resources or
inputs to production. Moreover, the way industry and the market economy have met this enlarged demand is by ﬁrst exploiting the easiest-toacquire, most immediately available, and therefore least costly resources.
As these readily accessible resources have become depleted, it has
become increasingly advantageous for industry to turn to less desirable
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and more costly alternatives. Technological innovation is one of the
primary strategies with which industry has exploited these options.
Take as an illustration recent efforts to drill for oil in deep water in
places such as the Gulf of Mexico. Previously the oil and gas industry
exploited the relatively accessible oil resources located in shallower
water and closer to land. Prior to the 1990s, most of the oil came from
shallow water wells, where drilling and production platforms could
stand on stilts anchored to the sea ﬂoor. As one would expect given a
growing population, the demand for oil continued to increase. During
the 1990s, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) navigation technology
became available; this made it possible for drilling rigs and ships to
stay precisely positioned over an oil well using satellite navigation and
microthrusters. Drilling rigs could thus be located and kept in exact
position long enough to lay the many miles of pipes required to exploit
a deepwater oil resource, and without drilling and production platforms
anchored to the sea ﬂoor. Deepwater drilling has thus now taken off in
the Gulf. The easiest-to-acquire, immediately available, and least-costly
oil resources have been largely depleted, and new technologies have
made it possible to exploit previously ignored or inaccessible ones.
New technologies have enabled more people in more households
to meet their sustenance needs and to enjoy their luxury goods. Further advancements in technology have made it possible for industry to
exploit additional resources, facilitating increased population growth,
which has posed problems that require more technological innovation,
allowing even less accessible resources to be utilized. According to
More (2000), this sort of positive feedback loop between population
growth and technological innovation has allowed industrialization to
continue to meet the sustenance needs of growing populations since
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Johnson and Earle (2000,
p. 29) argue that this has been a general tendency in human societies
throughout history, leading to an “upward spiral” of political-economic
integration and more powerful leaders.
The combination of population growth and technological advancement has changed the international calculus of production, consumption, and competition in a way that is unlikely to reverse itself in the lifetime of anyone alive today, and it has brought new forms of risk. Take,
for instance, products that come from rare earth elements, upstream
resources used, among other things, in automobile production, petro-
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leum reﬁning, ﬂat panel displays in cell phones, portable digital versatile discs (DVDs) and laptops, magnets, batteries, generators, medical devices, jet ﬁghter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile
defense, and space-based satellites and communication systems. The
United States used to be self-reliant in domestically produced rare earth
elements, but over the past 15 years it has become 100 percent reliant
on imports, primarily from China, largely because of lower-cost operations there (Humphries 2012).3
Dependence on upstream resources from foreign countries entails
potentially enormous economic and political vulnerabilities. Factors
such as distant natural hazards and accidents, as well as possibly hostile
foreign political and economic decision makers who control upstream
resources, threaten the stability of the production processes upon which
the well-being of segments of local populations depend. Insofar as
global markets function properly, and no hostilities arise, markets will
continue to solve some of these risk problems efﬁciently. However, the
integration of local production processes into global markets means a
loss of local security for the affected ﬁrms and households.
The Need for Innovation and Entrepreneurship
As long as the U.S. and world populations continue to grow, demand
will continue to increase for new technologies that enable improvements in the efﬁciency and effectiveness with which previously inaccessible resources can be utilized. The newly accessible resources will
in turn enable increasing population growth, with its attendant increases
in industrial specialization and trade. This is one big reason why innovation and entrepreneurship really matter. Regardless of whether the
populations of midwestern industrial cities grow, remain stable, or
shrink, rising national and world populations will put greater demand
on resources and cause increased competition in markets. Households
and ﬁrms in these cities can innovate, bring new goods and services to
market, and either successfully compete in these markets or be excluded
from them. Alternatively, households or ﬁrms can migrate in search of
a better set of circumstances, as many have done over the past few
decades.
Innovation, which is arguably the most desirable prospect for ﬁrms
and the households that depend on them, can be seen in the central
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Ohio automotive cluster, which has been able to maintain a competitive advantage over alternative locations that might offer better labor
or input costs by focusing on high-value-added manufacturing. As Hill,
Samuel, and Stewart (2008) explain:
The traditional ways in which manufacturers have tried to add
value to products have been to offer better quality, lower cost or
more speed or dependability in meeting just-in-time demands.
These factors have become business necessities: Delivery reliability, quality and cost are now standard. The new value opportunities
lie in customer experience, supply risk, and product and process
innovation. The quality of the business relationship, the support
for innovation, and the drive to minimize supply risk perhaps best
explain why some OEMS [original equipment manufacturers] are
succeeding and others are struggling. New domestics like Honda
of America Manufacturing [located in central OH] tend to nurture
a close relationship with their chosen suppliers, even providing
access to the production lines in order to improve not only product
but process. Tier 1 suppliers spoke favorably of customer companies that exhibited willingness to work with them on product
development and pricing. This kind of close relationship has real
economic beneﬁt in that it helps reduce risk and spur innovation.
(pp. 12–13)

Technology has always been a driving force for economic change,
and Freeman (1989) classiﬁes the latest shifts attributable to information and communication as the fourth major technological revolution.
This fourth phase adds to the textile innovations of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, railroads in the mid to late nineteenth
century, and electricity as well as the internal combustion engine during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The most recent
transition has accelerated the development of international markets and
powerful multinational and global corporations, and has fostered a new
economic climate that features the rise of the service sector, the loss of
prominence for manufacturing, and widespread consumerism.
Castells (1996) notes that this latest movement has been multidimensional in nature, but that a new paradigm rooted in major advancements within information and communication technologies lies at its
heart. These technological improvements have vastly increased the
integration of the existing world economy and created a new globalized economy. While the previous international economy experienced
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capital accumulation that ﬂowed between countries, the new globalized economy differs in that its “core components have the institutional,
organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time,
or in chosen time, on a planetary scale” (p. 102).
The process of industrial globalization is characterized by connections within national markets via consumers, production processes, and
the expansion of market competition (Wiersema and Bowen 2008). In
turn, consumers and the productive activities of ﬁrms are linked through
globalized industries, which make products and services ever more standardized through increasingly homogenized consumer preferences and
global economies of scale in both manufacturing and research and development (Wiersema and Bowen 2008). During the latter half of the twentieth century, globalization was also aided by government policies favoring deregulation and free market principles (Castells 2000; Singh 1994);
reduced trade barriers and costs of international transportation and communications (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 1999; Krueger 1995); increased
integration of global capital markets (Sachs et al. 1995); greater capital
mobility and reduced transaction costs; and a larger number of ﬁnancial
instruments (Irwin 1996). All of these changes have unalterably affected
the markets within which midwestern industries must compete.
The Outcomes of Globalization
By the 1990s, many developing countries had been brought into the
world economy, with increases in foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and production efﬁciencies (McMillan and Rodrik 2011).
This world market has, among other things, resulted in the breakdown
of the traditional, vertically integrated “Fordist” production process,
which formed the core of the U.S. manufacturing sector in the middle of
the twentieth century (Feenstra 1998), and in the growth of specialization by individual countries on certain phases of production (Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi 1999). The outcomes of globalization have also included
increased levels of regional, national, and global competition (Wiersema
and Bowen 2008), cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD
1987–1999), and the growth of multinational ﬁrms (Wiersema and
Bowen 2008). Collectively, these outcomes have negatively impacted
the economies of midwestern industrial cities, partially by increasing
competition in product markets, and partially by concentrating the cen-
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ters of ﬁnancial control in fewer and fewer world cities, exacerbating
the decline that began during the 1960s and 1970s. Integration of the
developing countries into the world economy all but guarantees that the
population and productive output of the United States in general, and
of midwestern industrial cities in particular, will continue to steadily
shrink as a share of the world’s total (Jackson and Howe 2008).4
Newly structured global-scale corporations have seized upon
before-unseen economies of scale in production, distribution, marketing, and management, giving way to a new level of world consumerism
that was a death knell for many previously thriving midwestern ﬁrms
that did not or could not operate on this scale (Levitt 1983). The global
corporation is a more advanced entity than the multinational corporation, and one that “operates with resolute consistency—at a low relative
cost—as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single entity;
it sells the same things in the same way everywhere” (Levitt 1983, p.
92). While global competition has forced U.S. ﬁrms to be more productive and efﬁcient (Hill, Samuel, and Stewart 2008), these beneﬁts have
not come without high costs, including stagnating wage rates (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993) and lost manufacturing jobs (Levitt 1983),
which contributed to the decline of cities and regions that were once
industrial powerhouses, such as those in the Midwest.
The “new economy” that had more or less fully emerged by the
1990s was integrated as never before in history at a global scale. It
was rooted in global knowledge and ideas, with wealth and job creation
tied to innovation and technology in all sectors of the economy (Acs,
de Groot, and Nijkamp 2002; Atkinson and Gottlieb 2001). Electricity
and the electrical engine helped bolster the industrial-based economy
that allowed cities such as Cleveland and Detroit to prosper during
the early and middle decades of the twentieth century. Similarly, the
new knowledge-centric economy has been driven by microelectronics,
computing, and digital communication advancements, including the
Internet and extensive software developments, which have spurred the
growth of places like Silicon Valley and the Research Triangle (Castells
1996). The infrastructure and transportation linkages that created comparative advantages for many midwestern cities during the early part of
the twentieth century were crucial to the success of their manufacturing industries. But these linkages were less important to burgeoning
knowledge-intensive industries that rely heavily on human capital to
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create a competitive advantage, and that are are primarily service- rather
than production-oriented while competing at a global scale.
Another major component of this “new economy” was the momentous shift from manufacturing to the service sector, leading to a new
industrial structure for many regions within the United States. The
demise of the global dominance of the U.S. manufacturing sector began
in the late twentieth century, during a period when developing countries
experienced signiﬁcant gains in technical skills and closed education
gaps that previously existed with other nations, particularly in industrial
and engineering ﬁelds; this was accomplished by developing infrastructure within universities, technical institutions, and vocational training
schools (Singh 1994). These knowledge and infrastructure gains, coupled with rapid capital mobility, allowed U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms to
exploit the regulatory, trade, wage, and environmental policies present
within many developing countries by either relocating there or subcontracting through ﬁrms within those areas (Feenstra 1998). Furthermore,
changes from recent technological innovations also directly affected
the operations of the manufacturing sector through the expansion of
new products, reduced costs, a reorganization of ﬁrms and industries,
improved structure and efﬁciencies of large factories and ﬁrms, changes
in production systems, ﬂexible specialization, and the introduction of
just-in-time production (Singh 1994).
The multidimensional forces of globalization that propelled a shift
in industrial structure for many regions within the United States also
helped to trigger a new, heavily bifurcated occupational structure, composed of higher-wage information technology jobs and lower-wage
service sector occupations, and the decline of mid-wage, blue-collar
manufacturing positions. A steady drop in both plant and ﬁrm sizes was
seen in manufacturing throughout the United States and other western
industrialized nations, which resulted from a combination of reduced
noncore business activities and new computer-based technologies that
improved productivity (Carlsson 1989).
The transition we have described means a larger-scale, more
integrated, technologically intensive, knowledge-based, and serviceoriented world economic order. As the inﬂuence of China, and to a
lesser degree India and Brazil, continues to grow, the U.S. economic
system in general, and the midwestern economic systems in particular,
will surely play a less dominant role on the world stage. But we do not
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see this as a cause for alarm. There is no convincing evidence that the
inhabitants of cities with greater economic dominance in world markets
fare better than residents in cities with lesser dominance.5 Goals, objectives, and policies oriented toward improved quality of life for residents
rather than attainment or reattainment of economic dominance appear
to offer greater promise for the future of midwestern industrial cities.

NEW STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PROSPERITY
In general terms, the global economic transition is driven by population growth together with technological progress, but in its details it
is complex beyond human understanding. The transition is inseparable
from the myriad of day-to-day decisions by unimaginably large numbers
of individuals throughout the economic world order. The disconcerting and sometimes frustrating experience of uncertainty in the face of
change felt within midwestern industrial cities is no doubt exacerbated
by the belief that these cities will not in the twenty-ﬁrst century regain
the world-level preeminence they enjoyed in the twentieth century.
As a consequence, a sense of social and economic crisis and bewilderment is common today in many midwestern industrial cities and
elsewhere. Within these places, there is a widespread perception of loss
of past prosperity and a diminished feeling of well-being. A frequently
shared view is that things used to be better, and public policies and programs must be devised and implemented to restore previous levels of
afﬂuence. Yet there is little agreement on what speciﬁc actions should
be taken to this end. Public policy proposals differ vastly, not only in
terms of what actions should be taken, but also who should initiate and
take responsibility for them, and who should pay for them. Moreover,
efforts to sort through and interpret the multitudes of inconsistent and at
times even contradictory facts, rules, norms, and interests served by any
given proposal tend to leave people frustrated, sometimes even those of
us who have dedicated our work lives to studying cities and public policies. We are presented with a predicament in which we encounter conceptualizations and relationships among multiple interdependent variables, all of which are necessary to think coherently about the renewal
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of prosperity in these cities, but which when taken together exceed our
unaided mental powers to meaningfully evaluate.
This book is predicated on the perspective that while midwestern
industrial cities will not remain globally preeminent, they need not
necessarily continue to experience diminished prosperity. Although the
time and circumstances since the heyday of midwestern industrial domination have changed and sociotechnical systems have become larger
scale and more complex, the foundations of renewed prosperity may
stem today, much as they always have, from a vibrant market economy.
Capitalistic markets are a central phenomenon of modern life. They,
and the institutional frameworks that enable and sustain them, such as
the U.S. Constitution, are arguably more than a little responsible for the
initial rise of prosperity in industrial cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The Importance of the Market
Capitalistic markets are in no small measure the cause of wealth and
productivity increases and are the vehicle that has made a much broader
array of goods and services accessible to many more people than ever
before. Capitalistic markets and their institutional frameworks have
been the source of technological advancements, a previously unimaginable range of choice of occupation and lifestyle, and unprecedented
levels of happiness and well-being enjoyed by a relatively large percentage of the population today (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, Nelson
1990, Ridley 2010). Perhaps most importantly, these markets, together
with their enabling institutions, have arguably given rise to unprecedented access to more and better information. Consequently, examination of these markets, their institutional frameworks, and their effects
on prosperity from various political and disciplinary perspectives (and
from perspectives that transcend normal disciplinary boundaries) is too
important to be left only to economists and public policymakers, largely
because they involve a great deal more than what we typically think of
as “economic” and “political” issues.
Of course, not everyone has conﬁdence that unfettered markets and
free institutions alone can or will renew prosperity in today’s midwestern industrial cities, especially without exacerbating other problems,
such as distributional inequities between class and race. Indeed, the
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concept of a capitalist market is merely a model or abstraction from
reality that helps us to represent and grasp some key elements of our
societies and their relationships to one another. Moreover, this model
may not be an altogether adequate one. It neglects to consider a range
of political and social realities that depart from premises of consumer
choice and decentralized decision making. For instance, it does not provide guidance on how and when societies should regulate monopolies
or provide infrastructure. It tends to come up short as to how or when
societies should respond to problems of extreme income inequality and
inequity. It provides no reason to have compassion for ﬁrms that go
under or for individual households that have been placed at risk for
homelessness and unemployment as a result of market efﬁciencies.
The ideal type of capitalistic market makes certain assumptions
about private property, exchange between legally free individuals, and
the production and distribution of goods and services through mutual
understandings and agreements between transacting parties to market
transactions. The assumptions about private property, in turn, presuppose the existence of governmental authority to design and establish
laws and property rights, and police power for the enforcement of those
laws and rights. The assumptions about exchange between legally free
individuals presuppose that people possess certain rights that meaningfully distinguish them from serfs or slaves, and that labor is not forcibly
extracted from them through the exercise of superior political authority or power. The assumptions about the production and distribution of
goods presuppose that decisions to exchange are not made by custom
or through the coercive use of power by any sort of centralized authority. In turn, all of these assumptions are open to question, if in no other
way than in their applicability in any given situation or set of situations,
including the renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities.
The Role of Public Policy
Nevertheless, some suppositions must always be made prior to any
systematic examination of a phenomenon. In this book, the assumption
throughout all of the individual contributions is that while capitalistic
markets provide the only tried and tested method of achieving prosperity, they have certain imperfections for which public policies are
at times necessary. Furthermore, all of the contributions are consistent
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with the following propositions: that augmented production (rather than
consumption) and exchange of goods and services within the context of
free institutions offer the best long-term solution to the social and economic problems of Rust Belt regions;6 that the development of renewed
productive capacity in these regions will in the ﬁrst instance require
up-front investments of time, attention and energy, and in the second
instance ﬁnancial capital; that many of the most important resources
and factors in the production of capital goods are not and will never be
completely mobile with respect to space and time; and that therefore net
increases in regional prosperity necessitate urban institutions, public
policies, practices, and cultures willing and able to divert into enhanced
production input resources that would otherwise go to goods and services that are immediately consumed.
All of the contributions assume conﬁdence in public policies and
institutions supportive of innovation, entrepreneurship, specialization,
and trade as the best route to renewed regional prosperity. But just as
markets have certain limitations, so do public policies. Not all public
policies are conducive to renewed prosperity; indeed, as the following
chapters discuss, even some of those public policies advocated in terms
of their positive effects on midwestern regional economic development
may do more harm than good.
We hope that the chapters in this book can avoid getting narrowly
associated with labels such as “conservative” or “liberal.” The focus is
on how older industrial regional systems really work and what can and
should be (and what cannot and should not be) done through both public
institutions and private markets in efforts to improve their performance.
How might urban policy be used to renew and update capitalist markets
so as to put old industrial regions back on the road to prosperity? What
mix of market versus nonmarket allocation mechanisms is optimal?
How can and do free people in such regions, living in democratic capitalist systems, solve problems to meet the needs and wants of others, so
as to turn their perceptions of scarcity and loss into ones of abundance?
Reframing Prosperity
When thinking of prosperous places, we may invoke images that
translate to a high quality of life and living standards, such as vibrant
artistic, musical, and literary communities; entertainment districts with
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a relatively high number of restaurants, bars, and cultural institutions;
an environment with great parks, green spaces, and recreational activities; accessible, convenient, and affordable transportation; good schools
and universities; and low rates of poverty, with high levels of employment. This is not an exhaustive list, nor are these characteristics only
found in places such as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles.
It seems to us that an important component of prosperity centers
on reframing this concept. The economic dominance that was previously associated with many midwestern industrial cities is unlikely to
reemerge, especially in light of the previously discussed transitions and
the inﬂuence of growing economies such as China and India. However, it is important to note that prosperity need not be exclusively tied
with economic dominance. Rather, the idea of a prosperous city is that
most if not all of the people who live in it have good lives. In the spirit
of Amartya Sen (1999), the people in a prosperous city have the freedom to live the kinds of lives they value. They see themselves as active
participants in shaping their own futures and by taking initiative and
accepting the responsibility for themselves and their actions, they have
the opportunity to better themselves and the prospects faced by their
children. There are numerous examples of urban and regional economies that have attained high levels of prosperity without economic preeminence, and there is an abundance of knowledge available to help
to turn the problems currently facing midwestern industrial cities into
opportunities. This book is all about such knowledge.
The concept of prosperity, which is traditionally linked to wealth
and measured in terms of income, unemployment, and poverty rates,
may be meaningfully and fruitfully reexamined with a more comprehensive approach, one that deemphasizes consumptive aspects and
focuses on productive ones, as well as on the social, psychological, and
health-related components (Bergmann 2010; Fodor 2001, 2012; Hamilton 2003; Jackson 2009; Sen 1999). In particular, the emerging policies
and practices of smart decline and right-sizing are working to address
the unique realities facing formerly dominant industrial cities, which
include planning for fewer people, buildings, and land uses, as well as
better aligning physical landscapes to meet the needs of future populations (Hollander 2011; Popper and Popper 2002; Schilling and Logan
2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that slower-growing metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), in terms of population, outperform higher-
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growth MSAs on many measures of prosperity, including income and
poverty rates (Fodor 2012).
Within the realm of midwestern industrial cities, achieving prosperity will require the leadership within cities and regions to broaden
their focus from past models targeted at economic dominance and heavily focused on short-term economic development strategies. While the
consideration of short-term strategies inclusive of business attraction,
retention, and expansion is warranted, these transactions need to be
linked to strengthening and improving the assets within the region’s
larger portfolio of products, businesses, and people.7 Past actions of the
leadership within many cities and regions have tended to be based on the
overriding importance and inevitability of increasing globalization and
the argument that, to be competitive in world markets, cities must compete for footloose industry not tied to any particular location or country,
which can relocate in response to local economic conditions. Striving
to succeed in globally competitive markets at all costs has proved less
than successful for many places and has served to intensify levels of
inequality among cities and among social strata within cities. Many
of the economic development strategies adopted in efforts to compete
for footloose investment tend to be short-term in nature and to focus
on immediate needs as well as politically marketable achievements,
such as job creation and growth of tax bases. While these approaches
may produce some desired outcomes, they fail to address the longerterm components of a comprehensive economic development strategy,
which moves beyond selling the existing assets of a region and toward
improving, strengthening, and changing assets for long-term prosperity.
This book is predicated upon the assumption that renewed prosperity is feasible in midwestern industrial cities if (and only if) good decisions are made within them by individuals with inﬂuence in both the
public and private sectors. Moreover, restructured public policy, especially microeconomic policy, is essential, as well as increased levels of
international business exchange, especially with the Chinese.
The Industrial Revolution changed the economic world order by
giving prominence to cities, regions, and nations that could adapt their
governance structures and the organizational processes through which
they made collective choices toward the power of free markets and private, personal industry, and innovation. By empowering the individuals within local economic systems, the Industrial Revolution empow-
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ered the cities, regions, and nations it affected. It led to a system in
which nothing will improve the fortunes of ﬁrms and individuals more
effectively and efﬁciently than public and private sector decisions that
increase production of the goods and services people value and the
exchange of such goods and services in free and competitive markets.
This is as true for midwestern industrial cities today as it was during
their inception, as it was for Chinese cities during their recent economic
miracle, and as it is for cities throughout the global economic system.

Notes
1. Measured in constant 2005 dollars (http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/
usgdp/result.php).
2. GATT later became the World Trade Organization (WTO), which today sets the
ground rules for international commerce.
3. Such considerations have recently given rise to the President’s National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-ofﬁce/2012/01/25/fact-sheet-national-strategy-global-supply-chain-security).
4. The rate of growth of the U.S. population, along with the rates of growth of other
advanced industrial nations such as Japan and Germany, is slowing down somewhat relative to the rate of growth of the world population overall. Partially this
relative shrinkage is attributable to the high growth rates in Africa and India. Partially it is also attributable to fertility declines that have historically been found to
go hand in hand with the development of wealthy and advanced industrial economies (Guinnane 2011). Various theories of fertility decline have been brought
forward to explain population growth rate declines, including ones that attribute
them to factors such as the availability of contraceptives, women’s decisions to
postpone childbirth, the relatively high cost of raising children in advanced industrial economies, and more women choosing to remain in the workforce rather
than have children (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Bryant 2007; Galor 2012;
Guinnane 2011).
5. Indeed, the “global-city hypothesis” (Friedmann 1986) asserts that the most economically dominant cities are especially prone to extremes of inequality.
6. For a thoughtful, stimulating, and informative argument that far from being the
path to prosperity, society’s orientation toward consumption is at the heart of our
social ills, see Hamilton (2003).
7. This conceptualization of a regional economic development framework stems
from multiple lectures and discussions with Ned Hill.
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Can Tax Expenditures Stimulate
Growth in Rust Belt Cities?
Benjamin Y. Clark
Cleveland State University

An oft-used arrow in the quiver of those overseeing local and
regional economic development is the incentivization of tax expenditures (public investment via tax abatements and credits, infrastructure improvements, and workforce training). Most states and
communities, including those in the Rust Belt, participate in the
game to some extent, leading to competition for promised jobs and
economic activity. Despite the willingness to offer such incentives,
there is at best scant evidence that these incentives are an efﬁcient
use of public funds.

Why do some cities thrive economically and others sputter and
decline? Are success and failure dependent on luck, or is there something more profound at play? While there are many ways to address
these issues, and certainly many contributing factors, this chapter will
examine one part of the question: Can tax expenditures play a role in
stimulating the growth of these cities? Consideration of the role of tax
rates, rather than tax expenditures, is also important but is outside the
scope of this chapter. Instead, the discussion will focus on how and why
state and local governments use tax expenditures to attempt to improve
the conditions of their communities.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that tax expenditure policy is a
highly inconsistent use of public funds. Local governments are at the
mercy of a larger macroeconomic environment, over which they have
little inﬂuence (Rubin and Rubin 1987). The lack of control leaves
localities with few tools to create positive change in their communities.
The device that these governments often turn to is tax expenditures.
As will be indicated, unfortunately, tax expenditures have been dem-
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onstrated for the most part to play little-to-no role in positive economic
development. Further, despite this evidence, politicians continue to see
tax expenditures as one of the most important options available to them.
Using a case study of an intraregional corporate headquarters move,
this chapter will investigate how competition among jurisdictions transfers wealth, yet creates few, if any, beneﬁts. It then explores how cities, counties, and other countries are dealing with the competition for
jobs that leads to tax expenditures and associated movements of wealth.
Finally, there will be a brief examination of some alternative economic
development tools that do not result in the large shifts of wealth associated with tax expenditures.

WHAT ARE TAX EXPENDITURES?
The bundle of tools that state and local government ofﬁcials use
within the tax code to try to encourage development are called tax
expenditures; they may also be viewed simply as spending that has been
initiated through the tax code. Surrey (1970, p. 706) describes them as
“special provisions . . . which represent government expenditures made
through [the tax] system to achieve various social and economic objectives.” The state of Ohio’s Executive Budget describes tax expenditures
in the following way:
Both tax expenditures and direct budgetary expenditures incur a
cost to the state in order to accomplish public policy goals. Unlike
direct budgetary expenditures, unless there is a pre-existing termination date, tax expenditures may remain in effect indeﬁnitely
with little or no scrutiny by policy makers. In most states, tax
expenditures are not analyzed and reviewed as part of the budget
appropriation process; Ohio is one of the relatively few states that
do produce a tax expenditure report in conjunction with the state
budget. It is probably safe to assume that if it were not for this
report, the ﬁscal impact of the various Ohio tax expenditure provisions would not be systematically estimated (Testa 2011, p. 1).

Tax expenditures include tax deductions, tax abatements, and tax
credits. Two examples are the federal mortgage interest deduction and
hybrid car tax credits. While there is a general belief that the original
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goal of the mortgage deduction was to encourage homeownership, the
subsidy came about largely by accident (Lowenstein 2006). Though the
origin may have been accidental, the inability of opponents in Congress
to rid the tax code of this tax expenditure could largely be tied to the
myth that it is the backbone of increasing homeownership. The beneﬁts
generated from the mortgage interest deduction accrue to those that
own homes, have mortgages, and itemize their tax returns—which ends
up being about 37 million people, or about half of the individuals who
own homes (Lowenstein 2006). It does not directly beneﬁt renters or
even the lower-income homeowners who do not make enough money
to itemize their deductions.
In a less accidental turn of events, the early adopters of the Toyota
Prius received tax credits the year they purchased the car. The size of
this hybrid car credit varied from year to year, but it provided a direct
subsidy, through the tax system, that encouraged the ownership of fuelefﬁcient automobiles. And like spending on roads or other goods and
services, all tax expenditures are transfers of resources from one group
to a designated priority; however, in the case of tax expenditures, the
wealth transfers are manifested in lower tax payments for select groups
or ﬁrms.
Tax expenditures are found at all levels of government. State and
local governments have been using tax expenditures to lure and develop
businesses since colonial times—in fact, Alexander Hamilton was the
beneﬁciary of a tax expenditure by New Jersey in 1791 to locate a factory in the state (Buss 2001). Despite the long history of tax expenditures in the United States, it was not until after the end of World War II
that their use gained signiﬁcant traction. The changing political moods
of the 1980s and 1990s further fueled the practice, leading many to see
tax expenditures as “free money,” by simplifying them as foregone revenues rather than a true expense.
The ﬂawed view of tax expenditures is problematic for budgeting
and makes ﬁscal policy evaluation exceedingly difﬁcult. Some states,
such as Ohio (where the case study in this chapter takes place), do try
and estimate the budget impact of tax expenditures. Further, the evidence, even if it may not be precise, presents a story of a big budget hole, $7.4 billion in ﬁscal year 2012 and $7.8 billion in ﬁscal year
2013 of “foregone revenues” or tax expenditures for Ohio (Testa 2011,
p. 9). Taken together, at more than $15 billion, Ohio would not have
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had a deﬁcit to work around for the biannual budget for ﬁscal years
2012–2013 and would have actually been in surplus for both years. The
magnitudes for local governments will clearly be much smaller, but the
comparative impacts can be just as large.
States often “prefer not to evaluate tax incentive programs in any
way,” thus avoiding the difﬁcult question of their effectiveness (Buss
2001, p. 93). Rigorous evaluations are often requested when direct
expenditure subsidies are provided to individuals or businesses (i.e.,
grants, food stamps, welfare checks), but they are frequently not
required when tax expenditures are being considered (Buss 2001). This
results in a huge void in our understanding of their impact on the ﬁscal condition at all levels of government. The state of Ohio report on
tax expenditures speciﬁcally states that it “offers no conclusions about
the validity of those expenditures. The responsibility of evaluating the
expenditure’s merit with regard to public policy belongs jointly to the
General Assembly and the Governor” (Testa 2011, p. 1).
Neither of the preceding parties has offered a comprehensive indepth analysis of the effectiveness of these programs. This demonstrates that, even in a state that has made efforts to actually account for
and report on the size of the tax expenditure budget, there still remains
a huge hole in our understanding of how effective these policies are at
achieving their goals. More broadly, however, tax expenditures decrease
the transparency of government budgets. Tax expenditures “allow politicians to appear to be reducing the size of government (reducing taxes)
while actually increasing it (increasing spending)” (Steuerle 2000, p.
1639).
At the local level, tax abatements are one of the most common
types of tax expenditures. Tax abatements are the product of a process
that is both bureaucratic and political in nature and result in lowering
the property tax burden on speciﬁc parcels of land. The political aspect
of tax abatements demonstrates how they are meant for more than just
tax relief, to encourage redevelopment of an area or economic growth
more broadly (Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn 2005). Finding a comprehensive study of a state’s local tax expenditures is not possible. States
that allow tax expenditures at the local level have “established the ﬁscal
framework under which local governments operate, including determination of the tax options available to them and the extent to which those
governments may adopt exceptions to the general structure” (Mikesell
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2002, p. 41). While some states track major local taxes, “local tax
expenditures are not detailed to particular local governments” (p. 41).
What this all means for state and local governments is that they need to
allocate more resources to investigate the effectiveness of tax expenditures if they are going to use them—something that just is not happening right now.
Why Are Tax Expenditures Being Used? Are They Effective?
Poor and rich cities alike have been employing tax expenditures to
attempt to spur economic development across the country, and not just
in the Rust Belt. The strategy is used to encourage development and
attract new jobs, under the assumption that if net taxes (taxes minus all
tax expenditures) in one city are higher than in its neighbor’s, jobs will
ﬂow to the jurisdiction with the lower net tax rate.
Unfortunately, this generally accepted and overly simplistic notion
is not consistent with the evidence. A ﬁrm’s decision to locate in a community (leading to an inﬂow of jobs to that community) is far more
complex than making a comparison of taxes across jurisdictions (Chi
and Hoffmann 2000; Wassmer 2007). The location decision-making
process falls under a much broader concept of business climate—
although there is signiﬁcant disagreement over how we can actually
measure climate—but it typically includes the quality of life, government policies, and the quality and cost of resources (Buss 2001). Some
business climate measures amount to seeking out the state with the lowest wages, taxes, and utility cost, paired with the weakest regulations,
the absence of a unionized workforce, and high subsidies for capital
(p. 98). However, it is clear that if that were the only possible determinant for ﬁrm location, the states with the nation’s highest tax burdens,
such as New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, would be without
employers, and that is clearly not the case.
What does have a clearer connection to a ﬁrm’s location decision
is the linkage between the levels of revenue collected and the services
provided by a jurisdiction. Consequently, the bundle of features a ﬁrm
seeks out, including tax rates and expenditures, involves not just the
taxes, but the taxes and level of service provided (Buss 2001). As with
any sort of investment, ﬁrms seek ones (in this case, in their location)
that will bring the biggest “bang for their buck,”where most are willing
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to pay a higher tax rate if the service they are receiving is also higher
quality or more comprehensive.
The Impact of Tax Expenditures
Ideally, investments yield positive returns. Similarly, the appropriate use of tax expenditures “should produce economic beneﬁts greater
than [their] costs. An even better [tax expenditure] is one that is costeffective, meaning that it delivers more beneﬁts for a given cost than
other similarly targeted initiatives” (Weiner 2009, p. 6). Tax expenditures, particularly those targeted at large ﬁrms, have failed “to produce
signiﬁcant net beneﬁts for their host communities, calling into question
the high-stakes bidding war over jobs and investment” (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 78). Weiner (2009) shows that “for each dollar of credit
granted, states usually collect less than one dollar in new tax revenue.
Thus most credits do not appear to ‘pay for themselves.’ It is therefore
important to understand the beneﬁts states are gaining for the revenues
they are giving up” (p. 4).
The discussion of beneﬁts foregone is often one that is not had by
states and local governments. A great deal of effort goes into crafting
tax expenditure policies, for little or no payoff, while much of what
affects local/regional economic growth (labor costs, skilled workers,
energy cost, natural resources, or climate) is beyond the control of these
governments (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, and Tannenwald 1997).
When a government entices a large ﬁrm to move to a particular
jurisdiction with a host of incentives, including tax expenditures, “the
location of a large company can crowd out other economic activity by
shifting sales from existing ﬁrms, congesting local infrastructure, and
raising prices in factor markets” (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). A large
organization locating in an area can create a diminishing return (Fox and
Murray 2004; Porter 1999). This may come about because a large ﬁrm
may choose to locate in an area without other signiﬁcant competition in
order to dominate that place and discourage other large companies from
locating there (Fox and Murray 2004); these businesses may actually be
hampering further economic development, rather than encouraging it.
Examples of this can be seen in Mercedes-Benz locating in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama (where the ﬁrm claims to be the “state’s largest exporter, with more than $1 billion exported each year to countries
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throughout the world” [MBUSI 2011]); and BMW in Spartanburg,
South Carolina (where the company asserts that it is “one of several
powerful engines driving the state’s growth” [BMW 2011]); and Volkswagen in Chattanooga, Tennessee (where the “plant is expected to generate $12 billion in income growth and an additional 9,500 jobs related
to the project” [Volkswagen Group of America 2011]); and Kia Motors
locating in West Point, Georgia (where the “project is the largest in history for the State of Georgia” [KIA Motors 2011]).
The incentive packages that these ﬁrms received were substantial,
but they were only a small part of the ﬁrms’ decision-making process.
Ultimately, the data on ﬁrm site selection show that “the location of a
large ﬁrm has no measurable net economic effect on local economies”
if it is examined holistically (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). This means
that the aggressive effort to recruit ﬁrms “fails to create positive private sector gains and likely does not generate signiﬁcant public revenue
gains either” (p. 79). This can be interpreted to mean that the siting of
a ﬁrm, often lauded as a major “win” by state and local development
agents, may not actually have the great effect promised. Because “there
is little evidence of positive or negative growth impacts associated with
the location of large ﬁrms,” local governments should instead try to
make more cost-effective economic strategic moves (p. 91).
The big “win,” as seen in high-proﬁle “mega-events” like the Super
Bowl and Olympics, which cities constantly ﬁght over, also provides
very little help in spurring economic development. Activities like the
Super Bowl or Olympics “have no real effects on spending in host communities,” a result that can in part be blamed on the “crowding-out phenomenon,” where long-term economic activity and investments lose
out to short-term jobs (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79).
Distributional Issues
The intent of many property tax abatements is to draw employers to
an area that might have otherwise been ignored; this can help to create
conditions that improve economic equality. When the tax expenditures
are constrained only to high-poverty and high-unemployment areas,
research suggests that tax expenditures can provide a disproportionate
beneﬁt to minorities and low-income individuals (Bartik 2007; Peters
and Fisher 2004; Wassmer 2007; Wassmer and Anderson 2001).
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However, most applications of economic-development-oriented tax
expenditures create an environment of inequality (Bradbury, Kodrzycki,
and Tannenwald 1997; Chi and Hoffmann 2000; Goss and Phillips
1999; Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras 2010; Kocieniewski 2011; Reese
1991; Reese and Sands 2006; Wassmer 2007). Tax expenditure policies
tend to exacerbate inequality across a region, rather than abate it. The
wealthy jurisdictions can afford tax expenditures that the poor ones cannot, which can lead to the rich getting richer (more jobs and economic
development) and the poor jurisdictions getting poorer (Dewar 1998;
Goss and Phillips 1999; Reese 1991; Reese and Sands 2006). This is
not to say that poor cities are not using tax expenditures, but that these
expenditures often put additional stress on communities in an already
difﬁcult ﬁnancial position (Rubin and Rubin 1987). For rich and poor
cities alike, these incentives rarely provide the beneﬁt they promise,
and those beneﬁts they do provide rarely exceed the costs (Reese and
Sands 2006; Wassmer and Anderson 2001).
Moreover, the beneﬁts associated with tax expenditures tend not to
accumulate where policymakers state they are supposed to accummulate (which is often in economically distressed areas). Goss and Phillips
(2001), for example, ﬁnd that “business tax incentives have had a positive effect on economic growth in low-unemployment counties, but not
in high-unemployment counties” (p. 237) and “tended to be undertaken
in areas with historically higher investment activity, thus contributing to
greater economic performance differences among counties in the state”
(p. 217). Tax expenditures have often been “criticized because they are
only effective at the margins in business location decisions” (Reese and
Sands 2006, p. 72). Negative relationships have been found between
some types of tax expenditures and the improvement of a jurisdiction’s
economic health spanning a 20-year period. While this does not mean
that in all instances tax expenditures will have a negative impact on a
jurisdiction, the research indicates that by not using tax expenditures
jurisdictions are not hindering their growth (Reese and Sands 2006).
Tax expenditures may foster inequality by favoring one industry
over another. A great number of tax expenditures concentrate exclusively on manufacturing, but in the process end up ignoring other
important sectors such as business services, health care, and ﬁnance
(Buss 2001).
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At the federal level, the corporate tax system can rightly be considered both uneven and highly complex (Kocieniewski 2011), in large
part because of tax expenditures that beneﬁt individual ﬁrms or speciﬁc industries. The inequity can spread to an intra-industry inequality, where two companies in the same industry, producing very similar
products, have different tax rates. This is often a result of the larger ﬁrm
having more power and wealth, allowing it to have its effective rates
reduced through new tax expenditures. At the federal level, tax expenditures that “intentionally beneﬁt speciﬁc companies or industries, cost
an estimated $100 billion more a year” (Kocieniewski 2011). However,
Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras (2010) show that when controlling for
the location of tax expenditures, neither distressed areas nor speciﬁc
industries were seen to beneﬁt, and that instead tax expenditures (or
incentives) were distributed in a pattern that “largely reﬂects the local
industrial mix” (p. 155). This same study did ﬁnd disparities between
urban and rural areas, where the beneﬁts of tax expenditures accrued at
higher rates to rural than to urban locales.
Many who support interjurisdictional competition claim that it
reduces taxes for all competing jurisdictions. This assertion, however,
is only valid when jurisdictions “are similarly endowed with taxable
resources and face similar ﬁscal challenges” (Bradbury, Kodrzycki,
and Tannenwald 1997, p. 12). Reality tells us that jurisdictions within
a region are rarely in the same resource/ﬁscal position, because some
“jurisdictions are continual winners and others perpetual losers in the
competitive process, especially in the absence of equalizing aid from a
higher level of government” (p. 12).
To make matters worse, most states do not have any written guidelines for determining how and when tax expenditures to business are
offered (Chi and Hofmann 2000). This can result in inequality in the
distribution of tax expenditures and make evaluation of the programs
very difﬁcult. Iowa, seeing some of the problems in Minnesota, where
“tax incentives tend to be focused on those areas already primed to do
well,” limited its tax expenditure program to “business investment in
areas of the state lagging in economic performance” (Goss and Phillips
1999, p. 226). Focusing on a particular socioeconomic group does not
necessarily mean that the tax expenditures will provide a greater beneﬁt
than cost, but, in terms of creating policy aimed at alleviating inequality, Iowa at least targets communities in greatest need.
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Information and Competition
If tax expenditures are only effective at the margins, as Reese and
Sands (2006) indicate, a signiﬁcant information asymmetry problem
arises for local jurisdictions. They are faced with a task of determining
which of those employers seeking the tax expenditures are the marginal
cases and which are just seeking additional rents (or proﬁt seeking) for
a decision they have already made. Unfortunately, these governments
have no good way to determine which cases are marginal and which are
not. Traditionally, the outcome of negotiations between a ﬁrm seeking a
tax expenditure and a local government depends on the relative power
of the respective sides (Byrnes, Marvel, and Sridhar 1999). If a jurisdiction has little to lose if the ﬁrm leaves, it can certainly try and call the
ﬁrm’s bluff, wait it out, and hope for the best.
In Ohio, as the ability to offer tax abatements extends to more jurisdictions, the competition among these areas leads to larger abatements
(Cassell and Turner 2010). From 1993 to 2009, nearly half of the 2,059
tax expenditures in Ohio that were approved by the state Tax Credit
Authority “were terminated or canceled before completion” (Lieb
2011). The failure rate to which the state of Ohio is admitting is simply
pointing out that these projects were terminated or cancelled, not that
they were actually successful in creating the jobs or economic gains that
they set out to attain. The current year projection puts tax expenditures
approved in one year for eight northeast Ohio (the area that includes
Cleveland/Akron/Canton) projects at $49.5 million over a period of 15
years (Schoenberger 2011). This results in large sums of money being
promised for projects over the long term, which come with very high
incompletion rates.
While these risky moves may be good for ﬁrms, the evidence that tax
expenditures provide a net beneﬁt is not very strong. Interjurisdictional
competition is a zero-sum game, in which companies pit neighboring
cities against one another for the best deal, and can hardly be described
as good for development across jurisdictions. The consequences are the
“job gains” for one city and “job losses” for its neighbor, a strategy
that does not provide net beneﬁts to the region. And, in many cases,
the businesses have no intention of moving but just want to get a better tax expenditure deal in their current location (Lynch, Fishgold, and
Blackwood 1996). Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1998) note that “acqui-
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escing to the rent-seeking behavior of ﬁrms leads to socially suboptimal
outcomes” (p. 140). The best case tax expenditures scenario, say Peters
and Fisher (2004), “is that incentives work about 10 percent of the time,
and are simply a waste of money the other 90 percent” (p. 32).

IF TAX EXPENDITURES ARE A LARGELY INEFFECTIVE
TOOL, WHY ARE THEY USED SO FREQUENTLY?
If tax expenditures aimed at economic development have at best a
10 percent success rate, and are a waste of money the other 90 percent
of the time, why do governments continue to use them? The reason
appears to be political, rather than their economic value. Although nothing is inherently wrong with a strategy based on politics, tax expenditures programs are frequently sold to the public based on their effectiveness. It is time that politicians acknowledge that these are frequently
political actions, not economic ones.
One reason tax expenditures are used so commonly is that politicians frequently do not view them as actual outlays of government
revenues. The ﬁght over what constitutes a tax expenditure and what
constitutes a tax can pit long-time ideological allies against each other.
For instance, in 2011, there was a battle over eliminating ethanol tax
expenditures, which, coincidentally, were commonly referred to as subsidies in the media. Grover Norquist, iconic antitax champion and head
of the group Americans for Tax Reform, was pitted against Senator Tom
Coburn, an antitax conservative from Oklahoma, who was himself a
signatory to Norquist’s famous antitax pledge. Norquist claimed that
the elimination of ethanol tax expenditures was an increase in taxes for
farmers and producers. In his view, a tax expenditure was not an expenditure at all but a part of the tax rate, so that any attempt to eliminate a
tax expenditure was actually a tax increase. On the other hand, Senator
Coburn rightly saw tax expenditures for what they are: spending. As
a result, two natural allies publicly opposed one another because they
could not agree on what constitutes an expenditure. This is problematic
for the government’s ability to manage its ﬁnances and budget.
While two self-deﬁned ﬁscal conservatives have fought over what
is and is not a tax expenditure, the broader political marketplace is even
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murkier. Beyond the debate over the deﬁnition of tax expenditures, our
political climate in recent decades has made new expenditures very difﬁcult to justify. This has led to expenditures masquerading as tax cuts,
and policymakers pushing for tax expenditures because they are more
politically palatable than additional spending.
Job and industry mobility within the United States and internationally, or at least the perception of that mobility, increases the pressure to
do something (Wolman and Spitzley 1996). However, it appears that
the fear of relocation is not necessarily based on veriﬁable reality. Lee
(2008) ﬁnds “a relatively small role for relocation in explaining the
disparity of manufacturing employment growth rates across states” (p.
436). Also, ﬁrms moving from one jurisdiction to another, while not
uncommon, cannot be explained by the incentive programs trying to
keep or pull them to or from a jurisdiction. In some situations, these
incentive programs are even positively correlated with a loss of jobs
or shuttering of factories. This may just indicate that state and local
governments are acting too late to keep ﬁrms that are moving jobs, but
it may also show that tax expenditures simply are not what drives the
decision to locate or relocate. A number of tax expenditures, particularly those for capital purchases, actually have a negative impact on
employment because they are making the machinery and equipment
that replace laborers cheaper, resulting in layoffs (Lee 2008).
Cutbacks in state and federal intergovernmental aid are putting burdens on local governments to do more with less (Wassmer 2007). At
the heart of the $1.4 billion budget impasse that shut down the state
of Minnesota in July 2011 was more than $400 million in cuts to local
governments (Dunbar 2011). Ohio’s 2011–2013 biennial budget cut
its support to local governments by nearly half a billion dollars (Marshall 2011). The challenges that many local governments face are not
just found in shrinking intergovernmental aid, but also in the ways and
amounts of money that can be raised. Here again politics is a primary
agent. State lawmakers are compelled to do something, which often
results in the institution of property tax restrictions that further hinder the ability of local governments to raise money. These cutbacks
and restrictions cause local governments to seek out alternative ways to
redevelop their economic situation. The result has often been the use of
tax expenditures policy, “not because it was effective but because it was
a remarkably easy path to follow, one that allowed [politicians] to claim
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they were mounting a serious attack on the economic problems of the
city” (Swanstrom 1985, p. 149). The tax expenditures allow politicians
“to take a bow for causing some massive private project” or “point to
towering skyscrapers downtown and say, ‘without my help these never
would have come about’” (pp. 149–150).
Often it appears as though “the solutions not only precede the
problems, they may supersede them and provide their own motivation” (Rubin and Rubin 1987, p. 57). As a consequence, short-sighted
public ofﬁcials trying to maximize reelection probabilities “may offer
more incentives than required. That is, the closer the negotiation with
business is to an election, the less chance the government ofﬁcial will
take in ‘losing’ the business, and the more likely the incentive package
will be larger” (Byrnes, Marvel, and Sridhar 1999, p. 809). To counteract these self-serving political aspirations, adding citizen involvement
could be beneﬁcial in tax expenditure negotiations with ﬁrms.
Another element of the political calculation is the number of jobs
the projects supported by tax expenditures will create. Both politicians and ﬁrms have a motivation to overestimate job numbers to justify spending. Gabe and Kraybill (2002) ﬁnd that tax expenditure programs result in ﬁrms on average overestimating the number of jobs the
tax incentives will create by 28.5 jobs with each facility’s expansion.
Their results “suggest that [tax expenditure] incentives do not result
in the creation of more jobs than would have been created without the
programs” (p. 724). Again, politicians are willing enablers of these
approaches because they want to be seen doing “something” and want
to be able to take credit for beneﬁts—if any materialize. Voters are left
without sufﬁcient information to do post hoc evaluations of these programs, uncertain if the jobs were created as a result of the tax credits
or not. The lack of an analysis of the promises made by the companies
creates an incentive for these organizations to overestimate the beneﬁts
and to garner larger tax credits.
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THE CASE OF BROOKLYN, OHIO, AND
AMERICAN GREETINGS
The case of American Greetings (AG), the largest publicly traded
greeting card company in the United States, provides a real-world
example of the implementation of tax expenditures at the state and local
levels in an attempt to keep or lure a ﬁrm. The predicament of Brooklyn,
Ohio, a Cleveland suburb and site of AG’s corporate headquarters, is all
too familiar. In May of 2009, Brooklyn faced the challenge of choosing
between drastic cutbacks to services and a tax increase in order to balance its budget. The citizens of Brooklyn voted, albeit narrowly, to raise
the local income tax rate from 2.0 to 2.5 percent (Noga 2009). Between
the time that this tax levy was put onto the ballot and the time that voters approved the measure, employers Key Bank, Hugo Boss, and AG
all announced layoffs from their local facilities. In response, the city’s
leaders pledged that they would reduce the property tax millage from
6.9 to 5.9 if the income tax rate were increased, as it eventually was
(Noga 2009). The total property tax rate for a Brooklyn property owner
would be 75.9 mills for those without exemptions, and considerably
lower for those who qualiﬁed for exemptions.
What transpired after the voters of Brooklyn approved the tax
increase is a story that many cities face every year: AG threatened to
move its headquarters out of the city because of the tax increase. The
company stated that although it understood Brooklyn’s predicament, it
was “disappointed” in the action taken by the city (Cho 2010). AG then
began a search for a new headquarters to locations not just in northeast
Ohio, but throughout the nation. In return, Brooklyn promised to lower
its income tax rate back to the 2 percent level at which it had been prior
to the voter-approved increase, with some in the government pushing
for it to be reduced to 1.5 percent. The challenge for Brooklyn Mayor
Richard Balbier was that “you just can’t take the taxpayers’ money and
give it to a company” (Cho 2011b).
By November 2010, AG had narrowed its new headquarters search
to 15 Ohio sites, most of which were still in the Cleveland area, and
to one in Chicago. Brooklyn prepared a tax expenditure package that
would be worth $6.5–$10 million over 15 years (Cho 2011b). The state
of Ohio got involved by passing a special tax credit for AG to remain
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in Ohio, signed ceremonially at the AG headquarters by Governor John
Kasich. In total, the state package prepared to encourage AG to stay in
Ohio equaled $93.5 million over 15 years (Cho 2011a). Days after this
tax expenditure package was signed into law, AG announced that it was
staying in Ohio.
A few weeks later, on May 20, 2011, AG announced that it was
moving its headquarters to Westlake, another Cleveland suburb. Coincidentally or not, the new headquarters location is part of a larger development that is owned in part by members of the Weiss family, which
leads AG (McFee 2011).
The move of AG’s headquarters from Brooklyn to Westlake will
be a devastating blow to its former home, as 13 percent of that city’s
revenues, or about $3 million, are generated from AG. Westlake may
have won out over Brooklyn in part because of a lower tax rate (1.5
percent rather than Brooklyn’s 2.5 percent), but company ofﬁcials did
make it clear that the decision was much larger than taxes. AG wanted
“an environment that more accurately reﬂects and effectively supports
our creative and innovative culture” (Cho 2011a). The ﬁrm also had an
aging headquarters that needed to be replaced. If one considers total
tax burdens, and not just the income tax, as is often the case, Westlake
actually has a substantially higher property tax millage of 9.6. The total
property tax burden for city residents is 100.9 mills, which includes
city, library, schools, and county taxes (City of Westlake 2011a).

IF TAXES WERE NOT THE IMPETUS FOR AG LEAVING
BROOKLYN, THEN WHAT COULD IT BE?
During the search for a new headquarters, executives of AG consistently stated that “they sought a location that would allow it to recruit
and retain talent in an atmosphere fostering creativity” (Bullard 2011).
The ﬁrm’s chief executive ofﬁcer stated that the new location, Crocker
Park in Westlake, would provide AG with a “lifestyle center that will
be attractive to our current and future associates. You will be able to
shop, dine, and ﬁnd a variety of leisure activities nearby. It is easily
accessible from several local freeways. The amenities and environment
at Crocker Park will give our associates in every department a place to

Bowen.indb 51

12/16/2013 2:13:46 PM

52 Clark

ﬂourish, and maximize their performance, innovation and creativity”
(Bullard 2011).
The beneﬁts of having more perks and services nearby have been
mastered by Silicon Valley ﬁrms like Google, which have barbers, day
care, dining, laundry, and recreation facilities. These perks for employees “have the added bonus of keeping the employee workforce in the
ofﬁce more often. Give employees enough reasons to stick around and
you’ll likely see productivity go up. Why head home when everything
you need is at work?” (Strickland 2008). By moving to Crocker Park
in Westlake, AG will have access to far more services that could potentially entice its workers to stay around the ofﬁce longer and that perhaps
could lead to higher productivity. This is clearly a beneﬁt for AG that
has nothing to do with tax expenditure policy.
By further comparing Brooklyn’s and Westlake’s infrastructures
and ﬁnances, a clearer picture of AG regarding the move will start to
surface. This is not to say that any one of these factors provides the
answer as to why AG moved, but together they do create a picture of the
differences between these two locations.
First and foremost, Westlake is a wealthier community than Brooklyn. This can be measured with two simple metrics: median household
income and median value of homes. In 2010, the median home value in
Westlake was about 89 percent higher than in Brooklyn, $234,000 and
$124,100, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Westlake’s median
household income in 2010 was 67 percent higher than Brooklyn’s
($68,091 and $40,661, respectively). Westlake has fared substantially
better during the housing bust that started across the country in 2008.
Brooklyn saw the average sales price of homes drop by 24.33 percent
between 2005 and 2010, while Westlake saw only a 12.12 percent
decline. The 10-year change in prices for the two cities also shows a
disparity: Brooklyn’s average change from 2001 to 2010 was a decline
of 8.02 percent, while Westlake saw a modest 0.56 percent increase
(Cleveland Magazine 2011).
The disparities between Brooklyn and Westlake can be further
examined by looking at the cumulative assessed value of both cities.
Since the population sizes of the cities differ substantially, Figure 3.1
controls for assessed value based on population. What is demonstrated
in this chart is that Westlake’s assessed value per capita consistently
hovers around a value that is about three times as large as Brooklyn’s.
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Next, Brooklyn also has 1.6 times as many people living below the
poverty line as Westlake (6.6 percent below poverty for Brooklyn and
2.5 percent for Westlake). Why might a wealthier city attract AG? It
may be that AG wants to project an image of prosperity to its employees, and clearly Westlake has a substantial advantage according to those
two measures of community wealth.
Third, there are substantial and measurable differences in the performance of the two cities’ education systems. Each year Ohio rates all
of its school districts. In 2011 it rated Brooklyn’s schools as “effective,”
while Westlake’s were rated as “excellent.” Each school district was
additionally given performance ratings (ranging from 0 to 120); Westlake received a score of 107.2 and met adequate yearly progress (Ohio
Department of Education 2011). While Brooklyn’s performance rating
score was 96.8, the district did not meet adequate yearly progress. Additional information comes from Cleveland Magazine’s annual “Rating
the Suburbs” issue. While rating systems in a magazine are bound to
come with some controversy, they are still read by people in the community and by those planning to move to the area. Here again we see
Westlake with substantially higher scores in education, receiving a rank
Figure 3.1 Assessed Value per Capita, Brooklyn and Westlake, Ohio
(2011$)
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Financial Reports. Population estimates are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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of 10 out of more than 200 communities in the Cleveland metro area, as
compared to Brooklyn, with a rank of 46 (Cleveland Magazine 2011).
Fourth, Westlake outperforms Brooklyn on a broad range of other
“lifestyle” ratings. Westlake is perceived to be a safer community than
Brooklyn. Again drawing from the Cleveland Magazine (2011) proﬁles, Westlake received a rank of 20 (lower being better) and Brooklyn
received a rank of 73. These scores are based upon a variety of crime
statistics for all metro Cleveland jurisdictions. Westlake’s “total community services” rating is 13, while Brooklyn’s is 15.
Finally, the ﬁnancial stability of the two cities is quite different.
One very broad indicator of ﬁnancial condition is bond ratings. Brooklyn’s bond rating, in September 2011, by Moody’s (2011), was Aa2.
Westlake’s rating by Moody’s, from December of 2011, was Aaa. While
both cities’ credit ratings are excellent, Westlake’s rating is as high as a
rating can be, considered a prime rating, while Brooklyn’s rating is two
notches lower. Westlake is unique in the entire state for being “the ﬁrst
suburb in Ohio to have been awarded all of the Aaa/AAA ratings” (City
of Westlake 2011b).
We can also look at ﬁnancial stability in terms of budget balances.
The fund balances of both cities are exceptional. Both carry fund balances well in excess of the best practice recommendations of the Government Finance Ofﬁcers Association (2009). This is particularly relevant in recent years of stagnating revenues (the Great Recession), where
both cities have been very capable of providing a cushion from which to
draw down excess funds without raising taxes or cutting services.
What can we tell from looking at the perceptions of infrastructure,
safety, and ﬁnancial stability? The case demonstrates clearly that taxes
were not the main issue in AG’s deliberations. Table 3.1 summarizes
the potential deciding factors in AG’s move from Brooklyn to Westlake.
On all nontax elements, Westlake has a clear advantage over Brooklyn.
If taxes were the main driver, then AG would have stayed in Brooklyn
because the city offered to lower its income tax rate to one comparable
to Westlake’s, in addition to a tax expenditure package worth up to $10
million and lower property tax rates. The case further demonstrates a
reality for many cities; they are at a great disadvantage relative to ﬁrms,
particularly large companies. If a major employer wants a new facility,
perhaps even one that it has been planning for years, it can leverage the
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Table 3.1 Comparison of City Advantages, Brooklyn and Westlake, Ohio
Advantage
Brooklyn Westlake
Ohio offered the largest package,
Neutral
State tax
although there were no requireexpenditures
ments to stay in Brooklyn.
Local tax
expenditures

X

Brooklyn offered a larger package
of tax expenditures.

Tax rates

X

Total tax burden in Brooklyn is
lower. Brooklyn income tax rate
was readjusted after AG threatened
to move; Brooklyn previously
had a lower property tax rate than
Westlake.

Community wealth
Home sale price
Median household
income
Assessed value
Poverty rate
Education systems
“Lifestyle” ratings
Financial stability

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

system to reap, at times, huge sums of money to do something it was
already going to do, with or without the funds.
In the case of AG, a triggering event (a one-half percentage point
income tax increase in Brooklyn) gave the company a strong negotiating position. Without access to AG’s internal communications, there is
no way of knowing if the ﬁrm truly wanted to leave the area prior to this
circumstance. What can be seen is a company seizing the opportunity
to extract rents from different jurisdictions by threatening to leave the
city, county, and state.
One can question the actions of the state in the Brooklyn-AG
case. Was the rush to keep AG in Ohio actually what killed Brooklyn’s
chance at keeping AG? The deal (nearly $100 million) provided by the
state of Ohio may have kept AG in Ohio, but for the state it did not mat-
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ter where AG was located, as long as it was within the state. This creates
an environment for the rich to get richer: the company got nearly $100
million and the city of Westlake got a new large employer at apparently
little direct cost themselves. This also provides an environment for the
poor to get poorer: the state of Ohio’s revenues dropped by nearly $100
million at a time when Governor Kasich was trying to ﬁll an $8 billion
budget deﬁcit, and Brooklyn, a poorer Cleveland suburb, lost its largest
employer, creating a big hole for it to dig out of. As stated by Cuyahoga
County Executive Edward FitzGerald, with AG leaving Brooklyn,
“You will have a community that will be the big loser [Brooklyn], and
the state will have paid for that” (Niquette 2011).
The case of AG echoes the ﬁnding in the literature that the decision
to move is not simple and pits neighboring cities and states against one
another, to the direct advantage of the ﬁrm. AG’s actions are rational,
based on its operating environment, and the company cannot be faulted
for how it handled the situation. This case is not meant to be a critique
of AG, but rather a critique of the political ecosystem within which it
operates.

A WAY FORWARD
AG’s move within Cuyahoga County from Brooklyn to Westlake is
having a signiﬁcant local political impact. This case is an example of
a kind of interjurisdictional competition that is seen across the United
States. Clearly the move will be devastating to Brooklyn, and while
it may not be a net loss for the county, it again feeds more inequality
into the jurisdiction in this zero-sum game. This is leading Cuyahoga
County and other places nationwide to start thinking less about competition and more about cooperation.
Cooperation among Jurisdictions
One step Cuyahoga County took in the Brooklyn-AG situation was
to not provide any incentives to AG. Cuyahoga County did not “want
to give them any incentive to move from one city in Cuyahoga County
to another,” especially in this case with, as Cuyahoga County Executive
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FitzGerald notes, “wealthier suburb[s] that can afford more grants and
tax incentives” (Cho 2011a). In an effort to stem the tide of cities within
Cuyahoga County ﬁghting with each other to land the next big headquarters, FitzGerald is trying to leverage his economic development
budget by offering incentives to cities signing on to an antipoaching
pact. Communities that commit to this will get revenue sharing and a
piece of the county’s $100 million economic development fund (Johnston 2011).
The ﬁght for jobs through tax expenditures among U.S. jurisdictions is also going on elsewhere in the world. In 2003 all but one of
Australia’s states and territories “signed an historic pact to end interstate bidding wars for business investment and major events” (State of
Victoria 2003). The pact, which was renewed in 2006 (State of Victoria
2006) and set for another renewal vote in 2011, came about as a result
of a bidding war for a A$430 million News Corporation/Fox movie
studio. Similar to the approach being taken by FitzGerald in Cuyahoga
County, the Australian pact “includes protocols to avoid offering ﬁnancial and other investment incentives to companies relocating from elsewhere in Australia—a situation where there is no national economic
beneﬁt.” Australian subnational ofﬁcials have found the pact to be very
valuable in reducing the ﬁrms’ rent extractions, because the businesses
try to overstate “the incentives offered by the potential ‘rival’ location”
(State of Victoria 2003).
One of the keys to the Australian and Cuyahoga County programs is
the explicit goal of sharing information among governments. By doing
so, these programs reduce the information asymmetry that exists when
ﬁrms attempt to play one jurisdiction against another. At heart, the challenge for these potentially rival jurisdictions is a prisoner’s dilemma,
in which cooperation will yield a better outcome for both government
parties, but with informational barriers present, one or both of the jurisdictions will tend to defect, resulting in a race to the bottom (Oates
1972, 1999).
The race to the bottom creates a fear in community ofﬁcials of
“losing local business and jobs [which] thus leads to suboptimal levels
of state and local public goods” (Oates 1999, p. 1135). Alice Rivlin
(1992), the ﬁrst to head the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce and a recent
member of the Obama Administration’s Debt Commission, sees the
competition between neighboring jurisdictions as a ﬁght that produces
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inadequate levels of public service delivery because the competition
drives revenues too low. She has proposed a revenue-sharing scheme
that would alleviate some of jurisdictions’ worries about losing business (Rivlin 1992).
While Cuyahoga County strives to create a system in which its
cities share information, the state of Ohio appears to be going in the
opposite direction. It has privatized its development activities, which
constrains access to information and citizen involvement. The limits
that Ohio Governor Kasich seeks are thought by some people to be an
economic advantage for the state, as it competes with its neighbors for
companies. Site brokers, the agents working for ﬁrms trying to relocate,
counsel governments to keep all bids secret. These consultants essentially threaten to blackball states and site brokers if they do not comply
with the secrecy pacts (Markusen and Nesse 2007, p. 22). The ﬁrms
beneﬁt from having information asymmetry on their side, which keeps
the fear of losing a deal alive by leaving cities and states in the dark. But
it is obvious that cities and states may not be going in the same direction
on this issue.
Jurisdictions are left in a quandary: they want to improve their ﬁscal and economic situations without being taken advantage of by ﬁrms
or decimating neighboring jurisdictions. Rivlin (1992) suggests that
States might provide higher-quality services if they shared some
taxes and did not have to worry so much about losing businesses
to neighboring states with lower tax rates. They would then have
more incentives to compete on the basis of excellence of their services. They would have to attract businesses and residents with
good schools, parks and transportation, rather than with tax breaks.
The common taxes would also simplify the tax structure and lower
the compliance costs facing companies that operate in many states,
as well as reducing the enforcement costs of the tax collectors.
(p. 142)

The Importance of Evaluating Results
We know that tax expenditures will continue to be used. It is also
clear that under certain circumstances tax expenditures can be marginally effective policy tools, but only if the jurisdictions employing them
take the time to analyze their use. Unfortunately, research suggests
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that “few municipalities place conditions on [tax expenditures], most
never evaluate the performance of ﬁrms . . . and abatement requests
are seldom or never rejected” (Sands, Reese, and Khan 2006, p. 44).
When data are collected, the information is often not appropriate to help
in evaluation of programs, nor is it timely (Buss 2001). One-third of
governments place few, if any, conditions on who gets tax expenditure
beneﬁts, and 88 percent of governments reject virtually no one (Sands,
Reese, and Khan 2006). Because most jurisdictions do not bother to
evaluate the outcomes of tax expenditures, it is little wonder that this
tool is so ineffective. The shotgun approach clearly is not working; targeting tax expenditures to distressed areas and evaluating the programs
could turn tax expenditures from a 10 percent to a 90 percent success
rate (Peters and Fisher 2004).
Further thought needs to be put into what types of ﬁrms are getting
the beneﬁts as well. Does the tax expenditure create negative externalities for a community (sweatshop work environments or major environmental burdens)? If so, does this really help to develop the community?
Clear goals for development are necessary, rather than a mechanism “to
provide political cover for the decision to grant an abatement” (Sands,
Reese, and Khan 2006, p. 53); not rejecting any ﬁrm’s applications
for tax expenditures provides just such a situation. However, in most
programs the evidence of targeting simply does not exist (Greenbaum,
Russell, and Petras 2010).
In addition to a lack of actual evaluation of the tax expenditure policies, there is also some difﬁculty in deﬁning the problem that is being
addressed. How is growth deﬁned? Is it growth of GDP, or employment, or some other factor? Why a company decides to move its headquarters to the Rust Belt, or out of it, is not a simple question. Trying to
model this decision-making process is even more difﬁcult. For example, Phillips and Goss (1995) note that “studies that use investment or
income growth as the dependent variable ﬁnd that taxes have a larger
inﬂuence on growth than do studies using aggregate employment or
individual ﬁrm data” (p. 325). Both income growth and employment
would presumably measure the economic health of a region, but if they
are leading to contrary conclusions, then modeling this question will be
problematic, at best.
Decisions made in the past can haunt a city for years, even when
the conditions are not the same today (see Box 2.1). If a large part of
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Box 2.1 Minicase of Atlanta, Georgia
Atlanta’s rapid growth has resulted in “trafﬁc congestion so bad it
threatens the region’s vitality” (Hart 2011, p. A:1). No deﬁnitive plan has
been developed, but Georgia’s and Atlanta’s leaders want to ensure that
the area can continue to grow. A proposed new sales tax could be one
way to fund a “balanced” approach (roads and public transit), but “ﬁerce
debate is under way over what that balance should be” (p. A:1).
Some leaders in the region are starting to recognize that, while “tax
cuts may favorably tilt the cost-beneﬁt analysis of investors pondering
whether to build a manufacturing plant in Georgia,” those beneﬁts “may
be quickly reduced if the end product is trucked through Atlanta, as plant
owners incur the indirect, yet real cost of tractor-trailers slogging inefﬁciently across” the city (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2010). The Atlanta
metro area has been described as being a “region at odds with itself,” as
it contains cities poaching ﬁrms from one another in the same zero-sum
game that the Rust Belt faces. Leaders in the region do recognize the
inconsistencies, as Atlanta residents hate the trafﬁc problems but also
hate the idea of raising taxes to the level necessary to ﬁx those problems.
The prospect of resolving these issues is complicated by a lack of cooperation among governments in the metro area, “which makes it more difﬁcult to create a thriving region and compete with our peer cities around
the country and world” (Chapman 2011).
Atlanta’s future hinges on its ability to solve not just its trafﬁc challenges, but also its water problem. The state of Georgia has been in
protracted disputes with Tennessee, Florida, and Alabama for access to
river waters, and the Atlanta area constantly ﬁghts with south Georgia
for waters within the state. Droughts in recent years have made access to
water perhaps even more important than transit to Atlanta’s future, and
this debate is more complicated because of rainfall, something no one
can control.

why a company stays or leaves a particular location is based on “softer”
issues like quality of life, which are even harder to measure than economic growth, the subjectivity of the potential answers will bias study
results. Some good ﬁrst steps will be to collect data, make sure the data
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being collected can actually measure the outcome, and have that data
collected and analyzed in a timely manner.
One of the basic themes of this book is that free trade in unfettered markets and the production of things people value, rather than
tax expenditures and other forms of government intervention into local
economies, offer the greatest promise for economic prosperity. The
tools that surface time and again in the tax expenditure literature are
investments in physical and human capital. These topics could necessitate entire chapters or books to cover their depth, but will be touched
upon brieﬂy here to illustrate alternative approaches.
Other Ways to Promote Industrial Development
Shifting the tax burden from businesses to residents often creates an environment that reduces the quality of services that are provided (Markusen and Nesse 2007). As has been mentioned earlier in
this chapter, taxes and tax expenditures are only a small part of the
decision-making process for ﬁrm location. The results of a higher tax
rate or lower tax expenditures may actually be welcomed by companies
because many of them place a high value on government services that
beneﬁt the ﬁrms directly or indirectly (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, and Tannenwald 1997; Wassmer 2007). For example, good school or university
systems will provide quality workers to ﬁrms, and good transportation
systems will allow for easier and cheaper shipping of goods to market. In the case of Brooklyn-AG, Brooklyn’s infrastructure and schools
were seen as insufﬁcient (or even deteriorating), while Westlake’s were
viewed as some of the best in the region (and improving). This disparity
provided yet another reason why AG would want to move its headquarters out of an area with inferior services to one with superior services.
Mathur (1999) provides evidence that investment in the development and accumulation of human capital is a more productive and prudent strategy to help support growth than are programs that focus on
other aspects of developing an economy. An overreliance on simply
luring companies based on tax rates or expenditures puts a region at risk
in the long term; if a company locates somewhere simply because of the
low rates, it is likely to jump ship as soon as another jurisdiction can
offer a better rate. However, if a company has made a choice because of
a region’s broader set of advantages, then small changes in a tax rate or
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tax expenditures will be little noticed, given all of the other factors that
brought the ﬁrm to its present location. As Mathur (1999) points out,
“public policy that encourages human capital stock and R&D is in the
long-term interest of a region, and the threat of interregional spillovers
should not distract regional policy makers from initiatives that promote
human capital stock of the region” (p. 214).
Investing effectively in physical or human capital infrastructure
requires actual outlays of funds, which is why the tax expenditure route
is taken so frequently—it offers much less resistance and conﬂict. Each
city, county, or region has its own special needs, and there is no onesize-ﬁts-all approach available for economic development. But it is
clear that investing in physical and human capital can be an alternative
to tax expenditures that has a more predictable and lasting effect on the
local economy. The mayor of Westlake, for one, does not want to be
faulted for the investments his city has made in infrastructure. He states
that “Westlake put a lot of money into its infrastructure and quality of
life. . . . Why shouldn’t we reap the dividends on that investment?”
(Miller 2011). In the case of AG, clearly Westlake is reaping the dividends of its investment. Broadly speaking, one of the best things a city
can do to ensure its future is to “take care of the basics, like infrastructure and education” (Talbot 2012, p. 74). This is particularly important
when resources are idle during a recession, when building materials,
capital, and labor are much cheaper, and will enable a city to prepare for
its next industry or employer.

CONCLUSION
The challenges that Rust Belt communities face are substantial. Let
us reconsider the question raised at the start of this chapter: Why do
some of these cities thrive, as others decline? Clearly, special attention
should be paid to the lessons that can be learned from the use of tax
expenditures in economic development programs. The ﬁscal stresses
that the region faces are substantial and reinforce the problems. Much
of the political rhetoric surrounding the demise of the area and the rise
of the South and Southwest tends to focus only on taxes, essentially
ignoring all other relocation factors.
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At the same time one needs to consider that these southern states
were also very far behind economically when compared to northern
states, so some of the geographical southern shift can be attributed to
the equalization of regions rather than an outright ﬂight. This is, of
course, no comfort to the residents of Flint, Michigan, who have lived
through decades of economic struggle, or to those of Cleveland, which
once had among the greatest concentrations of corporate headquarters
in the country, and is now frequently seen as an also-ran.
The problems facing Rust Belt communities are not isolated. Booming cities in the South, such as Atlanta, which were once the beneﬁciaries of the southern shift, are now facing the same challenges: companies leaving for greener pastures.
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4
The Evolution of Clusters
and Implications for the Revival
of Old Industrial Cities
Haifeng Qian
Cleveland State University

It has long been thought that ﬁrms cluster to gain shared economic
beneﬁts related to scale, access to skilled labor forces, and transportation costs. Over time the concept of clusters has evolved, no
more so than in the Rust Belt cities of the Midwest.

The study of industrial or regional clusters has a long history.
Alfred Marshall (1920) discussed the localization of ﬁrms within the
same area to pursue a shared labor pool, local provision of industrial
inputs, and spillovers of knowledge and information. The neoclassical
tradition emphasizes the impact of transportation costs and economies
of scale on shaping the location of ﬁrms (Hoover 1937; Isard 1951;
Krugman 1991). Following the economic transformation from Fordist
capitalism to post-Fordist capitalism in the developed world, there has
been renewed attention on agglomeration and clusters for the past three
decades. Scholars with a variety of backgrounds, including economics, regional science, geography, planning, and business management,
have sought the reasons for clustering or agglomeration economies.
These researchers have pursued new perspectives, including increasing
returns, ﬂexible production, innovation, entrepreneurship, knowledge
spillovers, and networks (Acs and Varga 2005; Gordon and McCann
2000; Jacobs 1969; Markusen 1996; Porter 1998; Scott 1988).
Witnessing the success of U.S. high-technology clusters, such as
Silicon Valley in California; Austin, Texas; and Research Triangle Park
in North Carolina, policymakers have increasingly considered clusters
as an effective tool for economic development. President Obama, for
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instance, supported a federal initiative to bolster regional innovation
clusters, with $100 million requested in his proposed ﬁscal year 2010
budget. This has been especially inspired by the work of Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter (1998, 2003), who has sought
to operationalize the identiﬁcation of clusters. Professor Porter was
invited to speak on clusters at the 2011 annual meeting of the National
Governors Association. Meanwhile, as of July 2011, 7 of the 10 most
read articles in Economic Development Quarterly, a journal focusing
on economic development policy and practice, included “cluster” in
their titles.1
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature on the evolution of clusters and explore its implications for the revival of old industrial or Rust Belt cities. Many old industrial cities feature declining or
declined clusters and are struggling to revitalize their economies. The
chapter starts with a review of deﬁnitions and typologies of clusters. It
then summarizes four streams of literature discussing the evolution of
clusters and endeavors to identify some major forces behind the dynamics of clusters, based on the limited research available. It does not solely
address clusters manifested in old industrial cities (e.g., the industrial
complexes identiﬁed by Iammarino and McCann [2006]), since one
type of cluster may evolve into another type. The chapter further examines cluster development in the U.S. Rust Belt, using Cleveland as an
example, and explores the implications of clusters’ evolution paths for
the revival of old industrial cities.

CLUSTERS: DEFINITIONS AND TYPOLOGIES
There are several terms associated with clusters, which have been
increasingly used in an interchangeable fashion, including “agglomeration,” “new industrial districts/places,” and “regional/industrial/business clusters,” among others. The ﬁrst wave of cluster research was primarily propelled by the seminal work of Marshall (1920), who popularized an agglomeration approach to understanding the phenomenon. This
perspective was carried forward in the work of Hoover (1937, 1948),
Mills (1972), and Krugman (1991). Together with Isard’s industrial
complex approach (e.g., Isard and Vietorisz 1955), the agglomeration
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view explored the beneﬁts of spatial or geographical clusters in terms
of transportation costs, economies of scale, shared labor and industryspeciﬁc inputs, and to a lesser extent, knowledge spillovers. Hoover
(1937, 1948) classiﬁed agglomeration as consisting of ﬁrms’ internal
expansion, localization economies, and urbanization economies. Internal expansion represents a ﬁrm’s economies of scale; localization economies address cost reductions as a result of the spatial concentration of
businesses from the same sector; and urbanization economies consider
the beneﬁts of agglomeration irrespective of sectors.
Clusters regained scholarly attention in the early 1980s among not
only economists but geographers, planners, regional scientists, and
management scholars. This second wave commenced from several case
studies of the artisanal and design industries in the “Third Italy” (e.g.,
Brusco 1982) and was later extended to the ﬁlm industry in Los Angeles
(Storper and Christopherson 1987) and to high technology, particularly
in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994; Scott and Angel 1987).2 Scott (1988)
terms these places “new industrial spaces,” which are characterized
by ﬂexible production, social division of labor, formation of external
economies, dissolution of labor market rigidities, and reagglomeration
of production. These industrial districts feature “a congeries of interconnected producers and associated local labour markets” (Scott 1988,
p. 182).
Markusen (1996) provides an inﬂuential typology of the industrial
district, which she deﬁnes as “a sizable and spatially delimited area of
trade-oriented economic activity which has a distinctive economic specialization” (p. 296). She argues that there are other types of “sticky”
industrial districts beyond Scott’s new industrial places that have demonstrated resilience, and proposes four types of industrial districts.
The ﬁrst type, called “Marshallian industrial districts,” features a
business structure dominated by small and locally owned ﬁrms. In these
districts, there is a substantial amount of trade among locally embedded suppliers and buyers, which is generally secured by long-term contracts, and a ﬂexible labor pool internal to the district instead of to any
speciﬁc ﬁrms. Compared with the classic Marshallian industrial district,
its Italianate extension is more innovative, cooperative, embedded, and
government led.
The second type of industrial district, the “hub-and-spoke,” is one
in which one or several large ﬁrm headquarters play a pivotal role in
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local business. These ﬁrms are vertically integrated, surrounded by
local suppliers, and embedded nonlocally. They are also globally oriented in terms of their input, products or services, and investment decision making.
The third type is coined “satellite industrial platforms” and has a
business structure dominated by large branch facilities that are externally owned and headquartered. These branches can range in the nature
of production from routinized assembly plants to research facilities, as
long as they are able to “stand alone.” Because the facility is controlled
by its remote headquarters, its cooperation with other local facilities is
generally low.
The last type, named “state-anchored industrial districts,” involves
a business scenario dominated by the local presence of state or national
capitals, large government institutions, or big public universities.
Porter (1998) proposes the most inﬂuential framework of clusters.
He deﬁnes clusters as “geographic concentrations of interconnected
companies and institutions in a particular ﬁeld” (p. 78). He considers
clusters to be a strategy for regions to build competitive advantage.
Consistent with his diamond model (Porter 1990), clusters involve
other industries connected with the core industry via both backward
linkages (i.e., suppliers) and forward linkages (i.e., channels and customers), and supporting institutions such as governments, universities,
and trade associations.
Porter argues that clusters encourage both competition and cooperation and promote innovation, entrepreneurship, and productivity.
He further operationalized his concept of clusters, using a combination
of location quotient analysis, locational correlation analysis, and inputoutput models to identify the clusters of traded industries in a speciﬁc
region (Porter 2003). The Porter school of cluster theory soon gained
popularity among not only scholars but also planners, practitioners, and
policymakers. This occurred despite the seemingly traditional policy
instruments Porter has proposed, such as improving human capital,
infrastructure, and intellectual property protection (Porter 1998). However, Martin and Sunley (2003) suggest cautious use of clusters as a
development strategy.
Porter’s concept of clusters is extended by Hill and Brennan (2000),
who deﬁne a “competitive industry cluster” as “a geographic concentration of competitive ﬁrms or establishments in the same industry that
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either have close buy-sell relationships with other industries in the
region, use common technologies, or share a specialized labor pool that
provides ﬁrms with a competitive advantage over the same industry in
other places” (pp. 67–68). This idea advances the research by providing a methodology based primarily on cluster analysis and discriminant
analysis to identify the clusters with competitive advantages in a region.
Gordon and McCann (2000) and Iammarino and McCann (2006)
develop a typology of industrial clusters in terms of transaction costs.
Under their deductive approach, categories of industrial clusters include
“pure agglomeration” following the tradition of Marshall (1920); “the
industrial complex” following the perspective of Isard (Isard 1951;
Isard and Kuenne 1953; Isard and Vietorisz 1955); and the “social network” following the work of Granovetter (1973). The ﬁrst type, echoing
Marshallian industrial districts in Markusen’s typology, is structured by
atomistic ﬁrms with unstable trading relations. Industrial complexes,
with one or several large ﬁrms surrounded by local suppliers, represent
identiﬁable and stable trading relations, and are structurally consistent
with the hub-and-spoke model. And the social-network model is characterized by the role of trust and social capital in forming business relations and is “essentially aspatial” (Iammarino and McCann 2006).
The aspatial nature of the social-network model discussed by Iammarino and McCann (2006) suggests that the geographic unit for clusters is indeed ﬂexible. Although every cluster has a geographic scope,
what matters for a cluster is interconnectedness of economic agents
(Porter 1998). The geographic unit of a cluster can be very small or
very large, depending on the spatial extent to which economic activities interact. By the same token, the geographic boundary of a cluster
is rarely consistent with any administrative boundaries and may even
be transnational (e.g., the Seattle-Vancouver technology corridor). The
unclear geographical scope of clusters has incurred criticism, such as
from Martin and Sunley (2003).
It should also be noted that, within the same region, different types
of clusters might coexist. An example is Silicon Valley, which, as
Markusen (1996) points out, hosts all of the four types of clusters she
identiﬁes. According to Scott and Angel (1987) and Saxenian (1994),
Silicon Valley is a typical Marshallian district. However, it also features the hub-and-spoke model with the presence of major hubs such
as Stanford University and Hewlett-Packard, the satellite industrial
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platform with the presence of branches of IBM, Oki, NTK Ceramics,
Hyundai, and Samsung, and the state-anchored model with the presence
of a strong defense electronics and communications sector (Markusen
1996).

THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS
To date, the literature on clusters’ evolution has been relatively
insufﬁcient for at least two reasons. First, clusters did not regain scholarly attention until the 1980s, and the most inﬂuential studies to date
are concerned with deﬁnitional and typological issues in the context of
post-Fordism and generally consider clusters to be static (e.g., Markusen 1996). Second, different types of clusters (and even those within the
same type) may exhibit diverse paths of evolution, which make it difﬁcult to ﬁnd commonalities. Efforts to explain the evolution of industrial clusters have been made for some speciﬁc cases (e.g., Feldman,
Francis, and Bercovitz 2005; Huggins 2008). Despite the difﬁculties of
generalization, a few scholars have discussed cluster evolution, and the
resulting literature may be categorized into four streams: 1) an industrial cluster evolves following the product cycle of its core industry, 2)
technical changes lead to new industrial composition of a cluster, 3) an
industrial cluster transforms itself from one type to another, and 4) an
existing cluster or even an incumbent ﬁrm may incubate a new cluster.
Each stream is discussed in detail in this section.
The Product Life Cycle Approach
The product life cycle theory, introduced by Vernon (1966) in the
context of international trade, describes the evolution of products,
which can be applied to the evolution of the associated industries. A
typical product life cycle can be decomposed into four stages: introduction, growth, maturity, and decline. In the ﬁrst stage, a new product
is introduced to the market and produced locally. As it is increasingly
accepted by consumers both locally and from outside the region, the
industry experiences a rapid expansion in the second stage, and production starts to move to other areas seeking lower costs, especially
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in terms of land and labor. At the third stage, the market demand for
this product is stable or even starts to fall, the production process is
mature, and production facilities are primarily located in areas with low
costs. Last, new products emerge as better substitutes, and the industry
declines. Jacobs (1969) ﬁnds that large diversiﬁed cities are cradles of
innovation and are thus the natural environment for the ﬁrst stage of
the product life cycle. Duranton and Puga (2001) further reveal that
innovations generally occur in diversiﬁed cities, but production may
relocate to specialized cities with lower costs once the production process becomes standardized.
In his seminal paper, Porter (1998) also addresses the evolution of
clusters in a way similar to the product life cycle approach. He lists
some forces behind the birth, growth, and decline of a cluster, arguing
that a cluster may emerge simply by a chance event, or as a result of
historical circumstances or new demand. An incumbent cluster or large
ﬁrms may also serve as the incubator of a new cluster. Once a cluster
starts emerging, according to Porter, its growth and expansion are characterized by a self-reinforcing process, in which opportunities in the
new cluster will bring dynamic, collective actions of talent, specialized
suppliers and forward channels, service providers, and related government agencies. A vigorous local business climate and supportive institutions provide jurisdictional advantages for the region, facilitate the
growth of clusters, and enable long-term prosperity for the region and
the cluster. The decline of a cluster, as Porter argues, generally comes
with technological discontinuities, failure to meet consumers’ changing
demand, and internal rigidities.
Change of Industrial Composition
In addition to the product/industry/cluster life cycle approach, some
quantitative scholars trace cluster changes over time in terms of their
industrial composition. A cluster in the Porter school involves not only
one or more traded industries but also linked industries as suppliers and
channels or consumers. These interindustry linkages can be identiﬁed
through the input-output model. Industries may also be interconnected
through shared labor pools and knowledge spillovers, as suggested by
Marshall (1920) and Hill and Brennan (2000), but these ﬂows are much
less measurable than interindustry trade.
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The industrial makeup of a cluster may be altered over time, reﬂecting technical developments occurring during that period. Montana and
Nenide (2008) adopt this approach and examine evolving clusters in
California’s central San Joaquin Valley and northeast Indiana from
1997 to 2002. The business and innovation services cluster in northeast
Indiana, for instance, was composed of ﬁve four-digit North American
Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) industries in 1997: 1) printing and related support activities (3231); 2) other ﬁnancial investment
activities (5239); 3) agencies, brokerages, and other insurance-related
activities (5242); 4) insurance and employee beneﬁt funds (5251); and
5) employment services (5612). By 2002, this cluster had evolved by
adding ﬁve newly related industries: 1) Internet publishing and broadcasting (5161); 2) securities and commodity contracts, intermediation
and brokerage (5231); 3) management, scientiﬁc, and technical consulting services (5416); 4) ofﬁce administrative services (5611); and 5)
facilities support services (5613).
Cluster Transformation between Different Types
As the third evolutionary approach, a cluster can be transformed
from one type to another under a given typology. Historically, regions
hosting the automobile cluster, e.g., Detroit, were transformed from
Marshallian industrial districts in the early decades of the twentieth
century to hub-and-spoke districts (Markusen 1996), or from the pure
agglomeration model to the industrial complex model (Iammarino and
McCann 2006). Today, there are only a few oligopolistic producers
dominating the local business structure in these regions. The ﬁnancial market in London, the fashion cluster in New York, and the semiconductor and electronics sector in Silicon Valley evolved from the
social network type to pure agglomeration (Iammarino and McCann
2006). As Iammarino and McCann (2006) point out, even for the hightech industrial sector, its cluster type and evolution path may vary from
case to case: Unlike its counterpart in Silicon Valley, the electronics
industry in Scotland has remained an industrial complex cluster for the
past 40 years.
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New Cluster Born out of Incumbent Clusters and Firms
The fourth type of evolution focuses on the role of one or several
incumbent clusters in incubating new clusters. Southern California’s
aerospace cluster, which has attracted talent and suppliers specialized
in castings and advanced materials, was associated with the birth of the
golf equipment cluster in San Diego (Porter 1998). Gray, Golob, and
Markusen (1996) and Markusen (1996) report that the aircraft/spacecraft cluster in Seattle anchored by the giant company Boeing contributed to the formation of other clusters such as port-related activities,
software, and biotechnology. Sometimes, several clusters may jointly
foster the formation of a new cluster. Porter (1998) ﬁnds that a cluster producing built-in kitchens and appliances was developed at the
intersection of the home appliances and household furniture clusters in
Germany.
Alternatively, the “incubator” may not be existing clusters but simply large and innovative ﬁrms or institutions. A new cluster may emerge
as a result of massive spin-offs from an incumbent ﬁrm in a region. For
instance, Fairchild Semiconductor played a critical role in shaping the
semiconductor cluster in Silicon Valley, spinning off a large number of
new entries, including major players such as AMD, Intel, and National.
According to Klepper (2011), a majority of the top performers in the
semiconductor industry were located in Silicon Valley and descended
from Fairchild Semiconductor, directly or indirectly. Klepper also
reports that the inﬂuence of B.F. Goodrich is associated with the creation of Diamond Rubber, Kelly-Springﬁeld, Goodyear Tire & Rubber,
and Firestone Tire & Rubber, which collectively underpinned the tire
cluster in Akron, Ohio. Similarly, America Online and MCI were the
hubs that facilitated the formation of the telecommunications cluster in
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area (Porter 1998).

CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF CLEVELAND
This chapter seeks implications of the evolution of clusters for the
revival of old industrial cities. This is a challenging task, because there
have been various evolutionary paths and because the diversity among
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old industrial cities implies different cluster-based economic revitalization strategies. The old U.S. industrial cities in the Rust Belt, such as
Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh, differ from each other in
terms of their industrial base and industrial organization, as well as the
extent of their progress toward renewal. As a result, it is inappropriate
to discuss cluster development in the general context of old industrial
cities.
This chapter’s focus is on the Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor metropolitan area. Cleveland has been declining for the past several decades,
suffering both population loss and stagnant economic performance. The
2010 census data show that Cleveland was still among the top 30 largest
metropolitan areas, with a population slightly above 2 million, down
3.3 percent from 2000. Economically speaking, employment had a 14
percent drop for the period of 1998–2009, as indicated by the census
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) business pattern data. This section
presents the pattern of cluster development in the Cleveland metropolitan area, and the next section will discuss the implications of the cluster
evolution literature for the revitalization of this region.
Given the emphasis on cluster evolution, examining the longitudinal data is critical. Longitudinal cluster development in Cleveland will
be described using two sets of data. One is from the Cluster Mapping
Project led by Porter, which identiﬁes clusters for each metropolitan
area using a combination of location quotient, locational correlation,
and input-output analysis (Porter 2003). At the core of each cluster is
one four-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code industry
that exports products, with a group of local industries supplying inputs.
The size of each cluster is measured by total employment in both the
traded and supplier industries.
There are two interrelated problems in using this data set for
this research. First, it covers only the time period of 1998–2008 (as
of March 2011). When looking at the evolution of clusters, long-term
historical data are needed, since it generally takes decades for clusters
to evolve (Sallet, Paisley, and Masterman 2009). Data for one decade
shed little light on the long-term evolution of clusters. Second, because
Cleveland started to lose its competitive advantage in the 1960s, data
for only the latest decade may not provide insights into the sources of
the decline. Technically, as long as employment data by industry are
available, it is possible to extend Porter’s methodology into earlier peri-
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ods. However, input-output relationships among industries, which are
needed to identify clusters, are not stable in the long term. The industrial composition of the same cluster hence could be very different over
a long time period due to technical changes in production. As a consequence, it is almost impossible to examine the growth and decline of a
cluster deﬁned in terms of a static industrial composition. However, if
changes in input-output relationships are accounted for, as in Montana
and Nenide (2008), a cluster could change signiﬁcantly in its structure
over a long time period, making the temporal data less comparable at
different times. This approach might be feasible for investigating one or
a few clusters based on the case study methodology, which allows for
reporting details of cluster structural changes along time, but might not
be appropriate for studying all clusters in a region.
As complementary information, long-term employment changes of
Cleveland’s leading traded industries, without considering intraindustry
linkages, will also be studied. Traded or export industries are identiﬁed
using the methodology introduced by Porter (2003)and the 2002 employment data by industry (four-digit NAICS code).3 The industry data used
in this chapter are from Moody’s Analytics Web site, (2013) economy
.com. The advantages of this site are that its data reach back to 1970
and address the suppressed data problem that appears in the federal data
source—the County Business Patterns (CBP). In the latter case, industry employment data are occasionally suppressed to avoid disclosing
information of individual businesses. These leading traded industries
are likely to be the core of major clusters and thus can be used to track
their evolution in Cleveland to some extent.
Table 4.1 presents the national ranking of major clusters in the
Cleveland metropolitan area based on Porter’s Cluster Mapping Project. A cluster is considered “major” and included in the table if its
employment size in Cleveland was among the nation’s top 20 either
in 1998, the earliest year with available data in the Cluster Mapping
Project, or in 2008, the latest year with available data (as of March 2011
[Porter 2011]). The table also shows the percentage change in employment during this decade. It can be seen that major clusters in Cleveland
are all in manufacturing, reﬂecting the historical economic base of the
city. In terms of employment size, the three largest among these clusters
are metal manufacturing (the largest both in 1998 and in 2008), production technology (the third largest in 1998 and the second largest in
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Table 4.1 National Rankings (by Employment) of Major Clusters in
Cleveland, Ohio, 1998 and 2008
% change in
Ranking
employment
Cluster name
1998
2008 (1998–2008)
Automotive
4
7
−44
Lighting and electrical equipment
4
10
−51
Metal manufacturing
4
3
−29
Production technology
5
3
−21
Motor driven products
8
>40
n/a
Building ﬁxtures, equipment, and services 10
5
62
Plastics
10
11
−23
Chemical products
12
14
−25
Medical devices
13
26
−33
Power generation and transmission
14
21
−31
Biopharmaceuticals
16
20
−28
Aerospace engines
17
13
−3
Construction materials
19
12
−2
Heavy machinery
29
11
81
NOTE: Bold type indicates a rise in ranking.
SOURCE: Cluster Mapping Project, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard Business School. © 2010 President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights
reserved.

2008), and automotive (the second largest in 1998 and the third largest
in 2008), as the Cluster Mapping Project data show. In terms of national
rankings, which provide insights into regional competitive advantage,
Cleveland placed in the top ﬁve nationally in employment in the automotive, lighting and electrical equipment, metal manufacturing, and
production technology clusters in 1998. In 2008, the leading clusters
were metal manufacturing and production technology. Cleveland was
among the nation’s top three in these two clusters. In addition, Cleveland had the nation’s ﬁfth-largest building ﬁxtures, equipment and services cluster in 2008.
As for changes between 1998 and 2008, Cleveland gained competitive advantage, as evidenced by rising national rankings, in 6 out of the
14 listed clusters: 10 metal manufacturing; 2) production technology; 3)
building ﬁxtures, equipment and services; 4) aerospace engines; 5) con-
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struction materials; and 6) heavy machinery. Among them, the heavy
machinery cluster marked the most signiﬁcant improvement, jumping
from number 29 to number 11. Following that, Cleveland moved up by
at least four spots in the construction materials, aerospace engines, and
building ﬁxtures, equipment, and services clusters. It is worth noting
that, although Cleveland had a higher rank in 6 out of 14 clusters in
2008, only two clusters—heavy machinery and building ﬁxtures, equipment, and services—experienced employment growth in this decade.
In comparison, Cleveland’s rank in 8 of the 14 clusters worsened
during the period. Among them, Cleveland’s motor driven products
cluster was number 8 in the nation in 1998, but dropped below number
40 in 2008. Other signiﬁcant declines occurred for the medical devices,
power generation and transmission, and lighting and electrical equipment clusters, each moving down in the ranking by at least six spots.
Now we turn to industry data for the time period of 1970–2009,
which provide better information for studying evolution trajectories.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the longitudinal change of Cleveland’s top-10
traded industries as ranked by their 1970 employment. Only 2 out of
these 10 industries—wired telecommunications carriers and insurance
carriers—are not manufacturing based. In 1970, the dominant traded
industry was motor vehicle parts manufacturing (with total employment
of roughly 30,000), which shrank tremendously in the ensuing 39 years
through 2009. Likewise, other top-traded industries in Cleveland also
declined during this period, although not as signiﬁcantly. One exception
was the insurance carriers industry, which grew by 60 percent, thanks to
the expansion of a few large insurance companies based in Cleveland,
such as Medical Mutual of Ohio and Progressive.
Figure 4.2 exhibits the industrial evolution of the 10 most specialized traded industries in Cleveland as ranked by their 1970 location
quotient;these are all in manufacturing, except interurban and rural
bus transportation.4 Using the location quotient instead of employment size can control for the national growth trend of industries (i.e.,
product/industry life cycles) and thus can better represent the dynamics
of Cleveland’s economy relative to the nation or other regions. Four
manufacturing industries also appear in Figure 4.1 among the largest
traded industries: 1) foundries; 2) machine shops, turned product, and
screw, nut, and bolt manufacturing; 3) metalworking machinery manufacturing; and 4) motor vehicle parts manufacturing. Changes in the
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Figure 4.1 Employment of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009, as
Ranked by 1970 Employment, Cleveland MSA, Ohio
Motor vehicle parts mfg.
Foundries
Machine shops; turned product; and screw, nut, and bolt mfg.
Other general purpose machinery mfg.
Metalworking machinery mfg.

Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy mfg.
Wired telecommunications carriers
Insurance carriers
Aerospace product and parts mfg.
Other fabricated metal product mfg.
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SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013).

location quotient of these most specialized traded industries exhibit
more diversiﬁed patterns than does the employment change in the
major traded industries listed in Figure 4.1. The location quotient of the
electric lighting equipment manufacturing industry, in which Cleveland
was most specialized in 1970, dropped from 6.5 to 1.8 from 1970 to
2009. Signiﬁcant drops also occurred in the other transportation equipment manufacturing industry, the motor vehicle parts manufacturing
industry, and the interurban and rural bus transportation industry. By
contrast, specialization in the forging and stamping industry intensiﬁed
during the same period. The longitudinal location quotient for the electrical equipment manufacturing industry shows an interesting U-shaped
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Figure 4.2 Location Quotients of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009,
as Ranked by 1970 Location Quotient, Cleveland MSA, Ohio
Electric lighting equipment mfg.
Foundries
Forging and stamping
Machine shops; turned product; and screw, nut, and bolt mfg.
Interurban and rural bus transportation
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SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013).

curve, ﬁrst becoming less specialized and after the 1990s regaining its
proportion relative to the national level. Changes in other traded industries were moderate.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 replicate Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively,
except that the industries are identiﬁed based on the 2009 data. A comparison between industries included in Figure 4.3 with those included
in Figure 3.1 suggests major shifts of leading traded industries between
1970 and 2009. In 2009, the top ﬁve largest traded industries were all
service based. Only 3 out of the top 10 were manufacturing industries: 1)
the motor vehicle parts manufacturing industry; 2) the machine shops,
turned product, and screw, nut, and bolt manufacturing industry; and
3) the other fabricated metal product manufacturing industry. As shown
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Figure 4.3 Employment of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009, as
Ranked by 2009 Employment, Cleveland MSA, Ohio
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SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013).

in Figure 4.1, these were also among the largest traded industries in
1970 but declined since then. The “big four” traded industries—insurance carriers; colleges, universities, and professional schools; legal
services; and computer systems design and related services—have
expanded signiﬁcantly since 1970 and each hired over 10,000 employees in 2009. Behind the high rank of the individual and family services
industry was Cleveland’s largest employer, the Cleveland Clinic.
In contrast to Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 reveals that the 10 traded industries with the highest location quotients in 2009 were exclusively manufacturing industries, and 5 of them were also among the top 10 most
specialized traded industries in 1970. The most remarkable change
between 1970 and 2009 was in the paint, coating, and adhesive manu-
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Figure 4.4 Location Quotients of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009,
as Ranked by 2009 Location Quotient, Cleveland, Ohio
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SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013).

facturing industry, with an increase in its location quotient from 2.9 to
6.2. Location quotient changes for other traded industries were moderate, providing evidence that Cleveland has been consistently specialized in these manufacturing industries.
What can be learned about cluster development and the evolution
of traded industries in Cleveland based on these data? Three observations merit attention. To begin with, manufacturing clusters and industries are foundational to Cleveland’s economy. Table 4.1 demonstrates
that all clusters with a high national rank (by employment) are manufacturing based, as of 1998 or 2008. Similarly, Figures 4.2 and 4.4 show
that Cleveland was consistently specialized in manufacturing industries
between 1970 and 2009.
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In addition, Cleveland’s manufacturing clusters and industries have
declined, but to a large extent due to product life cycles—the nationwide downsizing of manufacturing employment. In the case of clusters,
the decade following 1998 witnessed employment growth in 2 of the 14
leading clusters in Cleveland; however, Cleveland moved upward in the
national rankings of 6 of these 14 clusters. In the case of traded industries, while nearly all of Cleveland’s top-10 largest traded industries in
1970 shrank in the following decades, changes in location quotients for
Cleveland’s 10 most-specialized traded industries in 1970 (9 of which
were manufacturing industries) were rather diversiﬁed. For example,
Cleveland in 2009 lost 80 percent of its1970 employment in the foundries industry; its location quotient by contrast went down only slightly,
from 5.3 to 3.9.
Last but not least, some service-based traded industries have exhibited their vibrancy and have been driving job creation in Cleveland for
the past four decades; however, they have yet to build standout competitive advantage nationally. For example, the insurance carriers industry had over 16,000 employees in 2009 and was Cleveland’s largest
traded industry, but had only a modestly high location quotient of 1.7.
The location quotient for Cleveland’s second-largest traded industry in
2009—colleges, universities, and professional schools—was only 1.2.

THE EVOLUTION OF CLUSTERS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CLEVELAND
How may the literature on the evolution of clusters shed light on
the revitalization of a declining manufacturing city like Cleveland? The
four streams of literature on cluster evolution introduced previously
may have the following implications for cluster-based economic development and revival strategies.
To begin with, economic development strategies should reﬂect the
primacy of the market in cluster development. As Porter (1998) has
argued, the growth of a cluster is a self-reinforcing process in which
entrepreneurs seize market opportunities embedded in the dynamics
of cluster emergence. Entrepreneurship and competition are fundamentally important for cluster development, irrespective of the clus-
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ter type. Even for the industrial complex model identiﬁed by Gordon
and McCann (2000), or similarly the hub-and-spoke districts deﬁned
by Markusen (1996), the barriers to or opportunities for entrepreneurship created by one or a few large ﬁrms are critical to the performance
of a cluster. While Seattle is generally considered a success (Markusen
1996), Detroit is notorious for the rigidity and inﬂexibility brought by
the “Detroit Three” automakers.
Industrial policy, represented by tax incentives and government
subsidies speciﬁc to certain industries or ﬁrms, has been a popular practice. One of the latest cases of this kind of policy in Cleveland was
a 15-year, $93.5 million incentive package put together by the state
government in 2011 to retain the headquarters of American Greetings,
a Fortune 1000 company, in northeast Ohio.5 This case is discussed in
Chapter 3 of this book. Industrial policy, which reﬂects the preference
of the government and not necessarily competitiveness in the market,
may distort competition, discourage new entries, and create opportunities for rent seeking and destructive entrepreneurship—not to mention
the generally higher-than-minimum costs taxpayers have to bear due to
information asymmetry between the government and incentive receivers. This type of policy challenges market primacy, is a threat to healthy
cluster development, and thus should be abandoned.
The acceptance of market primacy and the repeal of industrial policy do not, however, mean that there is no role for government in cluster development. As Porter (1998) suggests, intellectual property protection and antitrust law enforcement at the national level and human
capital development and physical infrastructure improvement at the
subnational level are important aspects of cluster policy. The decline
of population in Cleveland has made physical infrastructure sufﬁcient
for cluster development. The focus should be on investing and retaining
human capital. Based on 2000 census data, only 23 percent of Cleveland’s adult population has a bachelor’s degree, a proportion that ranks
as 157 among the 331 U.S. metropolitan areas. Human capital is critical
to both knowledge creation and entrepreneurship (Qian and Acs 2013)
and accordingly plays an important role in maintaining the vibrancy of
clusters.
The second implication from the literature is that economic development strategies should take into account the path-dependent nature of
cluster evolution. Cleveland, as it has been for most of its history, is still
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specialized in manufacturing production both for clusters and for traded
industries. Nationally, most of these are declined or declining industries,
constituting the major source of the stagnancy of Cleveland’s economy.
Despite that, any proposed cluster development strategy for Cleveland
cannot simply overlook its manufacturing base. The history of the city
renders its infrastructure, supply chains, business climate, and institutional setting all favorable to the manufacturing sector. The competitive
advantage of Cleveland lies in its support systems for manufacturing.
For the last several decades, growth has been remarkable in service
areas such as insurance carriers and legal industries, yet these services
are very competitive given the values of their location quotient. Policies
or strategies in favor of service industries over manufacturing industries
would be fundamentally wrong.
In fact, it is not “shameful” to be manufacturing based. It is good
to have a specialization in “sexy” industries where that reﬂects genuine
competitive advantage, such as within high-tech industries in Silicon
Valley or Research Triangle Park, ﬁnancial and fashion industries in
New York City, or entertainment industries in Los Angeles, but manufacturing industries can also be drivers of economic growth. According to Markusen (1996), when the national manufacturing employment
growth rate between 1970 and 1990 was almost zero, the manufacturing employment of industrial cities that grew most rapidly during this
period increased by at least 50 percent. Porter (1998) states that “all
industries can employ advanced technology; all industries can be
knowledge intensive” (p. 80).
Consequently, cities like Cleveland should not think of abandoning manufacturing, but rather should focus on building regional capacity and jurisdictional advantages that reinforce the competitiveness of
manufacturing clusters. As long as Cleveland maintains its competitive
advantage, a manufacturing industry in the city may still grow by taking
a higher share of this nationally shrinking industry. At the core of the
competitiveness of manufacturing clusters is continuous innovation.
Such changes are not speciﬁc to high-tech industries; they are fundamentally important for sustaining the growth of all industries or clusters. This imperative also calls for public policy to strengthen regional
or local human capital.
The third implication from the literature is that there is a supporting role that public policy may play in facilitating the emergence of the
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next competitive cluster in Cleveland. As Klepper (2011), Markusen
(1996), and Porter (1998) have contended, the emergence of a cluster may result from the incubation activity of existing clusters, large
incumbent ﬁrms, or institutions like universities. Irrespective of industry, knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurship are critical in the formation of clusters this way. In fact, these two factors are interrelated; as
Acs et al. (2009) and Qian and Acs (2013) argue, entrepreneurial activity may serve as a mechanism of transmitting knowledge spillovers.
Cleveland’s productivity in knowledge creation, as measured by patents per capita in year 2000, ranked 144 out of 331 metropolitan areas;
by contrast, its entrepreneurial activity, as measured by new ﬁrms per
capita in year 2000, ranked 224 out of 361 metropolitan areas.6 These
measures suggest that not only knowledge creation and spillovers but
also entrepreneurship in Cleveland need to be strengthened to foster the
development of new clusters.
Beyond human capital investment and retention, as discussed
under the ﬁrst implication, public efforts may be put into small business support programs, like business incubators and Small Business
Development Centers. Business incubators, for example, may facilitate both knowledge spillovers (through the networking opportunities
they provide) and entrepreneurship (through the various primary and
professional services they offer). The publicly funded business support
programs, in accord with cluster policy, should service local businesses
from all industries.
Last but not least, it does not matter when a regional cluster was
transformed from one type to another under a typology like Markusen’s
(1996) or from one industrial composition to another one as suggested
by Montana and Nenide (2008), as long as the cluster maintains its competitiveness. The fall of Detroit was not because its automobile cluster
evolved from a Marshallian industrial district to a hub-and-spoke district (Markusen 1996), but because, along with this transformation, the
oligopolistic Detroit Three lapsed into rigidities that deferred entrepreneurial new entries (Chinitz 1961). Cleveland used to be one of the
most entrepreneurial cities in the United States a century ago, and its
decline was largely attributed to the loss of that spirit. Cleveland’s clusters, as elsewhere, have been evolving, and today its leading clusters
more or less cover all of the four types of industrial districts identiﬁed
by Markusen. All these types of clusters could be competitive, or not.

Bowen.indb 89

12/16/2013 2:13:57 PM

90 Qian

Regardless of cluster type and industrial composition, the true sources
of clusters’ competitiveness in a region are high stocks of human capital, well-developed infrastructure, and social, business, and institutional
climates that encourage learning and innovative and entrepreneurial
activities. Cluster development policy in Cleveland and other old industrial cities should be made in these directions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter focuses on the evolution of clusters and the associated implications for the revival of old industrial cities, using Cleveland
as an example. It reviews the literature on the deﬁnitions, typologies,
and evolution paths of clusters and also introduces some facts about
Cleveland’s cluster development based on the Cluster Mapping Project
and Moody’s economy.com data. At the core of the discussion is how
cluster evolution theories may shed light on the revitalization of Cleveland. Four implications are drawn from the literature: 1) highlighting
the roles of primacy of market, 2) path dependency, 3) public policy in
the emergence of clusters, and 4) the irrelevance of cluster types in the
context of economic development. In conclusion, human capital, innovation, and entrepreneurship should be the targets of Cleveland’s focus
in building competitive clusters and regaining economic vibrancy. The
capacity building approach to cluster development, as Sallet, Paisley,
and Masterman (2009) have noted, may mean that it will be decades
before Cleveland regains its former stature in the national economy,
and it may require collective leadership from both public and private
sectors.

Notes
The author would like to thank Minkyu Yeom for his research assistance with the data
and Srikanth Sivashankaran for his editing work.
1. See http://edq.sagepub.com/reports/most-read (accessed August 18, 2011).
2. The Third Italy refers to the central and northeast regions of Italy.
3. Porter (2003) gives three primary criteria for traded industries: 1) all states with a
location quotient greater or equal to 1 account for at least half of the total employ-
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ment, 2) the top ﬁve states represent an average location quotient of at least 2, and
3) the Gini index is at least 0.3. Following Porter’s suggestion, we also excluded
resource-based industries, in this case all four-digit NAICS industries under Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (NAICS code 11) and Mining, Quarrying,
and Oil and Gas Extraction (NAICS code 21).
4. Location quotient is the share of employment in an industry in a region divided by
the share of employment in the same industry in the nation. It reﬂects the extent
to which the region is specialized in the industry compared with the nation as a
benchmark.
5. For details, see http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2011/03/american_
greetings_to_stay_in.html (accessed October 1, 2011).
6. Patent data and new ﬁrm formation data used the 1999 metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) deﬁnition and the 2003 MSAs deﬁnition, respectively, leading to
different total numbers of MSAs. Patent data were provided by Kevin Stolarick
(University of Toronto); population data were from the 2000 census; and new
ﬁrm formation data were from Business Information Tracking System of the U.S.
Census Bureau.
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Stop Shovelling
A New Workforce Development Strategy to
Promote Regional Prosperity
Joel A. Elvery
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Workers laid off in the declining industries of Rust Belt cities are
often targets of the nation’s workforce development system. Additional training, it is thought, will help these workers ﬁnd new jobs
requiring their newly acquired skills. However, this is a “needsbased” approach; those workers perceived to have the greatest
need are offered training. Perhaps, instead, the system should target displaced workers who are most likely to advance in occupations (those possessing interest and aptitude), thereby eventually
creating openings for lower-skilled workers, i.e., job chains.

Workforce development policy in the United States has been driven
by goals, rather than by what is achievable. The main focus has been to
help people with few skills enter or reenter the labor market. The programs implemented to achieve those goals, however, have had limited
success. The simple truth is that many low-skilled workers have a difﬁcult time ﬁnding work because they cannot keep up with advances in
the economy. This has been especially problematic in the manufacturing
centers of the Rust Belt, where many jobs have been lost to automation
and competition from other regions. Even if low-skilled workers could
be trained for in-demand occupations, the number of openings at any
time is much smaller than the number of people who are unemployed
or working for low wages (Lafer 2002). This means that job training for
the least skilled has limited ability to reduce poverty.
As an analogy, the labor market for each skill group is like a bucket.
The bucket for the lowest skills is large, but it is completely full and
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shrinking relative to the other buckets. Workforce development organizations have historically focused on helping individuals enter this portion of the labor market. This emphasis continues today with the tiered
service system of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), where people
are only eligible for intensive training if they have proven to be unable
to ﬁnd work at pay near that of their prior position. Consequently, training resources are targeted to people who have difﬁculty ﬁnding work
and, except during recessions and their aftermath, these individuals are
typically low skilled. The training available is generally too little to
move these participants beyond entry-level positions. While a lucky
few ﬁnd a way to stay in the labor market, most spill over the side of the
bucket. This effect discourages the many unlucky training participants
who remain unemployed and wastes public resources.
It is time to stop shoveling more individuals into low-skilled markets. We must recognize that poverty reduction is only one potential
goal for workforce policy; increasing the efﬁciency of labor markets
and the level of individuals’ earnings are also good objectives. The most
effective way to achieve these aims is to orient our workforce system
toward facilitating advancement into occupations in which the vacancies outnumber the applicants. Job training dollars should be targeted
to individuals based on interest and aptitude, not need. While this strategy would not directly assist the poorest individuals, it would have the
potential to create job openings for them. As people advance in their
careers, their prior positions will open up, which could create a job chain
that results in openings for low-skilled workers. In addition, the productivity and income increases connected to job advancement would create
economic growth. This means that an advancement-centered workforce
system could better achieve the goal of the current system: to increase
the number of low-skilled individuals who are working.
Reorienting the workforce system to promote advancement into
open positions is especially important for metropolitan areas (metros)
in the Rust Belt. In the last 50 years, the growth of regions has been
closely tied to the education level of their population (Shapiro 2006)
and there is every reason to believe that this will remain true (Moretti
2012). The Rust Belt has suffered large, long-lived manufacturing job
losses both from 1970 to 1985 and again from 1998 to 2003. These
losses have generated a negative cycle that is difﬁcult to interrupt. First,
population declines; one estimate ﬁnds a metro’s population declines by
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1.8 people per job lost from the auto or steel industries (Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern 2007). The population decline reduces unemployment
rates to typical levels, but it also alters the composition of the workforce. Declines in population lead to declines in housing prices and the
poor, who are low-skilled on average, are disproportionately attracted
to inexpensive housing (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). As a result, Rust
Belt metros, whose residents were less educated than other metros with
similar income levels and house prices before the decline in manufacturing jobs, saw slower increases in education levels than regions that
did not suffer catastrophic job loss.
Numerous programs have been put in place to increase state education levels, but evidence of their effectiveness is lacking (see Groen
[2011] for a review of the literature). The challenge is that skilled people choose to live in regions where they can ﬁnd work. As a result, for
every 10 additional bachelor’s degree holders a state graduates, it only
gains three more degree holders than it would have otherwise (Bound et
al. 2004). By focusing on the jobs that are available, programs that help
people advance into open positions are likely to be an effective way for
the Rust Belt to increase its skill level.
This chapter argues that we need to reorient our workforce development system to focus on advancement and describes policies and programs that ﬁt that orientation. The ﬁrst section presents an informal
model for thinking about how labor markets function. Then, the discussion documents the limited success of the workforce development
system created in WIA, describes the kinds of programs that would
facilitate career advancement, and presents recent successful initiatives that demonstrate the value of advancement-centered workforce
development.

A LABOR MARKET FRAMEWORK
A great deal of evidence shows that labor markets in industrialized countries are imperfectly competitive (well summarized in Manning [2003]). It is best to think of U.S. labor markets as made up of
many submarkets, where each one covers a particular skill level and
a metropolitan area or nonmetropolitan region. Due to chance, people
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with the same skills can earn different wages, depending on which job
they ﬁnd. A worker with the good fortune to ﬁnd a high-paying job is
less likely to leave. People can only take jobs that are available, and
most submarkets have about as many open positions as job seekers. The
least-skilled submarkets are the largest; the more skilled the submarket,
the smaller it is. Movement between different submarkets can be done
in several ways. If individuals lose a job and cannot ﬁnd one at the same
skill level, they eventually fall to a lower-skill submarket. People can
also advance from one level to the next, but only with an investment of
time and usually money.
There are two types of unemployed workers in our labor markets.
Some jobless individuals have worked before or have recently completed college or other substantial training. The other group consists of
people who are hoping to enter the labor market either for the ﬁrst time
or after a long spell of unemployment.
The degree of balance between the number of jobs and the number
of people at each skill level has important ramiﬁcations. In submarkets with more people than jobs, unemployment persists and employers
face little pressure to increase wages. In submarkets with more jobs
than people, employers increase wages to attract the available workers.
There are large differences in the numbers of jobs and people in lowskilled submarkets (where people outnumber jobs) and submarkets that
require speciﬁc technical skills but not a college degree (where jobs
sometimes outnumber people). This can be seen in Figure 5.1, which
shows the average from May 2005 to November 2007 of the number
of unemployed individuals by most recent occupation and the number of openings advertised online in the occupation.1 The occupations
where there were more than ﬁve unemployed workers for every advertised position are less skilled: farming, ﬁshing, and forestry; construction and extraction; buildings and grounds cleaning and maintenance;
food preparation and serving related; personal care and service; and
production. The occupations with less than one unemployed worker per
each opening are all highly skilled: computer and mathematical science; health care practitioners and technical; architecture and engineering; business and ﬁnancial operations; life, physical, and social science;
management; community and social services; and legal.
The least skilled submarkets have many more seekers than jobs.
Most individuals enter the labor market at this stratum. Some people
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Figure 5.1 Average of the Help Wanted Online Supply/Demand Rate, by
Occupation, from May 2005 to November 2007
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NOTE: Average supply/demand rate is the average from May 2005 through November
2007 of the number of unemployed persons divided by the number of online helpwanted ads. “All occupations” is the total number of unemployed divided by the total
number of ads. The occupation-speciﬁc rates are based on unemployed persons’ occupations in their prior occupations and the number of ads speciﬁc to that occupation.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Help Wanted OnLine (Conference Board 2013),
accessed through Haver Analytics on March 6, 2013.

quickly move on to more skilled work, but others stay in these submarkets for their whole career. There are two major reasons that these
low-skilled markets have more participants than positions. First, workers of any skill level can compete in this market if they need to do so.
Second, the demand for labor in the least skilled submarkets has been
declining as a share of overall demand; as a proportion of employment,
the number of workers who specialize in manual tasks or routine cognitive functions has steadily declined since 1970 (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003).
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Many submarkets for skilled technical workers with less than a college degree have more positions than eligible job seekers. These midskilled occupations account for a large share of our labor markets (Holzer and Lerman 2009). However, the number of people pursuing skilled
technical degrees and certiﬁcates is predicted to grow more slowly than
the number of positions requiring those skills (Aspen Institute 2003).
This is already leading to fast-rising wages for some midskilled jobs.
For example, while overall real wages grew by 5 percent from 1997
to 2005, the real wages of radiological technicians rose by 23 percent,
and those of electricians rose by 18 percent (Holzer and Lerman 2009).
Because many such jobs require both specialized training and related
experience, it takes time for people to enter these submarkets. People
qualiﬁed for skilled technical jobs are less likely to migrate for a job
than are people in occupations that require a college degree or higher
(Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992). Therefore, employers usually ﬁnd
themselves searching for someone with a narrowly deﬁned set of skills
within the local region, which can be difﬁcult. This has been true even
during the slow recovery from the 2007–2009 recession.
How does the workforce development system ﬁt into this framework? In an ideal world, workforce programs would help people move
from submarkets with more seekers than openings to those with more
openings than seekers. This means facilitating the transition of people
into skilled technical submarkets and out of the least skilled submarkets.
However, the workforce development system created by WIA allocates
occupational training services to people who cannot ﬁnd work. Except
during recessions, much of the money goes to the least skilled job seekers, who are unlikely to have the basic skills required for midskilled
jobs. This means that public money is focused on training people to
enter low-skilled labor submarkets. Without job growth in the least
skilled submarkets, this is like adding sand to a bucket that is already
full. Some of the new entrants may ﬁnd jobs, but only at the cost of
displacing other people who are already working or looking for work.
This is why we need to refocus workforce development toward
advancement in the labor force, which would start with increasing the
ﬂow of people into skilled technical occupations. Typically, individuals
with some skills and work history can move into technical work more
easily than people who have been out of the labor force or in the least
skilled jobs. This implies that the people most eligible for advancing

Bowen.indb 100

12/16/2013 2:14:00 PM

Stop Shovelling 101

into skilled technical work are those who have been or are currently
employed in the next tier down. While helping such individuals would
not directly assist those who are disengaged from the labor market, it
could produce substantial beneﬁts for people in less-skilled submarkets
by beginning a string of advancing workers, called a job chain. Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) estimate that 10 new jobs with
hourly wages of $16.75 to $26.15 create 8.6 vacancies in lower-wage
positions.2 Job chains provide real opportunity to low-skilled individuals, in contrast to the false promise of training that does not lead to
employment.

THE TRACK RECORD OF THE CURRENT
WORKFORCE SYSTEM
Many readers may be disturbed by the proposition that the workforce system should abandon its almost exclusive focus on reducing
poverty by assisting the least skilled. I am not arguing that we should
give up the goal of assisting the poor—indeed, I believe our nation
should be doing more to that end—but I do believe that the current
public job training system is not a good way to achieve this mission.
It is not at all clear that the present approach to workforce development helps the poor in a meaningful way. Harry Holzer, a supporter of
job training programs, acknowledges the limited success of the public
job training system (2009). Unfortunately, there has not been a rigorous
evaluation of the beneﬁts of the WIA system, but the system that was
in place from 1986 to 1998, created by the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA), was evaluated using a classical randomized experiment.
Holzer (2009) reports that the average annual earnings gain for disadvantaged adults found by the National JTPA Study was about $100
per month in real dollars, with these effects appearing to dissipate over
time. While these programs have net beneﬁts, the fact remains that $100
per month in gross beneﬁt per participant is a minor gain. The results
for youths are even weaker. These ﬁgures cover the program under the
JTPA, when classroom-based occupational skills training was the main
service individuals received from workforce agencies. Because evaluations have shown that occupational skills training have the largest and
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longest sustained effects, it is likely that the typical effect of WIA services on individuals’ earnings is well below that of the JTPA. In 2007,
only 13.6 percent of people assisted through the federal WIA received
training services (Social Policy Research Associates 2010).
In his book, The Job Training Charade, Gordon Lafer (2002) makes
a compelling case that the limited labor market success of low-skilled
individuals is due as much to the lack of openings as to the lack of
skills. The majority of entry-level jobs in the United States essentially
require that a worker be on time, learn to do three-to-ﬁve simple tasks,
and have a good attitude and basic motor skills. The challenge for lowskilled individuals is not that they are unable to do the work, but that
there are too many people eligible for the same jobs.
This explains why most job training efforts have had limited success: they do not address the root problem. Even more than skills, workers on the margin need job openings. The most obvious way to create
these is through government programs that provide work opportunities
and income. There are four major difﬁculties with this approach. First,
it is unsustainable because the individuals only have jobs as long as
the government pays for them. Second, it is unlikely that these individuals would be efﬁciently employed. Third, such a program would
most likely need to continually grow as there has been a 40-year trend
of low-skilled work declining as a share of employment (Autor, Levy,
and Murnane 2003). Furthermore, even if this were an efﬁcient use of
resources, it has proven to be politically infeasible.
Sadly, federal workforce development programs have not achieved
their goal of decreasing poverty, nor have they made labor markets
more efﬁcient. In 1982, the occupations that employers described as
important and difﬁcult to ﬁll with qualiﬁed candidates included “computer programmers, systems analysts, word processors, data processors,
medical and laboratory technicians, machinists, and electricians” (Lafer
2002, p. 53). Today, only word and data processors can be removed
from that list. This inability to address the needs of employers hurts
regional and national economies. For example, Microsoft has opened
ofﬁces in Canada in order to take advantage of that nation’s skillfavoring immigration policies (Gohring 2007). When ﬁrms select work
sites, the availability of a suitable workforce is usually a top consideration. Regions that are adept at training individuals for more skilled
work are attractive to employers. This is illustrated by the subsidized,
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custom training programs provided by North Carolina’s community
college system, which have been credited for playing an important role
in the strong growth of the state’s Research Triangle region (Schmidt
1997).
WIA’s tiered service system limits the ability of its programs to
beneﬁt employers because training is directed to the clients with the
least skills. Data on the skills of those who receive training are not available. However, intensive training is reserved for people who are unable
ﬁnd work for an extended period of time, and it is reasonable to assume
that training participants are less skilled than the people who ﬁnd work
through Workforce Investment Board (WIB) postings. A Government
Accountability Ofﬁce survey (2006) of ﬁrms that posted positions with
one-stop centers operated through WIA found that two-thirds of the
people hired from these postings were low skilled. Given the weak fundamental skills of people who are unable to secure even the most basic
entry-level work, the hard-to-employ people that the workforce system
focuses on are unlikely to succeed in midskilled careers. In order to
address employers’ needs, the workforce system would have to target
training resources away from the least skilled and toward people with
strong basic skills.
The U.S. workforce development system spends an overwhelming
majority share of its resources on people who are not employed. However, it lacks mechanisms for helping people with jobs, or those who
are able to ﬁnd their own jobs, to advance in their ﬁelds or to change
careers. This would not be a problem if our economy were made up of
nothing but large employers; such entities can hire people for entrylevel positions, learn about their aptitudes, and provide training for them
to progress within the organization. However, 34.9 percent of employees at for-proﬁt ﬁrms in the United States work at companies with fewer
than 100 employees; another 14.1 percent work at ﬁrms with 100–499
employees (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010). For these people, advancing often requires changing employers.
The system of one-stop centers operated through WIA does provide a variety of training, but most clients either are not given access
to these resources or they choose not to use them. Of the 3.1 million
people served under WIA throughout the United States from October
2007 to September 2010, only 382,626 (12.4 percent) received training
services, and 15.9 percent of these were provided on-the-job or cus-
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tomized training.3 This means that less than 2 percent of the adults and
dislocated workers served by the WIA system during this time span
received on-the-job or customized training, the forms that are most connected to the vision of refocusing the workforce development system
on advancement.
The primary public mechanisms in place to help people advance
are community colleges and career centers.4 These are vital institutions, which deserve continued support and growth, but are insufﬁcient
in terms of capacity, affordability for students, and services offered.
Unlike that provided by the WIA, individuals must pay for community
college and career center training. As will be discussed in more detail, it
is difﬁcult for people who have the goal of becoming more skilled to get
the information they need about employment opportunities and options
for training. This uncertainty about how to move up and the clear
upfront costs of training are part of the reason that there is an imbalance
between job seekers and openings for midskilled occupations.
When someone advances to a higher-paying career, society as a
whole beneﬁts. The individual has more disposable income and consumes a portion of the incremental funds, causing economic growth.
Such workers also pay more taxes. Importantly, one person advancing
can start a chain of other people progressing, too. Suppose Jane has
been working on the Geek Squad at Best Buy and becomes a computer
programmer. Best Buy may promote a customer service worker into
the Geek Squad and then hire a new customer service worker. Presumably, Jane’s advancement has led to wage increases for one or two other
workers and created an entry-level opening, which people who want
to enter the labor market most need. These beneﬁts are not just hypothetical; Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) show that adding 100
midskilled jobs to a local economy creates 80 openings in lower-skilled
positions.

POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE ADVANCEMENT
Workforce development focused on advancement would play several roles lacking in our current system:
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•

identify occupations with the highest ratio of vacancies to eligible candidates;

•

assess individuals interested in career change or advancement to
determine their occupational aptitude;

•

encourage people with high aptitude for an in-demand occupation and who earn less than they would in that ﬁeld to pursue
training to become qualiﬁed for the area;

•

work with employers and educators to identify bottlenecks so
that a larger portion of those pursuing in-demand occupations
eventually become qualiﬁed.

There are a number of programs that could be introduced or expanded to facilitate advancement. To identify where public intervention
would be effective, it is helpful to think about the stages of progression
for an employed individual. Imagine Dave, a 20-year-old working at a
“big box” retailer who wants to gain skills and increase his earnings.
There are limited opportunities for him within the store because there
are few supervisory positions, and much of the ordering and logistics
is automated. Dave will ﬁnd it easier to secure a promotion elsewhere.
This means that his employer, even though it is large, has little incentive
to invest in his advancement.
Dave’s ﬁrst step would be to identify a new career. Ideally, he would
base this decision on the number of openings, wage and employment
trends, and knowledge of his own aptitudes. But where would he get
such information about different ﬁelds? For people who are working,
one-stop employment centers provide self-service assistance—essentially showing them how to use computer resources to look up information on jobs and training opportunities. He might go to the admissions
ofﬁce of a community college or a proprietary school (a for-proﬁt technical or trade school), though many people only take that step after they
have identiﬁed a career. Most likely, he will talk to friends and family
and accumulate anecdotal evidence about what careers are secure, pay
well, and suit him. Depending on whom he talks to, he may or may
not make a good choice. This is the ﬁrst opportunity for improvement:
provide easy access to more and better information on advancement
opportunities.
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After Dave selects a career, he has to choose a route for training.
Some avenues are self-evident, such as community colleges and proprietary schools. Other paths do not have such clear entry points and,
particularly in the case of on-the-job training (OJT), can require ﬁnding
a supportive ﬁrm. Suppose Dave decides to become a chef. The general
consensus is that proprietary culinary schools are not worth their cost
and it is better to learn through on-the-job experience (Hallock 2011).
But how would Dave know this? How would he judge which restaurant
jobs will provide valuable OJT? How would he know whether a community college or a proprietary school has a program that is respected
and valued by employers? Again, there is a critical lack of information
available to guide people on their paths to better jobs.
Another factor in advancing is ﬁnding a program that accommodates Dave’s work schedule and has slots available. Community colleges and proprietary schools have made great strides in accommodating working students’ schedules, but community college programs that
lead to careers in high-demand ﬁelds, such as nursing and radiography,
often have long waiting lists. These programs could be expanded. While
it is generally easy to borrow money for college, Dave may require
assistance with child care or transportation. Help may also be needed
to avoid predatory school loans, especially for students at proprietary
schools.
If all goes smoothly and Dave does manage to get the training he
needs to advance, he then has to search for work. If he chose a career
well, this should be the easy part because he would be moving into a
ﬁeld where there are more openings than people. If not, he may need
further assistance in identifying job opportunities. This is an area where
help is usually readily available, either through local one-stop centers
or the placement ofﬁces of individuals’ alma maters.
This hypothetical case demonstrates four clear areas in which government policies and programs could facilitate advancement for Dave
and others like him: ﬁrst, improving information and available counseling to help people choose careers that are in demand and for which they
have an aptitude; second, producing necessary information about community colleges, career centers, and proprietary schools; third, making
it easier to get training through cost savings, convenient scheduling,
and support services; and ﬁnally, matching individuals to the best available job through placement assistance.
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Career Counseling
The ﬁrst program that could facilitate advancement is one that
devotes resources to making career counseling more broadly available. Workers need to know where they can turn to get guidance about
how and where to advance. This could be achieved by refocusing WIA
spending in order to make substantive career counseling available to
everyone who is interested. Any such expansion of services needs to
be paired with a comprehensive marketing campaign so that people
are regularly reminded of the opportunity. The WIA route is attractive
because it could be paid for by redirecting funds from existing WIA
programs, rather than by ﬁnding new money to allocate to workforce
development. Of course, more could be accomplished with additional
resources, particularly since public spending on job training has been
declining as a share of gross domestic product since the 1980s (Holzer
2009). The challenge would be overcoming public perception of the
WIA-funded one-stop centers as places that help the unemployed.
Teenagers might feel more comfortable using the career services
available at their local high schools. Even if they only serve their current students, counselors in high schools can make a large impact on
students’ career decisions. However, counselors are spread thin and
have limited time available to give career advice. In 2006 there was
one counselor for every 285 high school students in the United States
(Barton 2006), and the number of students per counselors has most
likely risen because of budget cuts during the recession (Flaherty 2013).
Where counselors do remain, they primarily advise students how to ﬁnd
the right college, not the right career. This leaves students who would
be well suited for skilled technical jobs without advice on that option.
The lucky ones ﬁnd their way to community colleges, where they may
get better career direction. Many others will enter the workforce with
no guidance about preparing for a career.
Information about Training Programs
One of the reasons that career counselors are so crucial is that there
is little public information that can guide individuals toward job openings and training programs. Unlike four-year institutions, community
colleges are not featured and compared in guides to ﬁnding the “best”
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program. Good career counselors become experts on local employers
and training options. Therefore, the second option would be to give the
public access to information about different career training options.
At a minimum, there are ﬁve pieces of information that need to be
available to help individuals choose a career path and training program:
1) the proportion of people completing the program who are employed
in a related ﬁeld a year later, 2) the median monthly earnings of people
a year after their completion of the program, 3) the average weekly
hours the completers worked a year after ﬁnishing, 4) the percentage
of people who start the program who also ﬁnish, and 5) the number of
completers. This information should be gathered on a two- or threeyear rolling basis so that it is up to date and also robust to idiosyncratic
ﬂuctuations. Such material would tell individuals how likely it is that
the program would lead to a job, what they can expect to earn, and
the probability of ﬁnishing the curriculum.5 The data would come from
annual surveys of students who have completed programs, which are
currently used at some community colleges. These statistics would have
to be collected for all the major types of training providers: proprietary
schools, career centers, community colleges, and Internet-only schools.
Supporting the Training Process
The third way to facilitate advancement would be to provide support services while individuals are in training. Many such services
have been put into place in the last couple of decades, but it would be
worthwhile to expand them further. Policies that make training more
affordable for individuals, such as repealing the automatic reduction
of Pell Grants for students attending low-tuition schools and expanding the number of seats in community colleges, could also help people
advance (Kazis et al. 2007). Working adults would especially beneﬁt if
subsidized student loans were extended to part-time students. Offering
a complete set of courses when working people ﬁnd it convenient has
become more important with the increased need for lifelong learning
and growth in single-parent and dual-earner families. People who go
to school at night have difﬁculty ﬁnding child care, so expanding these
programs is also important.
Community college is one of the best mechanisms we have in
place for facilitating advancement. These institutions are usually lower
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in cost, and their students have higher earnings and employment rates
ﬁve years after entering school than observationally similar proprietary
school students (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012). Many are highly
responsive to the requirements of local employers, which helps them
prepare students for occupations with available openings. Community
colleges welcome students who take one or two classes of their choosing, enabling people to get just the training they need, so continuing to
improve and expand these institutions is essential. Three areas stand out
as opportunities for development: 1) enlarging programs with waiting
lists and strong placement records, 2) assessing students to ensure that
those enrolling in high-demand programs are likely to succeed, and 3)
steering students to programs that have high placement rates.
Even with limited information available, many people are able to
ﬁnd training that leads to jobs. As a result, many of the community
college programs with the best placement records have waiting lists.
This is especially true in health careers. For example, nursing and
radiological technology programs often have one-to-two-year waiting
lists.6 If these programs could expand capacity, it would help individuals advance and assist hospitals in coping with the shortage of nurses
and radiology techs. Of course, this is a difﬁcult task, and two major
factors that limit the growth of programs have proven hard to address:
the lack of instructors (Yordy 2006) and the scarcity of opportunities for
clinical training. Both stem in part from the choices of local employers:
people qualiﬁed to be instructors can earn more practicing than teaching, and most clinical training happens at local hospitals. Partnerships
between educational institutions and employers, such as Cincinnati’s
Healthcare Career Collaborative, are the most likely way to address
these problems.
Until programs with waiting lists and strong placement records
grow, we can facilitate advancement by doing a better job of allocating the limited spots available. Particularly in health career programs,
a substantial minority of students drop out of training programs. Some
community colleges now allocate seats in health sciences programs
with wait lists based on students’ academic aptitude (Moltz 2010). This
should become standard practice for community colleges across the
country.
Providing information and counseling to help people choose occupations and training programs is crucial to reorienting our workforce
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development system toward advancement. Improving student advising
at community colleges is a relatively easy way to do this. In the last
10 years, tremendous gains have been made in creating longitudinally
linked wage record ﬁles from the unemployment insurance system.
Some states and community colleges are using these data to produce
rich information about the employment and wages of students who have
earned credentials. Many community colleges survey recent graduates
as another way to learn about the career outcomes of their students.
However, this knowledge is often not conveyed to students. Advising
tends to focus on student desires, which may or may not include an
awareness of the job prospects associated with different training paths.
If advisers consciously direct students to programs that lead to employment, both students and the local economy will beneﬁt.
Of course, advisers can only steer the students with whom they
meet. According to the 2013 Community College Survey of Student
Engagement, 50.8 percent of community college students never or
rarely use career counseling; 20.2 percent responded “Don’t know/
not applicable” (Center for Community College Student Engagement
2013). Career counseling is needed by more than the scant 29 percent of
community college students that sometimes or frequently use it.
Placement Assistance
The last strategy that can help promote advancement is placement
assistance. Not everyone knows the importance of ﬁnding a job that also
offers a career. Placement support needs to help people ﬁnd employers
and also determine whether the employer will assist them in advancing
further. Continuing to provide job readiness training, which has proven
to be a cost effective way to help people retain their jobs (Holzer 2009),
is also worthwhile.

PROGRAMS THAT HAVE SHOWN PROMISE
The Cleveland/Cuyahoga County Workforce Investment Board
Some exciting new workforce development programs have been
implemented that also demonstrate how to facilitate advancement. The

Bowen.indb 110

12/16/2013 2:14:02 PM

Stop Shovelling 111

Cleveland/Cuyahoga County Workforce Investment Board (CCCWIB)
completely reinvented itself in 2010 because of a combination of budget cuts and disappointment with the share of participants who were
unable to ﬁnd work after completing training. Under the direction of
Larry Benders, the agency shifted roles from that of a traditional WIB,
which views itself as an organization that provides training for hard-toemploy individuals, to one more like an employment placement agency.
Essentially, because of the 2007–2009 recession, the number of people
with job skills coming into the CCCWIB’s employment centers dramatically increased. This meant that the challenge was ﬁnding openings
for them, not making them employable.
To ﬁnd positions, the CCCWIB combines cold-calling employers
with a sales force similar to that of a for-proﬁt employment agency.
The CCCWIB matches the openings to a database of people looking for
employment. Qualiﬁed individuals receive calls informing them of an
opportunity and its application procedure. Positions for which the number of qualiﬁed prospective workers is insufﬁcient are targeted for job
training. Individuals with an interest and aptitude for the opening are
hired by the employer, who receives a grant to defray the cost of training the clients. This hews to the idea of advancement in that it focuses
job training resources on cases in which qualiﬁed workers are hard to
ﬁnd and on those individuals who show strong potential for success.
The CCCWIB’s new demand-facing approach has only been in
place since July 2010 and has not been rigorously evaluated. However,
the available evidence suggests that the strategy is producing better outcomes. Compared to the rest of Ohio in the program years since the new
approach was implemented (2010 and 2011), the CCCWIB saw more
improvement in the outcomes of exiters than did the rest of the state.
The results are reported in Table 5.1. In 2011, the entered employment
rates (the percent of exiters who were unemployed at the beginning
of their program who were employed one quarter after exiting from
the program) for both adult and displaced worker exiters were above
the comparable rates in 2007, while for the rest of the state these two
indicators were well below their 2007 levels. Similar patterns hold for
the average earnings of adult exiters, but for displaced worker exiters
the CCCWIB and the rest of the state had similar changes in earnings.
The CCCWIB also had larger increases in the number of adults and
displaced workers served during 2010 and 2011 than did the rest of the
state.
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Exiter’s entered employment rate (%)
Program
year

Adults

Average earnings (2012$)

Displaced workers

Adults

Displaced workers

CCCWIB

Rest of Ohio

CCCWIB

Rest of Ohio

CCCWIB

Rest of Ohio

CCCWIB

Rest of Ohio

2007

80.1

78.2

84.7

87.5

14,702

16,264

18,479

18,629

2008

75.5

75.3

82.6

85.1

19,118

16,085

20,005

18,833

2009

53.1

65.6

62.3

68.6

14,755

15,472

17,405

18,038

2010

79.8

66.4

79.5

73.1

14,889

14,965

18,885

19,519

2011

91.2

72.9

91.1

79.1

18,244

15,585

19,564

19,487

SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data included in State of Ohio Workforce Investment Act Annual Reports for program years
2007–2011(Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services 2013); Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2013a).
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At the same time that the outcomes of CCCWIB’s exiters improved
more than those for the remainder of the state, the Cleveland area was
experiencing slower employment growth than the rest of Ohio. Table
5.2 gives the percentage change in employment during each program
year for the Cleveland Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)—which has
the county served by the CCCWIB as its core—and for the rest of Ohio.7
In each program year from 2007 to 2009, the Cleveland CBSA lost a
larger share of its employment than did the rest of Ohio. In 2010 and
2011, the Cleveland CBSA had less growth than did the rest of the state.
This is especially true in program year 2011, when employment grew
by 0.51 percent in the CBSA and 2.31 percent in the rest of the state.
The fact that the Cleveland area was growing less than the rest of the
state during the implementation of the demand-facing approach makes
the larger improvement in the outcomes of the CCCWIB’s exiters all
the more impressive.
The experience of the CCCWIB also gives hope that the public
job training system can be radically transformed without additional
funding. Due to the formulas for allocating WIA dollars, the CCCWIB
saw its budget cut in half from 2007 to 2011. This means that the WIB
served more clients and improved their outcomes at the same time it
was cutting staff and services. Other WIBs may also ﬁnd it possible to
achieve better results without increasing budgets by focusing on ﬁnding open positions, matching workers to those jobs, and training people
when there are not enough qualiﬁed applicants.
While the CCCWIB’s new approach has only been in effect since
July 2010, this innovative program has performed exceptionally well in
a difﬁcult time. More people are being placed into jobs (Perkins 2011),
and those individuals are earning more than in the past. Anecdotally,
employers are ﬁnding it valuable to partner with the WIB. People are
receiving training that actually leads to jobs, and ﬁrms are getting help
preparing people for hard-to-ﬁll positions. This is a leading example of
how the workforce system could promote advancement and make labor
markets more efﬁcient.
Other Workforce Development Initiatives
A pilot program that has shown promise is the Frontline Decision
Support System (FDSS), which was a partnership between the W.E.
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Table 5.2 Percentage Change in Employment in Cleveland Core Based
Statistical Area (CBSA) and the Rest of Ohio, 2007–2011
Program year
Cleveland CBSA
Rest of Ohio
2007
−1.31
−1.12
2008
−6.43
−6.13
2009
−0.64
−0.22
2010
0.57
0.97
2011
0.51
2.31
NOTE: WIA program years run from July of the indicated calendar year through June
of the following year. The employment percentage changes are calculated from June
of the indicated calendar year to June of the following calendar year.
SOURCE: Seasonally adjusted Current Employment Statistics June 2007 to June 2012
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013b).

Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and the Georgia Department of Labor.8 The Upjohn Institute has developed a methodology
that takes advantage of aggregate labor market and administrative data
from the unemployment insurance system and the Georgia Career Centers. For individuals served, the FDSS determines job prospects using
advancement-oriented criteria: the chance of ﬁnding work in the client’s most recent industry, the likely pay in the client’s next position,
and the occupations related to, growth prospects of, and available job
openings in the client’s most recent occupation.
The job counselors at Georgia Career Centers have been able to use
this information to help clients target their job searches or pursue training that will help them secure a job. The FDSS also assisted with this
task by giving counselors data on which class of service was most effective for prior clients who were similar to the current client. This helped
counselors guide individuals to the type of training that has the best
prospects for success. The two pilot implementations of this program
have received positive feedback from both staff and clients (Eberts and
O’Leary 2009), but the state of Georgia has cancelled the program.
The FDSS has promoted advancement in three ways. First, it has
helped individuals to develop realistic expectations about their job prospects, which prevents them from declining positions that pay less than
what they want but more than they should expect. Second, it has given
individuals a sense of the prospects for their occupation, which helps
people in fading ﬁelds choose to train for another career. Finally, it has
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provided guidance on which services are most likely to lead to employment. Giving counselors more relevant information should increase the
number of job seekers who pursue training that helps them advance.
In the arena of workforce development, programs that focus on speciﬁc sectors and on developing career pathways are seen as the most
promising route forward (Holzer 2009). Sectoral initiatives with a successful track record, such as the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership and Jewish Vocational Service of Greater Boston, combine close
relationships with employers and, relative to most WIA-funded activities, long and intensive training that addresses basic skills (8th grade–
level math, reading, and critical thinking), ﬁeld-speciﬁc skills, and job
readiness (Maguire et al. 2010). Participants also have substantially
larger earnings increases than do those in the typical WIA program. The
average earnings gain was $4,000 per year for participants in the most
successful sectoral program (Maguire et al. 2010), versus only $1,200
per year for WIA participants (Holzer 2009).
Sectoral workforce programs share many of the features that an
advancement-focused workforce system would need. First, they screen
applicants and work only with those who are anticipated to succeed in
training, which typically requires 6th-grade reading skills. This means
that they are better targeting their services to people who are likely
to advance than the WIA system does. Public/Private Ventures evaluated three of these programs and found that 7.0 percent of their participants did not have a high school degree or general equivalency diploma
(GED), compared to almost 16.7 percent of people who received intensive services through WIA in program year 2005 (Maguire et al. 2010;
Social Policy Research Associates 2010). This difference is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.1 percent level. Second, sectoral programs foster
close relationships with employers, helping to focus training on occupations with available openings. Finally, these programs stress developing technical competencies related to speciﬁc occupations, rather than
basic skills or job readiness. This emphasis on hard skills training is
essential to advancement.
In fact, the success of these sectoral programs may make the best
case for shifting to an advancement-focused workforce system. They all
have a mission to serve disadvantaged workers, a pool of individuals that
typically ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to succeed in training. It is likely that similar efforts would produce even more impressive results if they placed
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less emphasis on socioeconomic status and more emphasis on aptitude.
This is not to say that programs that serve disadvantaged workers and
job seekers are unimportant. We should maintain and grow efforts like
these while simultaneously introducing similar programs to promote
advancement that serve a broader cross section of the workforce.
These notable workforce development programs all have a greater
focus on advancement than is typical. Each of them has shown promise, although only sectoral training has been experimentally evaluated.
Collectively, they suggest that reorienting our workforce development
system toward advancement can be successful, both in theory and in
practice.

CONCLUSIONS
Workforce development policy has two fundamental goals: to assist
individuals who are struggling in the labor market, and to help employers ﬁnd workers with the skills they need. The track record on helping
individuals is mixed; the one on helping employers is even weaker. We
could do better at both goals if we reoriented our workforce development system toward helping people advance into open positions. This
would require redirecting resources away from individuals who are not
working toward those who are and who have good potential for promotion. Given the small beneﬁts disadvantaged workers typically get
from government-sponsored training, it is important to not overstate the
value of the existing programs for this group of individuals.
Promoting advancement is especially important in the Rust Belt for
several reasons. Targeting resources to help people upskill into open
positions would speed the process of adapting to further losses of manufacturing employment. Increasing the supply of workers eligible for
midskilled jobs that manufacturers report having difﬁculty hiring, such
as machinists and industrial equipment mechanics, may reduce employment losses by encouraging manufacturers to stay in the region. Finally,
the incremental improvements in skills associated with advancements
can add up and reduce the gap in skills between the Rust Belt and the
nation as a whole.
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It may be possible to reorient our workforce development system
toward advancement without additional funding. This new approach
would probably provide more intensive services, but it would also serve
fewer people. This is because people would be trained for open positions; the best estimates are that there are usually 10 times as many
people (employed and unemployed) looking for new jobs as there are
available jobs (Lafer 2002). Both individuals and employers would be
better assisted by a program that moves fewer people into open positions than by one that provides many people training that does not lead
to jobs. In fact, the CCCWIB was able to greatly improve its placement
results by becoming “demand facing” despite simultaneously suffering
large budget cuts.
It is reasonable to hope that this strategy would also assist the disadvantaged people who are currently the focus of the U.S. workforce
development system. Research and common sense suggest that the
primary obstacle faced by these individuals is the chasm between the
large number of people searching for low-skilled work and the smaller
quantity of available positions. Helping people advance can lessen the
gap by moving people from this market to more-skilled labor markets.
Furthermore, it is likely that having more people progress to skilled
employment will stimulate the economy because of increases in both
productivity and earnings. As the experience of the 1990s showed us,
sustained economic growth is the most reliable way to assist disadvantaged workers on a large scale.

Notes
1. These are averages of the occupation group-level Help Wanted OnLine data (Conference Board 2013) from the ﬁrst month data are available to the beginning of the
most recent recession.
2. Based on Table 5.2 in Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) and adjusting wages
for inﬂation from 1992 to 2012.
3. These ﬁgures are the author’s calculations from the Annual WIASRD Data Books
for program 2007–2009 (Social Policy Research Associates 2010).
4. A career center is a Perkins Act vocational educational venue that serves high
school students and adults. The centers provide classroom and cooperative training, usually for a smaller set of occupations than would a community college.
5. Completion can be hard to deﬁne because sometimes students get enough training
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to be hired for a skilled technical job prior to ﬁnishing a program. Whether or not
these people should be counted as completers is a difﬁcult question. The premise
here remains relevant: students need to know if the program leads to employment
and the pay and hours associated with that work.
6. While there are not good aggregate data on the length of community college waitlists, there are reports from the popular media, such as Korry (2010). Data are
available on the number of eligible students turned away from entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs. In the 2010–2011 academic year, 101,060 students
were accepted to these programs while 58,327 eligible students were turned away
(American Association of Colleges of Nursing 2012). This implies that admissions would increase by more than half if there were sufﬁcient capacity.
7. WIA program years run from July of the indicated calendar year through June of
the following year. The employment percentage changes are calculated from June
of the indicated calendar year to June of the following calendar year.
8. This description of FDSS summarizes Eberts and O’Leary (2002).
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Distinctly Cleveland
How the Arts are Helping
to Revitalize Rust Belt Cities
Gregory M. Sadlek
Joan Chase
Cleveland State University

Faced with the decline of the traditional manufacturing-based
economic engine, a handful of fading Rust Belt cities turned to
the arts as a means for revitalizing their local economies. Among
them is Cleveland, a city known for its rich cultural heritage.
While the arts may not replace the number of high-wage factory
jobs lost in manufacturing, it does offer different types of beneﬁts
related to quality-of-life that help redeﬁne a community’s concept
of prosperity.

Downtown Grand Rapids, Michigan, was once in decline. Hurt by
international competition, its manufacturing plants were closing, and,
at the same time, residents began moving out of the city to the suburbs. In the mid-1990s the situation started to change, and the turning
point seemed to be the opening of the Van Andel Arena in the middle of downtown (Thompson 2006). Civic leaders, however, realized
that revitalization was not simply a matter of constructing large public
buildings; they needed a grand strategy to draw people back into the
core of the city.
In 2005, under the leadership of Urban Marketing Collaborative,
a new “Arts and Entertainment Strategy: Downtown Grand Rapids”
report was created (Urban Marketing Collaborative 2005). The vision
captured in this document called for Grand Rapids to capitalize on “its
growing reputation as a destination arts and entertainment area” (p. 1).
It would have three distinct arts “attitude districts,” interconnected but
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distinct, that would draw audiences and enable them to be immersed in
a vibrant city core containing a broad cross section of arts. The values
reﬂected in this large arts district were to be “diversity, eclecticism,
urbanity, sophistication, high culture,” and it would become “a living
laboratory to experiment, explore, learn and share” (p. 2).
Although the document called for better marketing and promotion
efforts, no mention was made of what would become one of the most
important revitalization tools of Grand Rapids: the annual fall ArtPrize
contest. Created in 2009 by Rick DeVos, grandson of Amway founder
Rich DeVos, this contest annually transforms downtown Grand Rapids
into a living museum of art. But the distinguishing feature is that the
substantial prizes, until recently, were awarded not by professional art
critics, but by the visiting public.1 In 2011, the festival drew approximately 322,000 visitors, who experienced the works of 1,580 artists in
162 separate venues (Linn 2012).
The payoff to the city is the ﬁnancial boost given by the visitors to
the community. A study by Anderson Economic Group (2011) of East
Lansing, Michigan, estimates that the 2011 ArtPrize competition added
$15.4 million to the local economy. In addition, the Detroit Free Press
reports that the competition has been so successful that it is now being
copied in such cities as Akron, New York, and Los Angeles (Stryker
2012). Clearly, the arts strategy envisioned in the 2005 strategic plan
has succeeded in a signiﬁcant way, and it presents a model of urban
revitalization for other midwestern Rust Belt cities.
Milwaukee is also steeped in a manufacturing heritage but is now
counting on the arts to develop a new economic future. The Cultural
Alliance of Greater Milwaukee spearheaded the creation of a regional
arts economic development strategy, entitled Creativity Works! The
approach focuses on design, performing arts, visual arts, media and
ﬁlm, and culture and heritage organizations (Creative Alliance Milwaukee, n.d.). The Milwaukee region possesses a strong concentration
of creative workers and hopes to leverage this advantage through four
arts-based initiatives. The steps include growing the creative industries,
expanding the local creative talent base, developing sustainable infrastructure for creative industries, and fostering leadership systems to
integrate these industries (Creative Alliance Milwaukee 2011a).
A recent redevelopment effort that followed the strategy developed
in Creativity Works! occurred when Milwaukee launched an innova-
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tive program to animate a faltering retail space. The Shops at Grand
Avenue in downtown Milwaukee were “dedicated to presenting quality
creatives and small business owners a place in which to teach, work,
perform, and exhibit their work” (Creative Alliance Milwaukee 2011b).
This program ﬁlled the underutilized retail spaces with local artists,
artisans, and performers.
While the ﬁnal outcome of the Shops at Grand Avenue is not yet
known, Milwaukee advocates are committed to the Creativity Works!
strategy. Indeed, a recent study indicates that in 2010, nonproﬁt arts
organizations had a $300 million impact on the Milwaukee economy,
representing a 20 percent increase over the 2005 ﬁgure (Creative Alliance Milwaukee 2012).

PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARTS
AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
The turn to the arts for urban economic redevelopment follows
upon the publication of several inﬂuential studies. The contribution of
arts and creative industries has been recognized at least since the release
of Richard Florida’s Rise of the Creative Class (2002), and it has been
developed further by Ann Markusen, Greg Schrock, and Martina Cameron (2004) in their work on “the artistic dividend.” Florida links twentyﬁrst-century economic vitality to concentrations of people who earn
their living through creativity and innovation, including artists, artisans, performers and writers, of both popular and high art, as well as
to a regional cultural ecosystem that innovative people ﬁnd attractive.
Markusen and her colleagues show that the work of artists is connected
in interesting and important ways to the growth of urban economies,
although there is “no clear relationship between artistic strength and
either overall regional employment size or recent growth rates” (p. 19).
Cleveland is yet another manufacturing-oriented city in the Midwest that has suffered from changes in the global economy. As if to
prove Markusen’s point, although the area has traditionally had strong
arts institutions, it has suffered signiﬁcant losses of jobs and population. Like Grand Rapids and Milwaukee, however, the city is now
looking hard at building upon the arts to help its economic recovery.
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Indeed, there are already intriguing signs of improvement, including the
refurbished Euclid corridor, a transformed Gordon Square, the Global
Center for Health Innovation (a part of the new Cleveland Convention
Center), the Horseshoe Casino, the continued growth and development
of Playhouse Square, and the renewal of Cleveland State University’s
campus (Farkas 2013).
In addition, despite population losses citywide, the two districts
that actually gained population in the 2010 census were downtown and
University Circle, suggesting that hip young members of the creative
class are ﬁnding urban life in Cleveland appealing (Smith and Exner
2011). Since 2000, for example, the downtown neighborhood has experienced a 73 percent surge in population (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).
These residents are well educated: 49 percent have at least a bachelor’s
degree, compared to only 25 percent of the population in the Cleveland
metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Downtown inhabitants are also
youthful: 71 percent of the population is 44 years of age or younger
(U.S. Census Bureau 2011).
Finally, while the economic recovery has stalled in much of the
nation, Northeast Ohio has been buoyed by manufacturing growth
(Helper, Krueger, and Wial 2012). As conﬁrmation of this forward
movement, it is interesting to note that Portland, Oregon, a city widely
regarded as one of the top magnets for the creative class, has recently
sent a delegation to study Cleveland’s economic progress. “Cleveland
is an innovative city,” wrote the delegation’s organizers, and it excels
“in the areas most critical to urban success: talent, connections, innovation, and distinctiveness” (Miller 2012).
In discussing Cleveland’s distinctive arts scene, we will also use the
term “cultural ecosystem” because we want to suggest a broad deﬁnition of “arts” that includes both high and low forms, a wide range of
related nonproﬁt organizations, commercial art, and both formal and
informal activities. Bulik et al. (2003) argue that to be a vibrant and
distinctive community, a city must have a large range of arts activity,
“from large arts organizations to street festivals, world-class artists to
amateurs” (p. 8). We believe that Cleveland has such a strong mix.
How can Cleveland leverage its traditional strengths in the arts to
further this economic recovery? There are many theories of how cities
prosper, 18 of which are ably summarized and categorized in Joseph
Cortright’s City Success: Theories of Urban Prosperity (2008). Cortright

Bowen.indb 126

12/16/2013 2:14:06 PM

Distinctly Cleveland 127

argues that while cities share many common problems, “each city will
need to fashion its own distinct solution” (p. 4). Among the most relevant approaches to Cleveland’s revitalization, we believe, are those
he entitles the “attraction city,” the “amenity city,” and the “distinctive
city,” respectively. The “attraction city” theory suggests that cities succeed by developing “iconic attractions” that appeal to visitors and establish a city’s unique brand (p. 50). The “amenity city” theory suggests
that cities grow and thrive by providing social amenities, not only good
schools, safety, and parks, but also various kinds of appealing entertainment (p. 53). The “distinctive city” theory holds that cities ﬂourish by
creating a special identity and related attitudes that clearly differentiate
the city from others (p. 59). We believe that building upon Cleveland’s
traditionally strong arts scene will help the community achieve all three
goals, becoming a distinctive city with nationally known attractions and
plentiful amenities.
The signiﬁcance of a city’s distinctiveness is underscored by
Cortright in a 2002 article in which he analyzes the unique nature of the
Portland, Oregon, region; he concludes that, like Portland, each city has
its “own unique set of opportunities, shaped by its residents’ tastes and
previous development” (p. 13). Moreover, the cities that will best thrive
are those that do not try to copy the successes of others but build upon
the facets of their own histories and the special tastes and skills of their
current populations. Although many midwestern industrial cities, like
Grand Rapids and Milwaukee, are now turning to the arts for revitalization, we believe that Cleveland has a distinctive arts proﬁle that will
serve it well as it rebuilds in the new global economy.

CLEVELAND’S STRATEGIC PLAN
The examples of Grand Rapids and Milwaukee underscore the
importance of having a strategic plan, and, indeed, Cleveland has one.
In 1997 the Community Partnership for Arts and Culture (CPAC) was
created by the Cleveland and George Gund Foundations (CPAC 2011).
The partnership was immediately commissioned to write a strategic
plan for the arts in Cleveland. That plan was completed in 2000, and
since then, CPAC has sought to facilitate its implementation.
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Under the leadership of its president, Thomas Schorgl, CPAC promotes a closer connection between a lively arts scene and a vigorous
community (T. Schorgl and M. Van Voorhis, personal communication,
August 26, 2011). CPAC advocates for public policy that will sustain
the local arts and culture community, provides assistance to individual
artists and arts organizations, and conducts research related to the arts
sector.
As examples of the proactive nature of CPAC’s activities, we can
cite its two conferences entitled “From Rust Belt to Artist Belt.” The
ﬁrst was held in 2008 and focused on the opportunities created by the
arts for the traditional manufacturing centers of the upper Midwest.
The second was held in 2010, and its focus was artist-based community
development. The report of the ﬁrst conference emphasizes the mutually beneﬁcial relationship between artists and the communities in
which they reside. Rust Belt cities can offer artists affordable housing
and workplaces as well as a context rich with already existing highquality arts institutions. Artists can provide renewed population for
inner cities; sweat equity (as they restore dilapidated houses and studios
with their own hands and thus increase property values); and, ﬁnally, a
positive impact on the economies of the cities they adopt (CPAC 2008).
The second conference resulted in a program to encourage artists to
settle in the Collinwood arts district on Cleveland’s East Side. The initiative is a partnership between CPAC and New York–based Leveraging
Investments in Creativity (Ott 2011).
For 14 years, then, CPAC has been promoting community growth
by helping to build and unify the local arts culture. Are its efforts paying
off by luring more of the creative class to Cleveland? Thomas Schorgl
believes they are. He points to two recent articles that suggest that young
artists in the culturally rich city of New York are moving to Cleveland.
In Crain’s New York Business, Souccar (2010) describes the severe difﬁculties experienced by artists who try to live in New York; she then
notes the increasing interest of New Yorkers in a housing development
for artists in Cleveland’s Collinwood area. Collinwood is working to
continue this trend with the funding provided by CPAC and Leveraging
Investments in Creativity.
This phenomenon is explored in more detail by Alter (2009) in a
Wall Street Journal article. Alter discovers artists working to revamp
houses in Cleveland’s Detroit-Shoreway neighborhood and in Collin-
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wood. What’s more, Cleveland has adopted artist-driven renovation as
a strategy to counteract recent depopulation, investing $500,000 in 50
citizen-led pilot projects to reclaim vacant property. Alter focuses on
the journey of two New York artists, Michael Di Liberto and Sunia
Boneham, to a Collinwood project planned by Northeast Shores Development Corporation. Di Liberto, Boneham, and others are being lured
to Cleveland by its rich arts offerings coupled with a low cost of living.
Collinwood’s commercial district, the centerpiece of a once rundown neighborhood, is being renovated by a collective of 12 artists,
named Arts Collinwood. The group bought a 5,000-square foot building
in 2004 and has transformed it into an art gallery, a café, and nine art
studios. This initial investment opened the door to “a ﬂood of musicians, painters, and sculptors” (Alter 2009). The new residents, in turn,
opened three new art galleries, a recording studio, and a stained glass
studio. All of these serve as tangible evidence of urban revitalization.
This trend needs to be better documented through further research, but
the two articles in New York publications suggest that Cleveland is
becoming a magnet for young artists.

THE CITY’S ARTS PROFILE
Major Cultural Institutions
If Cleveland must develop its distinctive cultural ecosystem in
order to prosper, what is its characteristic arts proﬁle? Here one must
begin with the older, established arts institutions. Eric Wobser, executive director of Ohio City Incorporated, identiﬁes “the big ﬁve” cultural
institutions of the community as the Cleveland Orchestra, the Cleveland
Museum of Art, Playhouse Square, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame,
and the West Side Market (E. Wobser, personal communication, July
25, 2011). No one who has listened to the Cleveland Orchestra play in
the majesty of Severance Hall or who has spent hours either exploring
the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame or navigating the various booths in the
West Side Market could disagree. The Cleveland Museum of Art, which
opened in 1916, houses 43,000 works of art and is especially noted for
its Asian and Egyptian collections. It closed in 2005 to begin a major
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renovation and expansion to 592,500 square feet, a project designed by
New York architect Rafael Viñoly. The work is expected to cost $350
million, an amount that dwarfs anything else comparable in Ohio (Litt
2008). In 2008, the museum began reopening in stages. When completed, 30 percent more gallery space, including new east and west
wings and a large central court, will have been added.
While a dwindling population base has turned Cleveland into one
of the smaller major-league cities, it is remarkable that the community has such high-quality and long-established cultural landmarks
(T. Schorgl and M. Van Voorhis, personal communication, August 26,
2011). The “big ﬁve” institutions play a key role in making Cleveland
an “attraction city,” and they certainly draw tourists. For instance, more
than 90 percent of visitors to the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame come
from outside the Cleveland region (Rock and Roll Hall of Fame 2011).
The strengths of these institutions are sources of civic pride for a town
that has endured many difﬁcult setbacks. Karen Gahl-Mills, the director of the region’s recently founded public arts-granting organization,
Cuyahoga Arts and Culture, comments that “growing up in Cleveland,
one just assumes that great cities have great cultural institutions” (K.
Gahl-Mills, personal communication, July 7, 2011). Her experiences in
different parts of the country, however, suggest that this is not always
true of other American cities of comparable size. It is clear that these
major organizations can play a role in attracting the young professionals
Cleveland needs in order to increase its size and dynamism, but they are
not sufﬁcient.
Additional Cultural Assets
Indeed, Cleveland has signiﬁcant riches beyond the big ﬁve. The
city, for example, is the birthplace of “rock and roll,” and the presence
of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame indicates the importance of that
musical genre to the community. The popular music scene in Cleveland
is alive and well, with exciting performance venues, such as the Grog
Shop, the Beachland Ballroom, and the Happy Dog, regularly featuring
a large selection of musical choices to a local audience that Sean Waterson, co-owner of the Happy Dog, ﬁnds to be very sophisticated in its
musical tastes (S. Waterson, personal communication, July 26, 2011).
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In addition, Cleveland has a large number of nonproﬁt arts organizations that sponsor a wide variety of arts experiences. Cuyahoga Arts
and Culture, for example, funds 150 different arts organizations, and
more than half of these have budgets of under $1 million (K. GahlMills, personal communication, July 7, 2011). Thomas Schorgl commented that Cleveland is indeed a kind of laboratory for small-scale
arts development.
Another distinctive element to Cleveland’s cultural ecosystem is
that it is not concentrated in one area. Of the big ﬁve, only the Rock
and Roll Hall of Fame and Playhouse Square are located in downtown
Cleveland. The Cleveland Orchestra and the Cleveland Museum of Art
are ﬁve miles to the east in University Circle. As a part of the City
Beautiful campaign in the early twentieth century, Cleveland’s leaders
chose to develop University Circle to house the community’s new arts
establishments, as well as some of its major educational institutions.
University Circle was chosen because of its pastoral setting, which presented a sharp contrast to the industrialized sector to the west. According to Charles Michener, former senior editor of The New Yorker and
Seattle, this decision created in effect two centers, which has made it
harder to unite the city (C. Michener, personal communication, June
20, 2011).
In addition to downtown and University Circle, other small pockets of arts activity are scattered throughout the city. Three such
centers on Cleveland’s near West Side are the Gordon Square district, which is home to Cleveland Public Theatre and the Capitol
Theater; the Tremont area, which is now bustling with visitors to
new upscale restaurants; and the Ohio City area, which is concentrated around the West Side Market and is now dense with
new bars and restaurants, including Great Lakes Brewery. There
are others; there is no single arts and culture center to Cleveland,
and this poses a problem when one raises the question of where
Cleveland’s development dollars should be spent. Some observers see this dispersal as a major disadvantage, complaining that
Cleveland’s cultural ecosystem lacks coherence and connectivity. Others, like Evan Lieberman, Professor of Film at Cleveland
State University and guitarist with the rock group Poland Invasion,
ﬁnd this to be an attractive aspect of the city [E. Lieberman, personal communication, July 14, 2011]. A native of Atlanta, Georgia, Lieberman has become one of Cleveland’s most enthusiastic
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supporters. Lieberman ﬁnds the arts ubiquitous in Cleveland, part
of the terrain and cultural landscape, and as a musician and ﬁlmmaker, he could not be happier.

Other Unique Features
Cleveland is also a place of binary divisions. The famed East
Side-West Side split is perhaps the most entrenched, as it goes back
to the very earliest days of the city and the legendary battle between
Cleveland and Ohio City over competing bridges in 1836 (Miller and
Wheeler 1997). Beyond the obvious topographical distinctions, the two
sides ﬁnd themselves divided along lines of class, race, and ethnic cultures. But this is also true for the cultural ecosystem. Raymond Bobgan,
Director of Cleveland Public Theatre, for example, ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
difference in arts funding opportunities between the two areas. He ﬁnds
the established institutions on the East Side to be “massively capitalized,” while the newer arts organizations on the West Side struggle (R.
Bobgan, personal communication, August 4, 2011).
Michener sees this difference as an opposition between the old
East-Side elites and Cleveland’s working classes. Society members of
the East Side were descendants of Cleveland’s early industrial tycoons,
who viewed the city as the last outpost of the great Northeast and looked
toward New York for their ideas of good art and culture. On the West
Side are the descendants of the men and women who labored in the
tycoons’ factories and plants, often of various ethnicities recently emigrated from Europe. It is probably an oversimpliﬁcation to see the East
Side-West Side divide as reﬂecting only Michener’s binaries, but those
elements certainly have played a role in creating this situation.
What does seem to be true is that the arts scene in the University
Circle area is largely more established and has a more formal atmosphere. Other parts of the Cleveland cultural ecosystem are more contemporary and edgy. The Museum of Contemporary Art Cleveland
(MOCA) in its new and strikingly contemporary building (designed
by Farshid Moussavi and located in University Circle) is, perhaps, the
exception that proves the rule (Museum of Contemporary Art Cleveland, n.d.). Cleveland Public Theatre (CPT), located on the West Side,
is also dedicated to the work of contemporary artists, speciﬁcally those
from Northeast Ohio.
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The story of the founding of CPT is perhaps one of the best examples of arts helping to revitalize a neighborhood. In 1982, James Levin
founded a New York–style experimental theater in Cleveland, and he
was encouraged to look to the East Side, particularly to University
Circle, as a place to begin (J. Levin, personal communication, July
14, 2011). In those days, it was difﬁcult for people to imagine a major
cultural organization being located outside of University Circle. Levin
rejected that notion and wanted his theater to have a part in city rejuvenation. He settled on the Gordon Square District, which in those days
was a run-down, crime-infested neighborhood. His venue was to be
an old vaudeville theater, which was then a used-furniture store. He
launched the project, made progress, and, in 2005, handed over the
leadership of CPT to Raymond Bobgan.
According to Bobgan, no other market in the United States has a
theatre exactly like CPT. Across the street is the refurbished Capitol
Theater, which is the sole arts cinema on Cleveland’s West Side. Building on momentum, a $3 million dollar streetscape project visually uniﬁed the neighborhood (Gordon Square Arts District 2012). Today, the
square is home to a variety of attractive businesses, and CPT’s major
fund-raising event, Pandemonium, in Gordon Square each fall, is a night
of raucous carnival and a feast of contemporary arts of all sorts. In sum,
Gordon Square has become the kind of hip and authentic neighborhood
that draws young professionals back to the city, and its transformation
began with an investment in the arts.
Two other aspects of Cleveland’s arts scene differentiate it from
larger, better-known destinations. First, as noted earlier, the town’s
affordability is a major attractive feature for the creative class. Second,
unlike New York and Los Angeles, Cleveland is not a leading center for
the arts and entertainment industries, although work by Ivan Schwarz
and the Cleveland Film Commission, especially on the promotion of
the Ohio ﬁlm tax incentive, has recently been paying dividends (E.
Lieberman, personal communication, July 14, 2011). In 2011 alone,
seven major movies were shot in Cleveland, and notable producers on
the West Coast are starting to look to the city as a venue for ﬁlming.
Lieberman notes that Cleveland is rich in different kinds of topography
and architecture, making it ideal for just about any kind of ﬁlm. The
same attributes that attract individual artists to Cleveland also appeal to
commercial studios. Cleveland is an affordable place to make motion
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pictures, and the city works diligently to ensure that it is easy for ﬁlm
companies to obtain the required permits.
The fact that Cleveland is not an industry center is especially
important to Evan Lieberman, who has lived and worked in Los
Angeles. In Los Angeles, he argues, the industry and the bottom
line dictate what artists write. In Cleveland, because artists are not
tied directly to the commercial entertainment industry, they can be
more authentic. Indeed, “authenticity” is a common theme when
talking about the Cleveland cultural ecosystem and the neighborhoods in which it resides [e.g., T. Schorgl and M. Van Voorhis,
personal communication, August 26, 2011]. In Cleveland, artists
don’t have to take a stand either for or against commercialism, and
they are less likely to obtain huge contracts. Instead, they are more
inclined to simply want to translate their life experiences into art.
Indeed, Lieberman insists that the value that the arts contribute to
the quality of life goes well beyond the economic. Arts, he argues,
give us new ways of viewing the world, and they help us to lose
ourselves in the artistic moment. They either surround our worlds
in beauty or help us explore life’s misery and problems, and in the
end, they help us to imagine new possibilities. In a culturally rich
city like Cleveland, especially one that is not tied directly to the
commercial entertainment industry, these noneconomic aspects of
the arts also directly improve the everyday lives of the region’s
citizens. (J. Michener, personal communication)

Cleveland, then, has a base in the arts that can be used to attract
members of the creative class, but what needs to happen to make that
base stronger? When asked what could be done to improve Cleveland’s
arts scene, Michener remarked that “the cultural institutions need to do
a better job of knitting the city together.” Indeed, the need to increase
connectivity—bridging Cleveland’s geographical and social divisions,
creating new partnerships among arts organizations, and bringing people together with art—was high on the list of most of the experts we
interviewed. In Cleveland, art is everywhere, but it needs to be drawn
together more coherently and efﬁciently. Schorgl, for example, spoke
of the need to grow cross-sectional partnerships between various segments of the city’s economy. In addition, the established institutions
need to attract wider (and younger) audiences, and the smaller, more
popular arts institutions need to further the sense of community in their
own neighborhoods.
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The good news for Cleveland is that the arts community understands these imperatives. The more established organizations, for
example, have developed aggressive outreach and educational programs. With a lead endowment of $20 million from the Maltz Family Foundation, the Cleveland Orchestra has created an initiative, the
Center for Future Audiences, to draw a new generation of patrons to its
concerts (Cleveland Orchestra, n.d.). The goal is to create the youngest
symphony audience worldwide by 2018 (Suttel 2011, p. 12). During the
summers, the orchestra performs at Blossom Music Center, located in
Cuyahoga Valley National Park, just south of Cleveland. This venue is
much more family friendly than Severance Hall, and it has an expansive grass campus on which people can picnic and listen to the orchestra play. The Orchestra’s Director of Communications, Ana Papakhian,
revealed that, as of the summer of 2011, anyone under 18 years old has
been able to attend these summer concerts for free, a key strategy for
building a new and younger audience (A. Papakhian, personal communication, August 18, 2011). The hope is that an even more dynamic and
youthful arts scene will be the catalyst not only to retain young artists
and professionals in Cleveland but also to draw additional members of
the creative class to make Cleveland their home.

INITIATIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ARTS
The arts leaders we interviewed were optimistic about Cleveland’s
future: there is a sense that the Cleveland cultural ecosystem is part
of a larger movement toward a more vibrant city. As noted, although
Cleveland’s population again dropped in the 2010 census, key areas
of the city, downtown and University Circle, deﬁed that trend. Indeed,
downtown is alive with new additions like the Global Center for Health
Innovation and the Horseshoe Casino on Public Square, and these point
the way to greater density and trafﬁc in the downtown area. Euclid Avenue has been fully renovated with a sleek new rapid transit system, the
Health Line, running down the center, linking downtown with University Circle. In the concluding pages, we highlight four important initiatives, both large and small, that are creating a more dynamic arts scene
for Cleveland and, thus, hope for Cleveland’s further development.
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Classical Music Moves West
Sean Waterson moved back to Cleveland several years ago with the
intent to have a direct positive impact on his community. The result was
Happy Dog, a music venue that serves specialty hot dogs to accompany
upbeat music. Waterson’s goal is to help build a community on the near
West Side, and he wants Happy Dog to be the Gordon Square District’s
“living room.” Happy Dog features live music ﬁve nights a week, and
85 percent of its repertoire is rock. But what makes this venue so special is that it also offers classical music and polka on a regular basis. “If
New Orleans is jazz, Cleveland is rock and classical,” says Waterson,
and his programming reﬂects that belief.
Waterson started offering classical music at the Happy Dog after
meeting Cleveland Orchestra ﬂutist Joshua Smith. Together they
invented “Orchestral Manoeuvres at the Dog,” a regular series of classical concerts. The ﬁrst concert was a sellout, with lines of interested
customers running out the front door and down the block. Waterson
thought that the risk inherent in playing in a less-than-perfect environment actually created a palpable energy in the bar. In his blog, Smith
(2010) agrees that the evening was a big success, but he points out
that playing classical music in bars is not a new idea. Nevertheless,
the concept seems to have caught on particularly well at the Happy
Dog, and the promise is that this classical music programming will continue. If a major problem in Cleveland arts is interconnectivity, Waterson has found a way to link West Side residents with the classical music
scene, which heretofore has been largely an East Side, Severance Hall
phenomenon.
Sean Waterson was not satisﬁed, however, with his success in
“Orchestral Manoeuvres at the Dog.” He wanted to build more
bridges between West Side audiences and the heritage arts institutions on the East Side. Thus was born “Gordon Square Goes to the
Orchestra” and “Gordon Square Goes to the Art Museum.” Both
of these efforts were organized through Facebook. The idea was
to gather an audience from the Gordon Square area, hire a bus,
and transport the participants to East Side art institutions. After the
visits, the group dined at Happy Dog. Both trips were sold out in
24 hours. (Smith 2010)
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Public Support for the Arts
A second reason for hope is the availability of signiﬁcant public arts
funding in Cuyahoga County, which includes Cleveland and its suburbs. Michener describes past funding of the Cleveland arts community
as basically top-down, the result of a sense of noblesse oblige on the
part of the East Side elite toward the entire community, but this, he
says, is changing. Cleveland has a long history of active grant-making
organizations, such as the Cleveland Foundation and the George Gund
Foundation, but what is new and absolutely essential for the community
is the advent of a public arts ﬁnancing mechanism.
In 2006, the citizens of Cuyahoga County passed a 10-year cigarette tax to be used to fund the arts. As a result of this ballot initiative,
Cuyahoga Arts and Culture (CAC) was born, with a mandate to spend
approximately $20 million each year to promote the arts in the county.
The scale is massive. Schorgl commented that, if Cuyahoga County
were a state, it would have the third-largest public state budget for the
arts in the country, just behind New York and Minnesota. This large
infusion of funds has been transformative.
As noted earlier, CAC assists about 150 arts organizations. In addition, although CAC is not permitted to ﬁnance individual artists directly, the organization does play a role in cultivating local artists
through the agencies it supports. Cleveland’s Creative Workforce Fellowship, for example, which is funded by CAC, gives out $20,000 fellowships to individual artists on an annual basis. Gahl-Mills argues
that, if you want to ﬁnd the best indicator of the city’s distinct arts and
culture scene, you need to look at what is happening in the neighborhoods; there Cleveland offers a rich variety of experiences, many at
least partially ﬁnanced by public tax dollars.
Arts and Education Partnerships
The growth of creative partnerships among arts and educational
institutions provides a third positive force. These collaborations will
be important components in the bid to make the city’s arts scene even
more vibrant. Downtown Cleveland has a concentrated theater center
located just blocks east of Public Square, with massive venues from
the heyday of classic movies in the early twentieth century. Forty years
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ago, this neighborhood was run-down, and all the theaters except the
Hanna were closed. Because of the pioneering efforts of people like
Raymond Shephardson and Joseph Geary, the Cleveland community
rallied to save this area and created Playhouse Square, making it the
world’s largest theater-restoration project.
Today, with all the theaters going through at least one round of signiﬁcant renovations, Playhouse Square is the second-largest live theater district in the country, right behind Lincoln Center in New York.
Nine separate performance spaces, including the State, the Ohio, and
the Palace Theaters, are currently in operation. Playhouse Square draws
1 million visitors per year, and it is estimated that it has a $43 million
impact on the city economy (Playhouse Square 2011).
One of these spaces, the Allen Theater, a classical old movie house
in Italian Renaissance style, was underutilized, being occupied only
about 90 days per year (Collins 2011). At the same time, two other
community players were facing operational challenges. The art and drama programs at Cleveland State University (CSU), located just east of
Playhouse Square, were operating in antiquated, substandard buildings,
and university leaders wanted to build a new Fine and Performing Arts
Center to house both disciplines. The cost of such a new building, however, was prohibitive. The state’s capital budget would not sustain such
expenditures, and only two major community donors came forward to
offer support for the plan. The university was caught in a difﬁcult situation. Sixty blocks to the east of Cleveland State was the Cleveland
Play House, the oldest and perhaps most prestigious regional theater
in the country. Located near the world-famous Cleveland Clinic, the
Cleveland Play House found itself with an extensive physical plant to
maintain and diminishing audiences. Michael Bloom, former Artistic
Director of the Cleveland Play House, commented that the organization
was facing a very uncertain future.
Faced with the Great Recession of 2008–2009, the leaders of these
three organizations came to realize that a partnership could be a costeffective way to solve their problems. The vision was to move both
the Cleveland Play House and CSU’s drama and dance programs into
a remodeled Allen Theater. Through cooperation, both organizations
could move into affordable new space right in the middle of a thriving
arts district in downtown Cleveland, building upon the critical mass of
live theater that was already available there.
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This visionary project is now complete, but many obstacles had
to be overcome to make it happen. First, money needed to be raised
to remodel the Allen Theater into a contemporary venue with multiple
performance areas. As it was, the Allen had a relatively new and well
equipped stage house, whose existence would save the project about
$10 million in construction costs. However, the theater itself was much
too large for the kind of intimate experience envisioned by CSU and
the Cleveland Play House. Its 2,500-seat theater had to be cut back to
about 500. In addition, two theater venues needed to be created in the
parking lot adjacent to the Allen. These would be a new lab theater and
a 250-seat highly adjustable Second Stage, a novel performance space
that would not have been possible if each of the partners had tried to
accomplish this separately.
A team of seasoned fundraisers from all three partners, called “The
Power of Three,” was assembled, with the goal of raising $32 million.
But a second building was needed to house ofﬁces, classrooms, and
rehearsal spaces for both CSU and the Cleveland Play House. Located
around the corner from the Allen is the Middough Building, a ﬁve-story
ediﬁce, in which two ﬂoors were completely vacant. The “Power of
Three” team then created yet another partnership, with Middough Inc.,
one of Cleveland’s most distinguished architectural and engineering
ﬁrms. As a result of this arrangement, all of the partners, excluding
Playhouse Square but including CSU’s art department, now ﬁll Middough’s ﬁve large ﬂoors, and a new CSU Fine Arts campus has been
created. The campus includes not only the Allen Theater and the Middough Building, but also a structure on the corner of 13th Street and
Euclid, which gives CSU’s art gallery, now called the Galleries at CSU,
storefront space in Playhouse Square. All in all, several powerful partnerships will boost Playhouse Square’s artistic proﬁle, and make this
region a national model for creating synergies between education and
entertainment. Playhouse Square is certainly one more element that will
transform Cleveland into a major attraction city.
Arts Festivals
A fourth encouraging factor that is helping to create a more dynamic arts scene is the growth of distinctive arts festivals in Cleveland.
These events are important because they draw large numbers of people
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together from different parts of the city. Two programs that are especially noteworthy are the Cleveland International Film Festival and the
Ingenuity Festival.
In 1977, Jonathan Forman inaugurated the Cleveland International
Film Festival, screening eight ﬁlms from seven countries at the Cedar
Lee Theater (Cleveland International Film Festival 2013). Over the
years, the festival, supported by the Cleveland and George Gund Foundations, as well as CAC, grew signiﬁcantly, and in 1991, it moved to
Tower City, located downtown in Cleveland’s iconic Terminal Tower.
By 2011, the festival was screening approximately 150 feature ﬁlms,
grouped thematically, from 60 different countries. It had a budget of
over $1.5 million and about 1,000 members (Magaw 2011). Filmmakers from around the world were drawn to Cleveland, and there was
also a markedly engaged audience of about 78,000 fans, a 122 percent increase in attendance over the past eight years (Blackaby 2011;
Magaw 2011).
Meanwhile, the Ingenuityfest was created in 2005 by James Levin
and Thomas Mulready as a celebration of creativity at the nexus of
arts and technology (Brown 2010). Over the years, it has continuously
moved: from the Warehouse District to Playhouse Square to the lower
deck of the Detroit-Superior Bridge, and, ﬁnally, to Piers 30 and 32 of
the Port of Cleveland. At its current location, it literally brings together
Cleveland’s East and West Sides. In 2011 it drew about 40,000 people
to the center for three days of festivities (Ewinger 2011). Some exhibitions are pure art; others focus squarely on technology; and still others,
like Jared Bendis’s surround-sound audio game, “Treasure of the Wumpus,” combine both in interesting ways (Rosenberg 2011).
In some respects, there is no more appropriate way to celebrate the
existence and achievements of what Florida (2002) has called the creative class, and this festival continues to draw ever-larger crowds paying homage to creativity, in whatever form it takes. Like the ArtPrize
contest in Grand Rapids, both Ingenuityfest and the Film Festival are
well on their way to becoming iconic attractions, drawing more and
more people into the heart of the city.
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THE ARTS AS A PATH TO REVITALIZATION
A dean of the Levin College of Urban Affairs at CSU once
remarked that Cleveland’s size put it in a sweet spot—large enough
to enjoy major league sports and many other big-city amenities, but
small enough not to suffer from a variety of urban problems, especially
the curse of gridlock and giant trafﬁc jams. Whether or not this is true
generally—Cleveland still has plenty of big city challenges—it does
seem to be the case with respect to the arts. On one hand, Cleveland
has world-class arts organizations that are the envy of many other cities
its size or even bigger. On the other, Cleveland is small enough for one
man or one woman, like James Levin, to make a signiﬁcant difference
by building upon the arts to promote city development.
As in Grand Rapids and Milwaukee, the arts are playing a crucial
role in community revitalization, but Cleveland’s path to greater prosperity is building upon its own distinctive amenities, iconic attractions,
and arts proﬁle. Nevertheless, several critical aspects of this momentum
are transferable. As we have seen, the multiple Cleveland strategies for
urban development through the arts include
•

having a thoughtful and detailed strategic plan,

•

strengthening the city’s major artistic infrastructure and cultivating new initiatives,

•

making purposeful efforts not only to tie together widely dispersed artistic venues but also to capture younger audiences for
the ﬁne arts,

•

creating signiﬁcant arts and education partnerships,

•

supporting art through signiﬁcant public funding,

•

providing artists and arts organizations an affordable and welcoming place to work, and

•

creating multiple festivals to highlight the arts and draw audiences from the suburbs and beyond into the city.

It may well be that the broad scope and unique proﬁle of these combined efforts is the most distinctive aspect of Cleveland’s arts development strategy.
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Rocco Landesman, Chairman of the National Endowment for the
Arts, has offered independent conﬁrmation of the importance of the arts
to Cleveland’s redevelopment efforts. Appointed by President Obama
in 2009, Landesman has made the linkage between artistic activity
and economic development a centerpiece of his strategy to build the
Endowment (Litt 2011). After visiting Cleveland and touring its arts
attractions, he concluded that local arts organizations were indeed helping to revitalize the city. “We’re talking about it; you’re doing it,” he
said. Overall, Landesman believes that Cleveland is “an arts city,” and
that other cities would do well to follow its lead.

Notes
1. As of 2012 there is also a juried prize.
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7
How Energy Policy Enabled
the Decline of Midwestern Cities,
and How It Can Contribute
to Their Rehabilitation
Andrew R. Thomas
Cleveland State University

Globalization can’t be seen as the sole factor that led to the decline
in cities in the upper Midwest. Another contributing factor is
homegrown: domestic energy policy. For instance, subsidies for
rural electricity, funded by midwestern cities, made it possible for
manufacturing to move to the Sunbelt. Similarly, subsidies for an
interstate highway system established a permanent preference for
trucking over the Great Lakes shipping ports and railroad centers.
However, there are a number of energy policies that, if adopted,
could foster rather than impede economic growth in declining Rust
Belt cities.

In 1986 Michael Kinsley wrote an essay in The New Republic that
helped popularize the word schadenfreude in America. Schadenfreude
is a German word meaning “glee at the misery of others,” a word
Kinsley noted that only the Germans, with their grim humor, could
invent. Kinsley speculated that, after more than a decade of watching vast amounts of wealth being transferred from the Northeast to the
Texas Gulf Coast, the Northeast would enjoy watching the collapse of
the oil and gas industry, and with it, the Texas economy. Indeed, in
the late 1980s prices for natural gas dropped from over $4 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) to below $1.50 per mcf, and prices for oil fell
from nearly $40 per barrel (bbl) to below $15 per bbl (1980 dollars).
As a result, the oil and gas industry began a major contraction in the
late 1980s that continued through the 1990s. But the Texas economy,
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while damaged, did not collapse. Nor did the Rust Belt economies of
the Midwest and the Northeast fully recover when oil and gas prices
remained low throughout the 1990s.
For those of us who grew up in the Midwest, the 1970s were a
difﬁcult time. The cost of fuel at the pump had skyrocketed overnight.
Families waited in long lines to buy gasoline. Ford station wagons
were abandoned for Volkswagen Beetles. The expense of heating the
family home with natural gas was even more painful, as prices rose
from around $0.20 per mcf to over $3 per mcf in a decade. With the
rapid increase in energy costs came rampant inﬂation. Life in the Midwest was forever changed, with the perception that Texas cowboys had
hijacked our way of life—and in the process pocketed billions of our
hard-earned dollars. So it is small wonder that residents of the Midwest
and Northeast experienced schadenfreude when increased production
and decreased consumption inevitably led to an oversupply of oil and
natural gas and a price collapse in the 1990s.
To be sure, the advent of the Rust Belt economies of the Midwest
had many causes. We have heard much about them: bloated unions,
high taxes, globalization, and underperforming education are the most
cited. However, there can be little doubt that the energy crisis of the
1970s was a principal catalyst for the decline of the cities in and around
the Great Lakes region. It decimated the American automobile industry, as Japanese and European automakers stole market share with their
smaller, more energy-efﬁcient models. The effects cascaded throughout
the Midwest but were particularly hard felt in the Great Lakes region,
where automobile and steel manufacturing formed a large part of the
economy.
The American Midwest was suffering from what economist Gail
Tverberg subsequently described as the “high-priced fuel syndrome”
(Tverberg 2012). In short, consumers are required to pay more for a
necessity, and as a result they cut back on discretionary goods and services. If oil and gas prices go up, so do food prices, which are dependent
on oil for transportation and natural gas for fertilizers. Commuting costs,
electricity prices, and business expenses increase. The result is layoffs, cutbacks, and more pressure on discretionary goods and services.
Property values and tax revenues decline, and the follow-on effects are
magniﬁed. Figure 7.1 shows how acute the problem with oil prices was
for the Midwest in the late 1970s.
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Figure 7.1 Historic Oil Prices, 1900–2011 (2011$)
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NOTE: “Brent equivalency” is the accepted international benchmark for crude oil pricing.
SOURCE: Tverberg (2012).

The result of the “high-priced fuel syndrome” in the late 1970s was
an exodus out of the Midwest and the Northeast, especially of young
people. A comparison of a timeline of inﬂation-adjusted oil prices with
demographic change in the Northeast, Midwest, and the South demonstrates this: after decades of double-digit population growth, growth
in the Northeast and the Midwest plummeted after the oil shock of the
1970s. In the South, on the other hand, population growth continued
unabated, as shown in Table 7.1.
Yet when oil and gas prices crashed in the 1990s, the Northeast and
the Midwest failed to regain their pre-energy-crisis population growth
levels—clearly there were other forces at work. Some of these were
energy related and are discussed later in this chapter. Others were not,
although arguably the initial oil shock set in motion some of the pathologies that prevented a reversal of the trend. As of 2012, however, as
shown in Figure 7.1, oil prices were again at near historic highs (trading
at around $100 per bbl in 2011 dollars). The midwestern and northeastern economies are once more under the threat of the “high price fuel
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Table 7.1 A Comparison of Oil Prices with Population Change in the
Northeast, Midwest, and South, 1930–2010
% change in population
Price of oil per
barrel (2011$)
Northeast
Midwest
South
1930
19.00
16
14
14
1940
18.00
5
5
10
1950
17.00
10
11
13
1960
18.00
13
16
16
1970
17.00
10
10
14
1980
45.00
0
4
20
1990
38.00
3
2
14
2000
28.00
5
8
17
2010
90.00
4
4
14
NOTE: Oil prices are per barrel and based upon Brent Crude equivalencies.
SOURCE: Tverberg (2012); U.S. Census Bureau (2010).

syndrome,” as they export more and more wealth to import expensive
oil.
However, the advent of shale development promises some future
relief. In 2010 oil imports accounted for over half of the American trade
deﬁcit (Economist 2010). For the Midwest, which reached “peak oil”
(the inﬂection point at which oil consumption becomes permanently
greater than concurrent reserve addition) long before the nation did, this
deﬁcit is even higher. While oil prices have not yet dropped, American
oil imports have—principally as a result of the Bakken Shale in North
Dakota. In Ohio, there is likewise potential for oil production from the
Utica Shale. More importantly, domestic natural gas production has
increased dramatically because of shale drilling, and natural gas prices
are at historic lows. Indeed, for the ﬁrst time ever, natural gas prices
are completely decoupled from oil prices, creating a migration of truck
ﬂeets from gasoline-powered to natural-gas-powered engines. For the
reasons discussed later, shale development provides considerable hope
for an economic recovery in the American Midwest.
The volatility in oil and gas prices has hardly been the only energy
problem facing midwestern cities since the 1970s—it has just been the
most visible. This chapter will explore energy policies that have contributed to the decline of these cities and will consider strategies that
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might reverse some of the pathologies that have become so commonplace in the Midwest.
Some policies have had an adverse impact on cities in general;
other policies have had a deleterious effect speciﬁcally on the Midwest. Presumably all of these were unintended consequences: the policies were intended to produce desirable outcomes, but eventually had
results that society did not necessarily want. Those energy policies that
have affected cities in general will be considered ﬁrst, and then those
that have negatively affected cities speciﬁcally in the Midwest.

POLICIES THAT HAVE TENDED TO HARM CITIES
IN GENERAL
Low-Cost Gasoline
There can be little doubt that the American migration to the suburbs has been enabled by cheap gasoline. There is also little question
that federal and state policies have played a part in keeping gasoline
inexpensive. The debate, rather, is about how much government support there really is. In other words, what is the actual cost of a gallon of
gasoline at the pump, if you include all the externalities? Regardless of
how one calculates this, it is clear that cheap gasoline has been a signiﬁcant incentive for the exodus from the inner cities.
The public policy that can be most easily identiﬁed that has led to
inexpensive gasoline in the United States is the relatively low excise
tax on gasoline at the pump. Many people would agree that excise taxes
on gasoline are necessary to generate funds for building and maintaining roads, and that those who drive the most ought to bear the highest
burden of those costs. Many would probably also concur that we are
currently undertaxed on gasoline at the pump; in 2010, for the ﬁrst time
since President Eisenhower signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act into
law in 1956, the U.S. Highway Trust Fund was broke. Congress had
to infuse $8 billion in general revenue funds into the Trust to keep it
solvent. In 2011 Congress was forced to place another $19.5 billion
into a fund that is supposed to be self-sustaining through gasoline taxes
(Segedy, n.d.).
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The issue that is most often debated now is not whether we should
raise gasoline taxes, but rather when and by how much they should be
increased. These taxes vary from state to state, but they average around
$0.49 per gallon (American Petroleum Institute 2013).1 In Europe,
where migration from the central city has not devastated urban areas as
severely as it has in the United States, gasoline taxes are as much as 10
times greater, and prices at the pump are typically double what they are
in America (New York Times 2011). Figure 7.2 provides a comparison
of gasoline prices internationally.
It is no coincidence that Europeans tend to live closer to their jobs
than do Americans, or that Europe, as a result, tends not to suffer from
as much residential abandonment of the inner city as does the United
States. In short, the policy of making the cost of commuting by private
vehicle inexpensive has also made it easier for Americans to ﬂee urban
problems rather than to solve them.
Of course, Americans today would choose to pay just about any
price for gasoline if it means not having to live next to urban blight.
But the difference in living conditions that has engendered the migration to the suburbs has been created gradually. When the migration ﬁrst
began, it was not a matter of escaping urban blight: it was about choosing to live in a marginally better environment. We might, for instance,
expect a working-class family to stay in an inner-ring suburb, rather
than to move further away from employers, if faced with the incremental increase in cost. With gasoline taxes at levels similar to those in the
United Kingdom, moving 15 miles farther from the job might mean an
extra $4,000 per year in commuting costs, rather than an extra $2,000
per year. For a working-class family, that would be a powerful incentive
to stay put.
However, low gasoline taxes are only a part of the energy policies
associated with inexpensive gasoline. A more difﬁcult consideration
is the so-called oil and gas subsidy, the tax incentives that President
Obama called for an end to in his 2011 State of the Union address. Any
government subsidy for oil inevitably makes it easier for commuters to
move away from the downtown areas toward ever-longer commutes.
Critics of U.S. energy policy have for years called for the termination
of what they argue are massive subsidies to the oil and gas industry
through federal tax policies. Unfortunately, energy policy is largely set
in the United States through advocacy, and as a result it is hard even for
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Figure 7.2 Global Gasoline Price Comparison, January 2011
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NOTE: “Other” refers to those costs associated with acquiring, delivering, storing and
retailing gasoline at the pump.
SOURCE: Washington (2011).

experts, let alone the general public, to understand exactly what subsidies actually exist for oil and gas. Indeed, established energy interests
frequently express outrage over subsidies granted to “clean energy,”
even as fossil fuel technologies enjoy over 10 times as much government support as do these newer approaches (Plummer 2010).
The American Petroleum Institute (API), not surprisingly, argues
that there are no such subsidies. The ability to amortize investments,
accelerate depletion allowances, and offset “intangible drilling costs”
from tax obligations are, according to the API, standard accounting
practices in the mining industry (American Petroleum Institute, n.d.).
API points out that these accounting strategies are necessary to encourage the sort of massive investments required for such a high-risk business, and there is no reason to treat the oil and gas industry differently
from other mining industries.
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In the end, we can reasonably differ about what subsidies may or
may not exist in the Internal Revenue code, how big those subsidies
might be, and which of them are really necessary. But it probably does
not matter, because we do know that one massive subsidy exists for
imported oil that dwarfs all others: the United States spends billions
of dollars every year policing the world’s oceans, and it has done so
for a long time. The total U.S. yearly military expenditure to patrol the
world’s petroleum supply has been estimated to range anywhere from
$47.6 to $113.1 billion in 2003 U.S. dollars (International Center for
Technology Assessment 2005).
It is this policy that makes the shipping of inexpensive oil from the
Middle East possible. If this cost were passed along to the purchasers
of gasoline at the pump, there is little doubt that the price of gasoline
would be several times what it is today. Such an undertaking would also
be a boon to domestic oil production, which would be competing with
the actual cost of delivering foreign oil to the United States rather than
the subsidized cost. However, we are unlikely to see this “external” cost
realized at the pump. The notion that much of our defense budget is in
fact a massive subsidy to Saudi Aramco is not easy to understand or
accept. Nevertheless, the price of gasoline at the pump is artiﬁcially low
as a result of this subsidy, and this reduction has enabled mass migration to the suburbs.
Inexpensive gasoline and the resultant increase in automobile commuting have created another troubling consequence for urban centers
that has led to outmigration: a rise in pollution. Suspended particulate
matter, in the form of soot, dust, smoke, and other pollutants, has been
distributed into the air by trafﬁc exhaust fumes. In the United States,
measures have been taken to reduce the air pollution generated by automobiles, including the banning of lead-based gasoline. Indeed, compared to other major urban areas of the world, American inner cities
today have good air quality, or at least not greatly worse than that of
suburban areas. Unfortunately, many of these measures were taken after
the exodus from the central city had already begun.
Public Policies Encouraging Rural Electriﬁcation
We often hear that the solution to our energy problems is another of
America’s great collaborative undertakings in ingenuity and initiative,
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usually discussed in terms of either the Manhattan or Apollo projects. It
has been posed, for instance, that if we undertook a major Apollo-type
effort to develop a hydrogen ﬁlling-station infrastructure, we could shift
to a new transportation economy. This would be based on ultraefﬁcient
fuel cells, which rely on cleaner, locally produced natural gas as the
feedstock, and which produce clean water as a byproduct.
In fact, however, in the last century the United States has undertaken two “Manhattan-type” energy policy initiatives that have had
a signiﬁcant impact on midwestern cities. The ﬁrst was the development of the interstate highway system, now fundamental to the fabric
of American society. This program subsidized a nationwide preference
for automobiles and trucks over railroads and waterways and will be
discussed later as among those energy policies that have been particularly problematic for the Great Lakes cities. The second great American
energy policy undertaking was the program to bring electricity to rural
areas. It is this latter policy that has, over time, done the most to encourage migration out of the cities (and, as will be discussed later, out of
cities in the Midwest, speciﬁcally).
In the early 1930s rural electriﬁcation was stalled, leaving what
was then a majority of Americans, literally, in the dark. The reason why
rural markets had failed was manifest: the infrastructure to connect
widely dispersed houses to the grid had proven too costly. The Great
Depression further delayed investment in rural electriﬁcation. The
growing gap between living standards in rural and urban areas, a lag in
productivity growth in the agricultural sector, and the untapped potential rural demand for manufactured items such as household appliances
and telephones led President Roosevelt to create the Rural Electriﬁcation Administration (REA) in 1935. The REA (now the Rural Utilities
Service) has since been touted as one of the most profoundly successful
public policy initiatives in U.S. history. Some $410 million dollars were
set aside by Congress in 1936 for a 10-year program subsidizing loans
to construct the rural electrical supply infrastructure. Federally funded
public works programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the
Hoover Dam were set in motion, designed not only to create jobs, but
also to generate and deliver cheap electricity. Rural electrical cooperatives were granted preference in purchasing the cheapest power available, such as that generated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
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The result was that, just two years after the creation of the REA,
electricity was being delivered to 1.5 million farms in 45 states. By the
mid-1950s, almost all U.S. farms had electricity service. The cultural,
educational, and commercial disparity between rural and urban America
shrank considerably as electriﬁcation spurred growth in demand for
electrical appliances, plumbing, and information media such as radio
and television (Malone 2001).
But as with all social engineering, an unintended consequence
inevitably followed: subsidized power in the suburbs meant people
could abandon the city. The initial movement outward from city centers
began with the rapid expansion of the streetcar system, itself a product
of rural electriﬁcation. The ﬁrst suburbs that developed in the 1920s
and 1930s were laid out along streetcar lines. With the electriﬁcation of
rural America, streetcar lines extended further, creating the next ring of
suburbs, and a migration outward has continued to this day (El Nasser
2011; Shumsky 1996).
The absorption of much of the costs of rural electriﬁcation by those
who lived in urban areas made possible the exodus to the suburbs. It
became feasible for much of America to move “to the country”—and
to leave behind them the developing urban pathologies. Amazingly,
although the problem of rural electriﬁcation has been resolved for some
50 years, subsidies for rural electriﬁcation continue. Today our federal
government subsidizes rural electricity with billions of dollars of taxpayer money through an assortment of guaranteed loans, grants, and
preferred treatment; the most controversial of these strategies is support
for new coal-burning plants—while the rest of the country is trying to
cut back carbon emissions (Slivinski 2009).2
An Artiﬁcially High Cost of Electricity in Urban Areas
The energy cost increases in the 1970s and 1980s were not restricted
to oil and gas: electricity prices also rose signiﬁcantly. For decades U.S.
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution were all regulated,
with utilities enjoying “cost plus” rate recovery for nearly all of their
expenditures, regardless of their folly. The cost-plus strategy invited not
only technology stagnation, but also bloated utility budgets, since there
was no incentive to constrain costs. Inevitably, rates soared under this
paradigm; average U.S. electricity rates rose 60 percent between 1969
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and 1984, adjusted for inﬂation (Vaitheeswaran 2004). The biggest culprit for this problem lay with massive cost overruns associated with
the building of large centralized nuclear generation plants (D’Ambrosio
and O’Brien 2009).
Skyrocketing electricity prices were a major blow to urban areas
throughout America because those economies, especially in the Midwest, relied heavily upon a healthy manufacturing base. Manufacturing,
which even today consumes 30 percent of the nation’s electricity (Ohio
Manufacturers’Association 2010), was severely damaged by this, eventually leading to energy-intensive manufacturers championing electricity policy reform through deregulation. Ultimately this resulted in what
one energy writer calls the “Quiet Revolution”: governments around
the world began liberalizing their energy markets for both natural gas
and electricity (Vaitheeswaran 2004).
This regulatory reform, unfortunately, has not been uniformly
enacted throughout the United States, and even when it has, it has been
too late for many struggling urban areas that depended upon manufacturing jobs for their economic health. Even worse, many cities that
reside in deregulated electricity markets are captive to transmission and
peak capacity constraints, leading to excessive capacity (grid standby
power) and other charges by utilities, passed through on wholesale
power costs via regional transmission organizations. These capacity
charges threaten the value proposition provided by deregulation.
Energy reform legislation
The reform was motivated in part by the energy shocks of the 1970s
and the resulting legislation: the Natural Gas Policy Act (1978) and the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (1978). Both laws were passed to
deal with the energy crisis that had gripped the nation and catalyzed the
onset of the Rust Belt in the Great Lakes region. The Natural Gas Policy
Act froze “old” gas sold on the interstate market at unsustainable prices
but rewarded companies that drilled for new natural gas production with
market prices, thereby eventually alleviating the natural gas crisis. The
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, however, was less successful in
resolving electricity problems. Its goal was to resolve electricity shortfalls by encouraging conservation and mandating that utilities purchase
power from independent wholesale power producers. Nevertheless, the
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existing regulatory framework caused electricity prices to continue to
rise even as new generation was brought on line.
Under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act the individual
states were to encourage new generation from small (below 80 megawatts [MW]) facilities that used something other than fossil fuels, or
used waste heat. Utilities were required to purchase power from these
producers at “avoided cost,” the cost the utility would have had to pay if
it had built new, centralized electricity generation of a like amount. But
avoided costs were not based on market prices; there was no wholesale
market for electricity at the time. Instead, prices were based on “but
for” forecasts, that is, the generation cost expected to be incurred had
no such new generation been developed, and regulators soon found that
electricity prices had no relation to market realities. Independent power
producers had no incentive to innovate or to provide electricity at a
lower cost (Lesser and Giacchino 2007).
By the 1990s a wholesale electricity market was beginning to
develop (partly in response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992). Further,
because of a sluggish economy, demand for electricity was stagnant,
and surplus capacity developed. Yet power costs remained high because
of the massive cost overruns and the cost-plus regulatory recovery
schemes. Residential and commercial end users, with limited voice for
advocacy at the time, could do little about this. Energy-intensive industrial users, on the other hand, had the wherewithal to inﬂuence energy
policy in the United States and began to lobby for the right to bypass
utilities and to take their loads to an open wholesale generation market.
As a result, in 1994 deregulation was introduced to America through
sweeping regulatory reform in California (Lesser and Giacchino 2007).3
Deregulation thereafter spread throughout the nation and continues to
develop to this day.
The impact of deregulation on electricity production
and distribution
It has taken nearly 20 years for wholesale markets to develop for
electricity, and the jury is still out on how well deregulation will work.
Ohio, which ﬁrst deregulated in 2001, suffered through a deep recession
before wholesale electricity prices ﬁnally began to drop. Even then,
states like Ohio that have restructured their energy markets continue to
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have electricity prices higher than those that did not (American Public
Power Association 2012).
One reason why deregulation has failed in some urban areas is that
the regional transmission organization (RTO) remains captured by constrained transmission. As a result, utilities are forced to maintain large
and expensive amounts of standby (backup) power for peak periods of
use. This results in an RTO capacity charge passed through with the
wholesale price that can be on the same order of magnitude as the actual
cost of electricity. Nowhere is this problem more evident than in the
urban areas of northern Ohio, where a 2012 capacity auction held by
the RTO resulted in an increase in capacity charges by 2015 that will
approach or exceed in magnitude the wholesale price of power actually delivered. In theory, these high capacity charges should encourage
utilities to build more local capacity. In fact they do not: utilities do
not build new generation in an unregulated environment in response
to short-term price signals, since there is no guarantee of a return on
their investment. If anything, high capacity charges have the opposite effect—they encourage utilities to underinvest, thereby distorting
the generation technology mix toward more expensive peaking units
(Meunier 2010). The result is that utilities will pass through capacity
charges—the cost of expensive standby generation—onto wholesale
power costs that can be nearly as much as the cost of the power actually
consumed.
But for Ohio and other midwestern states, the damage was already
done before deregulation. Electricity-intensive manufacturing—e.g.,
steel, aluminum, glass, and chemical industries—has traditionally made
up a large part of the urban workforce in Ohio. These industries struggled to remain competitive in the face of high electricity prices, and the
loss of jobs severely damaged urban areas throughout the Midwest.
Yet even while generation has been deregulated, the transmission
and distribution side continues to be devoid of competition. Electricity,
natural gas, and telephone grids fall into what are traditionally considered to be “natural monopolies,” instances where we cannot build and
maintain multiple grids. The best we can do is to provide alternatives
to the grid. Indeed, this was exactly what happened in the telephone
industry: wireless networks provided the competition that drove down
the cost of wired phone systems.
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For electricity, however, utilities have no desire to see their principal asset—the grid—devalued. Not surprisingly, utilities have lobbied
hard to protect this resource. For instance, one way of introducing competition for the grid is for end users to generate their own electricity on
site. Utilities have perceived on-site generation, the most common form
of distributed generation (DG), as a threat to the grid and have not welcomed it. Utilities have been very successful in advancing regulatory
barriers to DG that continue intact to this day.
Generation alternatives
Nevertheless, the next “quiet revolution” will be the introduction of competition to the regulated side of electricity. The ﬁrst place
this is likely to happen will be in the shift from centralized to distributed electricity generation. It has long been thought that energyintensive industries like steel, glass, and chemical manufacturing could
be “ground zero” for rethinking how energy is generated and used in the
United States. These industries consume large amounts of fossil fuels
and electricity to melt scrap iron, iron ore, and sand, and to produce
chemicals. Recycling the waste heat from these industries could itself
generate some 5 percent of America’s electricity needs. Likewise, in
Gothenburg, Sweden, two reﬁneries use waste heat to provide nearly
half the 450,000 residents of that town with district heating. None of
the 150 reﬁneries in America recycles waste heat for use in residential
heating (Vaitheeswaran 2004).
Utilities initially disfavored DG because they found value in economies of scale: large-scale coal plants in particular were more efﬁcient
and capable of producing less-expensive power than smaller plants.
However, large-scale coal plants were not amenable to being located
in crowded urban areas, rendering the waste heat produced from such
plants difﬁcult to use. Waste heat has a limited value unless buildings
and homes are spaced closely together and are located near the source
of the heat.
Once utilities became heavily invested in the grid, they had little
interest in local generation. What’s more, deregulation of the generation
market cemented the utilities’ distaste for DG. Utilities today nearly
always favor investment in the grid, with its guaranteed return, to risky
generation ventures. Indeed, the bigger the grid became, the more money
utilities made. So when large-scale power users began to push for
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opportunities to self-generate, utilities pushed back with an assortment
of obstacles, ranging from exit and standby fees to heavy-handed interconnection standards. DG was simply not cost effective except for very
large industrial users.
The effects on cities were twofold. First, because cogeneration (also
called “combined heat and power,” or CHP) was not cost effective, few
cities developed heating networks to use waste heat. And second, as
large industrial users departed from the grid through the deregulation
of power generation, captured urban residential and commercial users
were left behind to pay a larger share of the cost overruns associated
with nuclear and other expensive power. Rural residents, on the other
hand, were able to avoid this capture through their cooperatives.
Successful lobbying by the clean energy industry and others,
including smaller industrial users and new aggregated power purchasing cooperatives, has led to some regulatory reform. Most notably, net
metering (where meters run backward when excess power from DG
is placed into the grid) rules have enabled a recent increase in smallscale renewable DG. However CHP, the most cost-effective form of
DG, continues to be ineligible for net metering in most jurisdictions,
and standby fees continue to render most CHP projects uneconomical.
Moreover, the changes that have been made have been mostly too little
too late: the longtime preference for centralized power has made it difﬁcult for cities now to develop waste heat networks similar to those that
exist in Europe. A hostile regulatory environment and a lack of a heat
transportation infrastructure have colluded to play a role in the decline
of urban economies.

ENERGY POLICIES THAT HAVE TENDED TO
SPECIFICALLY HARM MIDWESTERN CITIES
Cheap Air Conditioning
For all the angst over public policies that have led to the exodus
from the Midwest to the South and Southwest, none would matter but
for the advent of inexpensive air conditioning. Around the same time
that the energy crisis gripped the Midwest, air conditioning had begun
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to be widely available, cheap, and commonplace throughout the United
States. Until this transformation, the climates of the American South
and Southwest were miserable to live in year-round.
It is difﬁcult to overstate how cheap air-conditioning has changed
U.S. society. It catalyzed the population boom in the South and Southwest (Cooper 1998), and it reformed the American political landscape
(Pﬁffner 2009).4 We have become so dependent on air conditioning that
some have likened it to a drug. Anyone who has stepped into an airconditioned store on a hot summer day can attest to the sense of instant
gratiﬁcation climate control can provide. Fifty years ago a third of the
U.S. population resided in the South and Southwest; now it is over half.
The relocation of manufacturing, businesses, and jobs to the American
South is a direct result of air conditioning and of the energy policies that
made it cheap (Evans 2005).
The policy that has most enabled this transformation has been the
Rural Electriﬁcation Act (REA), which provided the largely rural south
with the favorable electricity rates that allowed it to grow (Diamond
and Moezzi, n.d.). Without the REA, it would have taken generations
longer for air conditioning to become affordable in the South, if ever.
But it is hardly the only energy policy that enabled cheap air conditioning: the failure to account for external environmental costs associated with the emission of refrigerants has also served to artiﬁcially
suppress the cost of air conditioning. In the 1980s, wealthier countries,
such as the United States, moved away from using chloroﬂuorocarbons
(CFCs) for air conditioning to save the atmosphere’s ozone layer, but
the replacement refrigerants are still highly potent greenhouse gases.
North America, with 6 percent of the world’s people, accounts for 40
percent of the world refrigerant market (Cox 2007). The South and the
Southwest represent the vast majority of this usage—and our policies
ignoring the actual cost of air conditioning have made it easier for businesses and manufacturing to move there.
In the Midwest, summers can be uncomfortably hot for short periods, but brief spans of heat are not debilitating to labor. Long periods
of cold, on the other hand, can be inexpensively managed with proper
clothing and heating systems. Manufacturing has historically thrived
in cold climates and could not have been successfully implemented in
a climate where intense heat dominated for half the year. Cities like
Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and New Orleans in the past were home to
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sleepy societies where work often shut down during the long summer.
There was no interest by captains of industry to relocate manufacturing to the U.S. South or Southwest—or to Mexico or other subtropical
countries, for that matter—due to the toll taken on both the workforce
and machinery.
Cheap air conditioning changed all of that. With the emergence
of mechanical cooling, working conditions in factories improved and
entire manufacturing industries rose up in the South, facilitating the
explosive economic development and population growth in the Sunbelt
region. Air conditioning did more than make the workplace bearable;
it also enabled the South to manufacture products sensitive to heat and
humidity, such as textiles, color printing, pharmaceuticals, and food
processing. In addition, the ofﬁce environment improved, with air conditioning becoming an important factor in workplace efﬁciency (Steinmetz 2010). One study tested federal employees and found a 24 percent
increase in output by typists when transferred from an environment
without air conditioning to one with it (Cooper 1998).
Before air conditioning, the extreme heat in the South was not only
uncomfortable and counterproductive, it was also a major health concern, as it facilitated the spread of disease. With the introduction of
air conditioning, infant mortality was reduced and malaria eliminated
(Arsenault 1984). The South became a more pleasant and attractive
place to live as air conditioning and technological advances brought
about improvements in public health.
Air conditioning was originally implemented in industrial and
commercial settings but eventually proliferated in residential homes
and automobiles, as the technology became not only cheaper, but also
smaller and less dangerous with the development of nontoxic coolants.
Several types of air conditioners were available on the market starting
in the 1930s, but as they were both expensive and cumbersome, they
remained a novelty for home use for the next 20 years. In 1951, an inexpensive, efﬁcient window air conditioning unit was ﬁnally introduced
and became popular. By 1965, central air conditioning had entered the
market and could be found in 10 percent of homes in the United States
(Carrier, n.d.). With technology steadily improving, most new homes
were being built with central air conditioning, and window air conditioners were increasingly ﬁnancially accessible (Great Achievements
2013). By 1975, air conditioning existed in 50 percent of American
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homes. By the 1980s, when depopulation of the Rust Belt in favor of
the Sunbelt had begun in earnest, 90 percent of new homes in the South
had adopted central air conditioning (Pipe Doctor Plumbing, Heating,
and Air Conditioning, n.d.).
Paralleling this development was air conditioning in cars. Air
conditioning in automobiles was ﬁrst available as a factory-installed
accessory in 1940 with the Packard line, but with the onset of World
War II, growth in this sector was stunted along with the rest of the airconditioning market. Even in the 1950s, the air-conditioned car was
considered an extraordinary luxury and the ultimate status symbol, to
the degree that some people in Texas drove around with their windows
rolled up in the 100-degree heat just to give the impression that their
car had air conditioning installed. By 1973, however, more than 80 percent of new cars in the South were being outﬁtted with air conditioning
(Fergusson 2006).
Today we live in a very different world, where the hot climate
is considered a reason to live permanently in the South rather than a
reason to avoid it. This is more than a little bit due to the advent of
inexpensive air conditioning. Most Americans prefer suffering through
a short walk in intense heat from their air-conditioned house to their
air-conditioned car to digging out of a snow drift and scraping ice off
their car windows. Corporations are eager to blame their decisions to
relocate manufacturing to the Sunbelt on unfavorable tax rates, unions,
and other dollars and cents considerations. But one wonders how much
executive distaste for midwestern winters controls decisions about relocations for manufacturing. So long as air conditioning is cheap and
readily available, no amount of tax incentives or union concessions can
compete with a lifestyle preference for mild winters.
Promotion of Trucking over Railroads and Waterways
The U.S. government undertook a major social initiative in the
1950s and 1960s designed to make interstate transportation by automobile easier and less expensive. This energy policy would have interesting and momentous consequences for the American Midwest. The
program was promulgated during the Eisenhower Administration as
the American Federal-Aid Highway Act. The initiative consisted of
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the development of a national trust for the purchase, through eminent
domain, of large amounts of private land, and the subsequent building
of an interstate highway system unlike anything ever seen. In short, the
United States embarked upon a strategy to build a highway and bridge
infrastructure that would transform the American landscape forever,
making travel across the country easier, faster, and less expensive.
Change the landscape it did—and a great deal more: it forever
altered American culture. Trucking beneﬁted relative to railroads and
waterways, helping it to become the transportation mode of choice for
shipping a wide range of goods and materials throughout America. This
contributed to the decline of the traditional midwestern transportation
economy—railroads and waterways—and with it, to the decline of the
Great Lakes port communities.
Developing a network of major interstate highways was certainly
a laudable public policy: driving time and costs were reduced signiﬁcantly, and travel efﬁciencies inured to the beneﬁt of all, as the expenses
of transporting goods dropped. Moreover, the indirect subsidy to the
automobile industry was a short-term boost to the Great Lakes cities
that manufactured trucks, automobiles, and parts. However, the longterm effect on these cities manifested itself later in another, less desirable manner: Great Lakes shipping ports and railroad terminals became
largely obsolete. The advent of subsidized high-speed interstate highways, combined with subsidized cheap gasoline and diesel fuel, inevitably led trucking to become the preferred method of transportation of
goods and materials across America. From Duluth to Buffalo, Great
Lake cities watched their once-busy harbors turn into ghost ports. Railroad terminals across the Midwest also shut down, and with them disappeared the livelihoods of many Midwestern families who had worked
on those trains for generations.
Although the majority of the people in America at that time were
located in the Midwest or the Northeast, the new superhighways crisscrossed the country in equally spaced patterns without regard to population. The goal of the new interstate system was, after all, to make travel
among the states easier—and this included crossing the underpopulated
regions of the South and Southwest. The consequence, however, was
to indirectly support migration to the rural South and Southwest. The
new interstate highway system not only helped render obsolete the tra-
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ditional transportation economy of the Midwest, it also subsidized the
inevitable movement of workers to the South and Southwest by making
it cheaper to transport goods and materials to and from those regions.
Failure to Embrace Change in Energy Policy
A third category of energy policy that generally has had a troubling
result for midwestern cities stems from a behavioral disorder common
to all leaders who set public policy: the failure to identify and understand social change, and to respond to that change in a timely way. The
general reason for this shortcoming is that vested interests, especially in
the trillion-dollar-a-year energy business, usually resist change mightily. Steps that may be good for society in general may not be good for a
particular sector of the economy, and that segment may be particularly
persuasive in helping government leaders to set public policy. In a society where policy is made by competing advocacy groups, alignment
with the status quo has a signiﬁcant advantage.
The best example of how this culture can be shortsighted relates
to the political resistance to the adoption of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards. These guidelines were originally established as a means of improving automobile efﬁciency in response to the
1973–1974 Arab oil embargo, which caused crude oil prices to triple
and exposed the United States to vulnerabilities in relying on imported
petroleum. In the period leading up to this ﬁrst oil shock, new-car ﬂeet
fuel economy had dipped from 14.8 miles per gallon (mpg) in 1967 to
12.9 mpg in 1974. With the Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975,
CAFE standards required the passenger-car program to achieve newcar ﬂeet fuel economy standards of 27.5 mpg by 1985.
Control over the passenger-car program remained in the hands of
the Secretary of Transportation, and standards could be adjusted within a range of 26 to 27.5 mpg without requiring Energy Policy Conservation Act amendments and the subsequent approval of Congress.
Under the same act, the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration (NHTSA) was given authority over the structure and alterations
of the light-truck program (Yacobucchi and Bamberger 2007). CAFE
standards set by the NHTSA were only held to the “maximum feasible
fuel economy standards,” broadly deﬁned by Congress as having technological feasibility, economic practicability, and consideration for the
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effect of other standards on fuel economy and the need of the nation to
conserve energy (Moulton, n.d.).
The predictable reaction from the automobile and petroleum industries was to resist any change as long as possible. This strategy worked.
Since achieving the ﬁrst target of improving fuel economy to 27.5 mpg
in 1985, no improvement in standards has been made, and none is anticipated until 2017. Further, those energy efﬁciency standards that were
adopted were easily circumvented. A sport utility vehicle (SUV) loophole was exploited that encouraged American families to buy trucks
(including SUVS) instead of cars. Light trucks with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 8,500 pounds are exempt from CAFE standards. For
light trucks under this weight, fuel economy standards only increased
by 2 mpg, from 20.2 to 22.2, during the 15 years between 1992 and
2007 (NHTSA 2013). Buoyed by the SUV market, truck sales in America exploded, eventually overtaking car sales by the late 1990s.
Unfortunately, this only served to put the U.S. automobile industry
at a competitive disadvantage to its European and Japanese counterparts, who continued to build more efﬁcient cars. As oil prices rose
sharply in the mid-2000s, truck sales faltered (see Figure 7.3). By 2008,
with the economy in free fall, car sales caught up with truck sales for
the ﬁrst time in over a decade, as sales for trucks dropped to half of
their 1990 numbers. American car companies, notably the Detroit Three
(GM, Ford, and Chrysler), were in no position to weather the storm,
as proﬁts had become heavily dependent on SUV and truck sales, and
these ﬁrms required government support to stay aﬂoat. Resistance to
the CAFE standards, in response to a perceived threat to the viability of
the American automobile industry, contributed to the near bankruptcy
of this entire U.S. industry. Midwestern cities, especially Great Lakes
cities, suffered grievously in the process.
The resistance to deregulation of electricity markets and to DG provides other examples where vested interests have conspired to thwart
job creation in the Midwest, especially in traditional manufacturing
industries such as steel, glass, and chemicals. The overall dependence
of centralized generation upon the importation of fossil fuels has intensiﬁed the high cost of power for midwestern urban areas, insofar as this
region has traditionally been an importer of coal, oil, and gas. DG, on
the other hand, tends to rely on local fuels such as waste heat, solar, and
wind, and as a result usually returns more money to the local economy.
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Figure 7.3 U.S. Car and Truck Sales, 1950–2010
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According to one expert, as much as 50 percent of every dollar spent on
conventional centralized generation leaves the community. However,
for renewable DG, about $1.40 is returned to the local community for
every dollar spent (Sovacool and Watts 2009).
There will always be resistance to change by those who stand to
lose from it. But when it comes to energy, policymakers are particularly
vulnerable to short-sighted decisions. The stakes for energy generation choice are enormous. We can expect parties to aggressively advocate their own interests in the status quo. Unfortunately for midwestern cities, this intransigence has too frequently been harmful to local
economies.
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ENERGY POLICES THAT WILL HELP MIDWESTERN
CITIES RECOVER
U.S. energy policy in the past 70 years has encouraged migration
of jobs and residents out of the Midwest, and this needs to change. Yet
we do not want to rebuild midwestern cities at the expense of rural
areas, or at the expense of the South or Southwest. Certainly no one
would advocate a return to poverty and misery for the South so that
the Midwest could once again enjoy a more robust economy. Similarly,
with so much of our commercial activity now moved to the suburbs, we
cannot abandon those spaces. But we can at least try to redress some
of the imbalances in our energy policies that have so decimated the
cities in the Great Lakes region. New approaches that do not directly
encourage migration out of the cities certainly would help. Some of the
most important energy strategies that could be deployed are those that
can help deliver clean, inexpensive energy to midwestern communities.
Several of those policies are set forth in the following discussion.
Policies That Encourage DG
The shift to clean and high-efﬁciency energy systems is key to both
sustainability and economic growth. This change will transform virtually every aspect of the economy, transportation systems, and construction, as well as the conﬁguration of human settlements in the twentyﬁrst century. Urban areas in particular are highly vulnerable to paradigm
shifts in technology. Technological innovation is the “principal mechanism underlying the successive epochs of urban evolution.” Throughout the history of American cities, changes in transportation and energy
have been the root cause of fundamental transformation (Berry 1991).
Forces are working together now that will transform the structure of
urban society.5 Cities throughout the United States need to understand
these forces and prepare themselves for the changes that are coming.
One of those fundamental transformations will be the shift away
from centralized generation toward a DG model. Developing a regulatory environment that is friendly to DG will help position communities
for growth and sustainability. This will not only reduce the costs of
energy in the inner city through such mechanisms as CHP, but will also
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create jobs locally. Moreover, since DG tends to be cleaner than centralized generation, it also tends to make for a more pleasant environment
in which to live and work.
Advantages of DG for the Midwest
Midwestern cities are well placed to play a leading role in the development of DG. That is because the many locations where DG is likely
to ﬁrst become economical are those involving generation at industrial
sites, and midwestern cities are among the nation’s leaders in generation
capability from industrial waste heat. According to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Ohio, for instance, produces enough waste
heat to “generate the equivalent power of 8 nuclear power plants” (Margonelli 2010). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory projects that wasteheat recovery systems can be available for around $1,500 per kilowatt
(kW) installed (Margonelli 2010)—a price that should be attractive for
electricity-intensive manufacturing. The potential to avoid future carbon taxes and to create jobs also makes this of considerable interest to
midwestern cities.6
Three other factors will likely lead to the advancement of DG in
the Midwest. The ﬁrst is the April 2012 adoption of new federal EPA
Clean Air Act pollution standards (the so-called Boiler MACT regulations [EPA 2013]) that will cause area-wide capital investment into new,
cleaner steam-generation capacity.7 Many midwestern industries have
big, old coal boilers producing large volumes (over 100,000 pounds
per hour) of steam. These boilers tend to work continuously, are inefﬁcient, and require as fuel low-sulfur “compliance coal” (Casten 2012).8
Industrial users that are considering an upgrade of their coal boilers in
order to comply with the new rules may ﬁnd this to be a convenient time
to convert to more efﬁcient heat-creating systems, such as CHP. With
this approach, electricity made as a byproduct of generating heat can
be converted for use on site, thereby dramatically improving systemic
efﬁciency.
The second factor relates to grid congestion, especially in the Great
Lakes areas. Northern Ohio, for example, has been grid constrained for
a number of years. As a result, and in anticipation of retiring old coalburning generation facilities, First Energy now plans to undertake a $1
billion transmission upgrade (Funk 2012). Indeed, the regional transmission organization (RTO) that Ohio utilities belong to, PJM, antici-
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pates that there will be changes in the next several years to the generation ﬂeet producing power for Ohio on an “unprecedented scale.” PJM
announced in May 2012 that it had purchased in an auction a “record
amount of new generation” for 2015–2016. Northern Ohio suffered the
highest prices in the PJM capacity market—$357 per MW, more than
twice the PJM unconstrained price of $136 per MW (PJM 2012). All of
these costs will be passed through to urban residents and businesses in
the form of capacity charges on wholesale electricity bills. One expert
projects that capacity costs alone in First Energy’s Ohio region will
increase by 700 percent by 2014 over today’s charges, reaching $0.0317
per kilowatt-hour (kWh) by 2015 for a user with a 50 percent load factor (Brakey 2012). Such costs could be avoided if DG were strategically
adopted in response to the constrained grid.
The third factor relates to another threat midwestern urban economies face: carbon regulation. Driven in part by EPA requirements to
either clean up or shut down old coal plants and in part by a depressed
natural gas market, much of coal electricity generation will be replaced
by natural gas in the coming years. According to one recent study,
even accounting for a marginal increase in life-cycle greenhouse gases
generated through hydraulic fracturing, burning natural gas emits less
than half the carbon that burning coal does (Hultman et al. 2011). This
reduction in carbon emissions will likely become a critical element to
the viability of midwestern economies, especially in urban areas that
are so dependent on manufacturing, as increasing restrictions are placed
on carbon emissions. CHP will in all likelihood become the most compelling solution to the problem of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: it
not only uses natural gas (or biomass) as its principal fuel, it is also far
more efﬁcient than centralized generation.
CHP systems, however, do not as a rule enjoy the beneﬁts of net
metering. Utilities do not have to pay the full value of electricity when
taking power back onto the grid. Instead, they pay what they consider to
be the value of displaced power, calculated at the cost of generation at
some distant centralized point. The actual electrons may be delivered to
a manufacturer down the road 100 yards, but the utility is not required
to compensate for the strategic location of the power generation.9
This policy, along with the general one of guaranteeing a “cost
plus” recovery on expenditures on the still-regulated grid, has led to
the traditional utility being incentivized to allocate as much of its costs
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as possible to building and operating the grid, and as little as possible
to generateing electricity. Not surprisingly, we see as a result widely
disparate estimates for the cost of power production from centralized generation. Utility accounting under this system, which may not
include such things as the anticipated cost of decommissioning a power
plant, typically sets a low generation cost for nuclear power. Yet the
cost for nuclear energy generation, by most measurements, is very high
(Vaitheeswaran 2004).10
Needed changes in policies
As noted by energy pundit Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain
Institute, the old model of centralized generation with a ubiquitous grid
was based upon the twentieth-century idea that generation was less reliable than the grid. But the twenty-ﬁrst century reality turns this model
on its head: today, generation, especially gas turbine, is more reliable
than the grid. Accordingly, one of the fundamental reasons for centralized generation no longer exists. As Lovins (2001) notes, today “the
cheapest, most reliable power” is that which is “produced at or near the
customers” (p. xiii).
For DG to take hold in the Midwest, several policy changes will be
required.
•
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Net metering and/or improved sales options for excess generation. Currently, in most jurisdictions excess generation cannot be
“net metered” (i.e., the meter does not run backward), and must
be sold back into the grid at the unbundled “generation rate”
(i.e., the generation charge, without the transmission or distribution charge) for power. Under such circumstances, the return for
generation is signiﬁcantly diminished: there is no value attributed to the strategic location of the generation near a market. For
smaller systems (below 138 kilovolts [kV]), however, utilities
are often required to purchase the power only at the displaced
generation price (i.e., the “avoided cost of generation.”) In Ohio,
the avoided cost has been set as low as $0.012 per kWh (Wissman 2012). Accordingly, smaller systems will likely not even
recover the going rate for unbundled wholesale generation. Netmetering rules should be established for CHP, or at least regulations should allow for better sales options for excess power.
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•

Reduced standby rates. At the outset, it should be noted that the
public policy case for the assessment of any standby fee is by no
means clear. A strong argument can be made that both utilities
and consumers beneﬁt greatly from DG, and it is counterproductive to charge standby fees (Casten 2003). Any measures that
reduce the need for repair or construction of distribution and
transmission assets inures to the beneﬁt of all users, not just the
DG end users (Casten 2003; Miller 2012). Nevertheless, regulatory bodies are inclined to accept the utility arguments for
the need for standby fees. The problem, then, is to determine
what charges are reasonable under the circumstances—and what
charges can be borne by distributed generators without rendering
the project unviable. The EPA has determined that, unless the
customer can avoid at least 90 percent of its otherwise applicable
rate costs, CHP will not be viable (Weston et al. 2009). Unfortunately, this number is one that is not commonly met with existing
standby charges in most jurisdictions. In a study by the Midwest Clean Energy Application Center, avoided-cost percentages
from utilities in Iowa, for instance, ranged from a low of 74 to a
high of 81 percent among Iowa investor-owned utilities (Miller
2012). Policies need to be established either doing away with or
making manageable standby charges.

•

Microgrid development. One way to capture the full potential of DG is through a distribution system architecture called
a “microgrid.” Unlike DG, a microgrid consists of more than
a single point of generation. Like DG, however, a microgrid
should have the ability to isolate itself (islanding) from the utility’s distribution system during a grid disturbance. Islanding has
the potential to give a higher level of reliability to end users than
that provided by the macrogrid system as a whole.11 The typical microgrid uses DG and cogeneration to provide both electricity and heat to multiple customers joined together on a local
network. Microgrids also offer potential advantages in power
quality and reliability over macrogrids, which tend to provide
homogeneous power quality when customers may have heterogeneous requirements (Neville 2008). There is currently considerable uncertainty over how microgrids will be regulated, but
under most jurisdictions, it appears that only utilities can operate
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microgrids. There will need to be clarity in the regulations over
how microgrids may be operated and who may operate them
before they can be deployed.
However, the policies necessary to enable DG are not just regulatory
in nature. Urban universities, for instance, can play a critical leadership role in preparing cities for a transition to DG. To accomplish this,
universities should change their approach toward technical education
for the energy industry, and federal and state governments need to support this shift. Policies that promote DG will have little value if there is
not a workforce that is capable of deploying the new technologies, and,
importantly, of understanding the value proposition associated with
DG. Without such a workforce, transactional costs threaten to slow the
advancement of DG.
For centralized generation, professional services have traditionally
comprised a small percentage of the total project cost. Accordingly,
utilities have engaged the biggest and most expensive law ﬁrms, banks,
architectural and engineering ﬁrms—and money has been no object.
But in the world of DG, projects may cost $300,000 instead of $300
million. Yet many of the same legal, regulatory, ﬁnancial, and engineering issues arise in small projects as in large projects; transactional costs
do not go down in proportion to project size. Today’s energy-systems
professional needs to be nimble, trained in multiple disciplines, and
capable of assessing value inexpensively.
State and federal resources should be brought to bear on urban
four-year engineering and engineering technology programs throughout America, but especially in the Midwest, to create comprehensive,
cross-disciplinary energy-systems training. Under current university
models, applied technology is not a priority, and certainly the social
sciences are not. Universities are rewarded with large research grants
with generous overhead compensation for energy technology, especially through federally funded programs such as the National Science
Foundation. But applied engineering programs and research on social
impediments to the adoption of advanced energy do not generally get
this same sort of support.
Midwestern urban areas have the most to lose if a transition to DG
is not enabled. Ohio, for instance, is highly vulnerable to a carbon tax or
a cap and trade system. Roughly 88 percent of Ohio’s power generation
comes from burning coal. In the meantime, Ohio, which is ranked sev-
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enth nationally in population, is ranked sixth in total energy consumption, fourth in industrial energy consumption, and fourth in greenhouse
gas emissions (Consortium for Energy, Economics, and the Environment 2008). In short, Ohio’s economy is dependent on traditional forms
of energy generation that are patently unsustainable. Urban universities
in Ohio and other midwestern states must take the lead in helping to
rewrite regulatory law and in retraining their workforces for the inevitable paradigm shift from central to distributed power generation. State
and federal resources need to enable this transition to be made without
a massive disruption of midwestern economies.
Exploitation of Shale Formations
One of the most exciting and promising developments for the urban
economies of both the Midwest and the Northeast has been improvements in drilling and completion techniques in the oil and gas industry.
Speciﬁcally, horizontal drilling and new hydrofracturing technologies
have enabled oil and gas companies to produce hydrocarbons from
organically rich shale deposits that were laid down in sedimentary
basins hundreds of millions of years ago. Previously, shale formations
had been too impermeable to produce hydrocarbons in commercial
quantities. Now, suddenly, vast commercially producible oil and gas
reserves exist in areas of Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, North
Dakota, and other places around the world. For the ﬁrst time since the
1800s, the Midwest is poised to not only be self-sufﬁcient, but even to
export oil and gas.
This will of course be a badly needed shot in the arm for the ﬂagging economies of the Midwest. Related job creation in ﬁnancial and
legal centers such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Columbus, Akron, Canton,
and Youngstown has already begun. More will be coming as drilling
picks up. In addition, shale development tends to be more serviceindustry intensive than traditional oil and gas exploration because of
the relatively high cost of drilling and completing wells, and the high
rate of production decline (requiring more drilling). In other words,
there will be more wells and more completions, yet fewer failures, driving a robust new oil and gas service industry. Even though much of the
early wealth to be generated from this industry will be for rural landowners, inevitably the urban areas of the Midwest will beneﬁt greatly,
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not only from the reduced hydrocarbon prices, but also from professional service companies locating in cities to be close to a skilled workforce and to transportation hubs.
Pennsylvania has been the forerunner in economic development as
a result of shale drilling. According to one study by Penn State University, the Marcellus Shale development has led directly to 44,000 jobs in
2009 in that state, creating around $3.9 billion in economic value added
to Pennsylvania, with $8 billion more in 2010 and $10 billion more
in 2011 (Considine, Watson, and Blumsack 2010). Likewise, in Ohio,
economists have estimated that by 2014, 64,000 jobs will be supported
as a result of developing the Utica Shale, adding some $4.9 billion to
the state’s gross domestic product (Thomas et al. 2012)
But setting aside these promising employment numbers resulting
directly from oil and gas exploration, perhaps the best news for midwestern urban economies will be the long-term source of cheap natural
gas. Shale gas has transformed the American energy landscape almost
overnight: between 2006 and 2011, natural gas prices dropped from
over $10 per mcf to under $4 per mcf (U.S. Energy Information Agency
2012a). Shale gas, which comprised less than 2 percent of the gas produced in the United States in 2000, now comprises 37 percent—and is
rising (Yergin 2012). In the meantime, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
in 2012 were the lowest since 1992, due in principal part to the rapid
replacement of coal with natural gas as a source of electricity (U.S.
Energy Information Agency 2012b).12
States such as Ohio will no longer be experiencing huge trade deﬁcits due to the purchase of oil from the Middle East. This newfound
source of oil and gas promises a stable, 20–30-year supply of inexpensive hydrocarbons to heat homes, to generate electricity, and to fuel
transportation. The Energy Information Agency projects natural gas
prices of between $4 and $8 per mcf through 2035 as a result of the
“shale gale” (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2012a). Further, petrochemical companies, which also rely on long-term, inexpensive and
stable supplies of natural gas for feedstock, can justify the ﬁnancial
commitment to locate or expand manufacturing in the Midwest.
State and federal policies should encourage shale development.
Regulation of the industry must be tight, sure, and comprehensive; any
spills or contamination from wastewater generated by drilling will set
back development enormously. State regulatory agencies and state geo-
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logical surveys must be completely independent from the oil and gas
industry under their purview and be fully funded. This can be done
through severance and other taxes generated by oil and gas production and also through long-overdue taxes on imported oil, especially
from those locations where U.S. military presence is required to safely
transport oil to American ports. This latter policy, more than any, has
the potential to provide ample resources to enable the safe production of
U.S. oil and gas supplies from unconventional sources while restoring
wealth to American cities.
Importantly, midwestern cities should not use the newfound hydrocarbon wealth to go back to business as usual. While the oil and gas
reserves located in shale beds in the Midwest and the Northeast provide a more climate-friendly alternative to burning coal, they are still
an exhaustible resource that emits large amounts of carbon into the
atmosphere. These reserves should be considered as a bridge to an economy based on hydrogen, electric transportation, and renewable energy
generation—an economy where oil and gas are used primarily in the
petrochemical sector rather than the energy sector. Policymakers in the
Midwest have an opportunity to do something that their counterparts
in Texas, Louisiana, and even the federal government have failed to do
with their respective oil and gas largesse: plan for the inevitable transition to alternative energy supplies without a massive disruption of the
economy.
Policies That Reﬂect the Actual Costs of Transportation
and Power Delivery
For some 80 years our energy policies have placed the burden of
growth in rural locales on the urban areas. That policy must be reversed.
Now it is time for the rural areas, or at least the suburbs, to support
growth in the inner city. The same sort of program that led to the development of rural electriﬁcation should now be put into place in our inner
cities: subsidized loans and grants for DG and access to cheap, federally supported electricity. Municipal utilities in particular would beneﬁt
from having priority for the cheapest electricity available, from which
savings could be used to attract business, industry, and residents back
to the city.
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Monetizing some of the external costs of power generation and
gasoline consumption would also help cities, especially in the Midwest.
For instance, if the actual cost of air conditioning were passed on to
consumers, manufacturing management might reach a different conclusion about the beneﬁts of relocating operations from the Midwest to the
South or Southwest. Similarly, if the total cost of transportation were
passed on to commuters, residents might reach a different conclusion
about the beneﬁts of moving ever farther from the city.
Just as we have seen decades of policy subsidizing rural electriﬁcation over urban electriﬁcation, we have also seen decades of policy subsidizing rural transportation over urban transportation. This is another
policy that must be reversed. We cannot now abandon our reliance on
interstate highways. However, we can fund programs that make life
easier for residents of midwestern cities. This begins with better transportation systems.
Better, faster, and more comfortable public transportation would
certainly be a major ﬁrst step. It will require a signiﬁcant and continuous subsidy to sustain such a program, because it will take decades to
see the demographic response. In many of the Great Lakes cities, the
hardest part about transportation is driving in snow. Public transportation could alleviate much of this problem.
Winter travel is problematic not just for commuting, however; it
is also a problem for walking in the city. Many midwestern cities cannot afford to effectively plow and salt roads and sidewalks, and walking becomes an adventure. Funds should be directed to cities to enable
them to respond quickly to winter storms. Sidewalks and crosswalks
can be heated by underground steam systems to keep them free of ice.
Better still, underground passageways can be built connecting downtown urban centers such as universities, museums, sports venues, commercial districts, arts districts, and ofﬁce parks. Houston has such an
underground tunnel system in its downtown, and it is used mostly in
the hot, humid summer. A number of Canadian cities have downtown
indoor walkways; Montreal’s underground complex is so vast that it is
known as the ville intérieure, the “indoor city.” Midwestern cities could
have a similar system in their downtown areas for winter activities. To
be sure, these sorts of programs are not easily accomplished, especially
in a bad economy. But the rural electriﬁcation program was established

Bowen.indb 178

12/16/2013 2:14:20 PM

How Energy Policy Enabled the Decline of Midwestern Cities 179

in a far worse economy. It will take the same sort of effort to rebuild
midwestern cities to their former glory.
Regional Energy Planning
The Midwest today has an opportunity to reimagine sustainable
industrialization. More than anything else, a return to a healthy manufacturing base would lead to a revitalization of urban areas. Manufacturing has long been the lifeblood of the midwestern urban economy,
but it is also an energy-intensive business, especially for such industries that produce aluminum, steel, chemicals, and glass. Manufacturers
account for roughly one-half of U.S. natural gas and 30 percent of its
electricity consumption. Accordingly, a secure, reliable, and affordable
source of electricity is a top priority for midwestern manufacturers.
Those manufacturers for which electricity costs make up an especially
signiﬁcant portion of their product costs are most vulnerable to rapid
rate increases (Ohio Manufacturers’ Association 2010). The ongoing
decline in manufacturing jobs throughout America has accelerated
in recent years, reﬂecting not just high electricity costs, but also the
return to $100 per bbl oil and the “high priced fuel syndrome.” Ohio has
lost some 117,000 manufacturing jobs in the the period of 2008–2012
alone—the second highest total in America (Thomas 2012).
With foresight and planning, the Midwest can develop energy policies to help reverse this trend. As outlined in this chapter, forces are
coming together today that necessitate rethinking industrialization in
the Midwest. Rising electricity capacity charges, EPA Boiler MACT
laws, carbon emission reduction mandates, and the development of
shale gas all demand that midwestern policymakers formulate strategies for enabling DG and a conversion of transportation ﬂeets to natural
gas or electricity.
Urban areas would beneﬁt from collaboration between local governments and industries to develop regional energy-planning scenarios.
This will be especially important in older, more densely populated areas
of the Great Lakes and the Midwest, where DG holds so much promise.
DG, especially CHP, will not be a “one size ﬁts all” application; every
situation requires an analysis speciﬁc to those circumstances. However, planning can help manufacturers identify strategies to use “off the
shelf” technologies when possible.
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In particular, for regions with a large variety of manufacturing and
other electricity-intensive users, a coordinated CHP program can be
useful to organizations trying to ﬁnd a ﬁt for their power and heat needs.
Such a program might be set up to address three strategic areas:
1) commercial buildings and small industrial applications—deploying similar equipment and similar ﬁnancial goals and capabilities;
2) institutional facilities—usually with larger power and heat
requirements and with much longer-term ﬁnancing abilities,
which are more amenable to Energy Savings Company (ESCO)
savings structures (arrangements whereby energy savings realized are used to fund efﬁciency upgrades); and
3) major industrial and district heating CHPs, where large-scale
power is generated, visibility is high, and the returns to the districts and industries involved are potentially great.
The development of an energy master plan might begin with a Geographical Information System–based “energy map” that is prepared at a
neighborhood, local authority, or subregional scale. It would include an
assessment of existing building energy demands as a baseline, identify
likely locations for new business development, and assess effects on
energy demand. It might also include a “heat map,” identifying anchor
heat loads, such as large public buildings (King and Shaw 2010).
These energy maps could reveal CHP-generated district heating
opportunities that local authorities or project managers might be willing
to support. They may also inform growth options and serve as the starting point for energy planning for developers. A decentralized energy
master plan could include technical, planning, ﬁnancial, and legal support—all better enabling manufacturers to evaluate DG opportunities.
Local energy planning can provide a road map for manufacturing to identify strategies for developing on-site DG opportunities. For
the reasons discussed earlier, transactional costs threaten small-scale
generation. Manufacturers are generally unwilling to spend hundreds
of thousands of dollars identifying potential DG projects. Regional
energy planning reduces these costs for manufacturers by identifying
not only potential projects, but also possible collaborators and sources
of funding.
Traditionally, regional energy plans have been developed in the
United States to address climate action plans and to decrease reliance

Bowen.indb 180

12/16/2013 2:14:20 PM

How Energy Policy Enabled the Decline of Midwestern Cities 181

on fossil fuels.13 However, the type of energy-mapping strategies that
were developed for London, England, will be required to enable manufacturing to identify opportunities to provide district heating through
CHP projects. That approach included a 10-stage undertaking with,
among other things, data gathering, project identiﬁcation, ﬁnancial
modeling, and feasibility studies (King and Shaw 2010). This sort of
information would signiﬁcantly enhance manufacturing’s appetite for
undertaking DG.
Finally, any regional energy study should include an investigation
into the transformation of transportation ﬂeets to compressed or liqueﬁed natural gas and to electric vehicles. Notwithstanding the advent of
oil development from shale formations such as the Bakken in North
Dakota and the Utica in Ohio, the United States will continue to be an
oil-importing nation. By substituting natural gas or electricity for gasoline and diesel for our transportation ﬂeets, we can reduce our nearly
billion-dollar-per-day trade deﬁcit (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013),
and in the process decrease greenhouse gas emissions. With natural gas
trading for a fraction of the cost of oil for the foreseeable future, this
transition would save money and repatriate dollars domestically.
Urban areas can facilitate this change by identifying infrastructure
needs and by developing strategic locations for refueling and recharging stations. In areas where shale gas is abundant, additional planning
may enable the development of refueling stations near gathering, transportation, compression, storage, and distribution infrastructure. Water
use and discharge planning would further enhance shale development,
as would road use and maintenance planning.

CONCLUSIONS
In American society, policy is set by advocacy. Unfortunately,
under this system, those entities with a preference toward maintaining the status quo have a signiﬁcant advantage in setting policy—even
when that course of action is not in the general public interest. No
ﬁeld of enterprise suffers from this problem more than does the energy
industry, in which the stakes are enormous, and change can be disruptive. Incumbent industries have propagated the notion that we cannot
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replace our current energy models with new ones. Even when unbiased
information is set forth, the public struggles to understand it; an unsuspecting citizenry is unable to differentiate between a vested interest and
an independent expert.
This problem helps to explain why programs such as subsidies for
rural electriﬁcation continue to exist some 40 years after 99 percent of
American farms have been connected to the grid. It also is a cautionary message to policymakers who may want to rectify the imbalance:
energy policies that enable and encourage migration from the cities,
especially from those in the Midwest, will be very difﬁcult to change.
Not only do these cities face the problem of overcoming vested interests, they are also dealing with reduced political might as a result of
decades of population and wealth ﬂight. It will require considerable
political courage for policymakers to undertake the sort of long-term
commitments to energy policy that will be needed for midwestern cities
to return to the robust economies they once enjoyed. But this starts by
recognizing the complicity that long-existing energy policies have had
in creating the decline of urban economies in the ﬁrst place.

Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges research and editing support for this chapter from
Su Gao and Srikanth Sivashankaran.
1. The federal portion of this does not vary; it is around $0.18 per gallon. For a discussion of the history of the excise tax, see Pirog (2010).
2. As noted in Slivinski (2009), rural electricity is just one of a number of utility
services subsidized by urban dwellers.
3. California was also the location for the ﬁrst failures in deregulation. A combination of ﬁxed retail prices and rising costs of generation, together with some market
manipulation by Enron and others, nearly left several California utilities insolvent.
4. Pﬁffner (2009) argues that the current partisan culture has its roots in the demographic change brought on by the advent of air conditioning.
5. Berry (1991) argues that massive change following technical innovation accelerates during times of “stagﬂation,” such as we are arguably experiencing in America
today. This acceleration in growth comes as a result of a combination of investors
recognizing opportunity in depressed prices and public ofﬁcials recognizing that
help is needed to get the economy moving again. Both forces are at work today.
6. According to Policy Matters Ohio (2012), as many as 20,000 jobs could be created
from cogeneration, and the release into the atmosphere of 13 metric tons of carbon
dioxide would be avoided.
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7. The Ohio Public Utilities Commission resolved in February 2012 to develop an
educational forum to begin a pilot program to advance and share information
about combined heat and power as a strategy for compliance with the new Boiler
MACT rules. “Boiler MACT” refers to the set of adjustments to the Clean Air
Act that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency instituted December 20, 2012,
speciﬁc to certain categories of boilers and solid waste incinerators. The adjustments made include emission limits for certain pollutants speciﬁcally targeted at
categories of boilers and solid waste incinerators, changes to the subcategories of
boilers in establishing standards, a revised implementation timeline, and adhering
to established standards for the “highest emitting of the highest 0.4 percent of
boilers” (EPA 2013).
8. Compliance coals run around $90 per ton, or $3.60 per mmbtu (million British
Thermal Units, which measure energy content); 1 million btus are roughly equivalent to 1,000 cubic fee (mcf) of natural gas. If a boiler were 75 percent efﬁcient,
this means that the cost of delivered steam would be $4.80 per mmbtu.
9. Ohio’s original net-metering law was enacted in 1999 as part of the state’s
electric-industry restructuring legislation. The Public Utilities Commission of
OHIO (PUCO) later revised its net-metering rules in March 2007, prompted by
the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005. Initially, PUCO required utilities to credit
customers’ net excess generation at the utility’s full retail rate. However, in June
2002, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that each utility must credit excess generation
to the customer at the utility’s unbundled generation rate. See http://energy.gov/
savings/net-metering-29 (accessed October 24, 2013).
10. This policy of allocating costs when possible to the grid rather than to generation,
in addition to ensuring the cost-plus return, makes certain that the utility generation is highly competitive in the wholesale market.
11. For purposes of this discussion, nongrid-connected microgrids are not considered,
although these may have some application in more isolated areas.
12. Not all observers agree that shale gas has been a signiﬁcant contributor to this
trend. See Howarth (2011).
13. See, for example, Kane County (2011) and San Diego Association of Governments
(1994).
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8
Entrepreneurial Initiatives
in Chinese Markets
Why They Are Important
and What Firms Need to Know
Chieh-Chen Bowen
Cleveland State University

As China’s role in the world economy grows, American ﬁrms and
entrepreneurs—including those in Rust Belt cities—will need to
ﬁnd ways to gain entreé to its growing domestic marketplace.
Understanding the culture, language, and economic mechanisms
in place are crucial to gain access and establish a foothold.

Throughout the twentieth century, no single nation or block of
nations had nearly as much economic power and inﬂuence as the United
States. During much of that period, no region had as much industrial
might as the Midwest. Now, however, as the early part of the twentyﬁrst century unfolds, the age of total U.S. world supremacy is ending, so has the era of midwestern industrial superiority ended within
the United States. China in particular is a vastly more prosperous and
vibrant country than it was even 20 years ago. According to the World
Bank, between 2007 and 2010 China’s real GDP growth was at an average rate of 10.85 percent per year, as compared to 0.54 percent per
year over the same period in the United States (World Bank 2012).
China is now the second-largest economy in the world and is expected
to become the largest around 2016 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013). China’s growth and development
are an inexorable and major aspect of the economic context within
which any renewal in midwestern prosperity must occur.
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At current growth rates, China’s economy is doubling in real terms
every seven or eight years. Between 2001 and 2010 average household
income in China grew by more than 125 percent in inﬂation-adjusted
terms (Rodriguez 2012). This was the fastest period of economic
growth over a single decade of any nation in recorded history. China’s
ascendency is, moreover, not just seen in its growth rate but also in its
immensely large population. As a consequence, we have started to witness a totally different structure in the world’s economy, in which the
United States and all of its cities and regions play a different and less
inﬂuential role than in the past century.
While the economic context within which midwestern industrial
cities must adapt and compete has changed, this is not necessarily a bad
thing. It simply means that industry in these cities must take a few steps
back and rebalance inside and out. They must become more efﬁcient
and successful at anticipating the jobs of the future, moving resources
into new areas, redeﬁning prosperity, and putting far more emphasis
upon investments and exports to other countries, especially China.
Prosperity is created and renewed at the margin. It requires production and exchange of the goods and services people value. For
midwestern industrial cities, this emerging economic context means,
among other things, that the renewal of prosperity depends on how well
local entrepreneurs and ﬁrms understand the economic, legal, social,
and political environments in China. Such comprehension is necessary to successfully export and invest in new Chinese markets. In this
author’s view, export and investment are among the most important
keys to renewed prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. The old saw
rings true that one can buy in one’s own language, but one must sell in
the language of the buyer. Nowhere is this more important than when
doing business with the Chinese.
This chapter aims to contribute to the renewal of prosperity in
midwestern industrial cities by discussing and giving practical advice
regarding the culture and traditions one must know about to successfully export to—and invest in—Chinese markets. The implications of
understanding this environment are explained using the examples of the
failure of Google when it was forced to pull its operation out of mainland China in 2010, and the success of Rupert Murdoch when the Chinese government granted him the ﬁrst “landing rights” to sell foreign
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programs to cable system prime-time slots, then later, rights to provide
media content to mobile users.

THE GROWING MARKET IN CHINA AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR U.S. AND MIDWEST INDUSTRY
There are many reasons for the surging U.S. interest in China,
involving not only its pace of economic growth but also its sheer size
of population, territory, and foreign reserves. China has quickly transformed from one of the largest suppliers of cheap labor and inexpensive
goods to one of the largest consumer markets, where multinational corporations compete to grow their market shares (McGregor 2005). The
People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become one of the most popular
host countries for global ﬁrms and the most appealing market for foreign investors since 2002, according to A. T. Kearney’s Foreign Direct
Investment Conﬁdence Index (Laudicina 2010). China joined the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2011, as a condition of entering the WTO, China also agreed to open its markets to global producers without requiring technology transfer, a condition on which it used
to insist. Thus, PRC’s exports and imports of goods and services have
been growing explosively. Even during 2011, when the world economy
was mired in European economic crises and global slowdowns, PRC’s
total export value was $1,898.60 billion, a 20.3 percent increase from
the previous year. The total value of imports was $1,743.46 billion, a
24.9 percent increase from the previous year (Ministry of Commerce of
the People’s Republic of China 2011). It is also worth noting that the
PRC’s imports are rising at a faster pace than its exports. This growth in
imports signals enormous market needs that are not fulﬁlled by China’s
local producers, and its urge to reach outside its borders to purchase
goods and services. The rapid growth rate of imports provides evidence
of the PRC’s interest in growing its consumer economy.
The fast-growing import and export sectors attract many U.S. companies to do business with China. According to U.S. Census data, China
has become the second-largest trading partner with the United States; in
2012 the value of imports from China was $426 billion, and the value
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of exports to China was $110 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Trade
stimulates growth in economic activities and creates jobs. Moreover,
as the world economy globalizes, the effects of trade are increasing.
In Ohio, 21.2 percent of jobs depended on trade in 2008, up from 10.5
percent in 1992. Also, exporting companies grew faster, paid higher
salaries, and had broader consumer bases than did nonexporting companies. Furthermore, overseas competition tended to stimulate higher
growth and development rates (Business Roundtable 2010).
China’s burgeoning economy and expanding middle class have created a huge appetite for U.S. goods and services, including business
technological solutions, construction materials, and consumer products.
U.S. exports to China grew from $27.5 billion in 2003 to $108.6 billion
in 2012, a 294 percent increase in a decade. During the same period of
time, Ohio’s exports to China grew from $823 million in 2003 to $3.656
billion in 2012, an impressive 344 percent increase in a decade. Ohio
ranked eighth in exporting goods and services to China among all states
in 2012. Other midwestern states also enjoyed a much faster growth
rate in exports to China than that of the United States overall, as shown
in Table 8.1. In many midwestern states, China ranks third among all
foreign trading countries in export markets, trailing only the two large
border countries of Canada and Mexico (U.S.-China Business Council
2013).
Knowing that the Chinese people are buying is only the ﬁrst step.
Figuring out what they are buying, exporting it, and selling it to them
require deeper understanding of the cultural and social norms in China.
Making products and services for the Chinese market necessitates
knowledge of the entire business system, including the local social,
cultural, legal, and political environment. All of these elements are
interconnected, and changes in one are not isolated from changes in the
others.
Numerous corporations have entered the Chinese market without
substantial knowledge of the nation’s business environment and practices, and have thus encountered many failures. The renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities depends, in no small measure, on
learning from these failures to improve the chance of success when
doing business in China. Consequently, in the following sections, different key aspects of China’s economic, political, legal, and social environment will be discussed.
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Table 8.1 Exports to China from the United States and from Midwestern States, 2003 and 2012 (2003$)
United States Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Michigan
Missouri
2003 ($, millions)
27,500
1,167
454
566
439
463
2012 ($, millions)
108,600
6,092
2,601
3,151
3,703
2,227
% increase, 2003–2012
294
422
473
457
743
381
China’s ranking in export
3rd
3rd
3rd
2nd
3rd
2nd
market, 2012

Ohio
823
3,656
344
3rd

NOTE: Percentages calculated from unrounded data.
SOURCE: U.S.-China Business Council (2013).
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CHINA’S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
China’s economic reform was launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping
when he pushed to open up and modernize the old and closed communist economy to improve the quality of life for the ordinary people. For
the next three decades until 2010, the economic growth rate averaged
10.0 percent per year for real GDP growth (World Bank 2012). China
has changed from a centrally planned and organized economy to a
market-oriented one. Before the reform, the state directed and monitored
a large share of the country’s output and production goals, controlled
prices, and allocated resources throughout most of the economy. China
has also been transformed from an isolated economy with virtually no
international trade and foreign investments to the top-ranked exporting
country and the second-ranked importing country in global trade, as
well as a very powerful player in foreign investment and exchange. Its
high level of monetary reserves makes it a major force during worldwide economic crises (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).
The newest ﬁve-year economic and social development plan has
continued China’s commitment to open up the market, optimize foreign
trade structure, and develop economic relations with mutual beneﬁts
and win-win results (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China 2012). To get close to this market, many companies have set up
operations or joint ventures in China, which are practically impossible
without ﬁrst understanding how business functions in China.
The Chinese people have developed special principles for doing
business using their own customs. Chinese business models are quite
distinct from those in the United States. Research has shown that failing to recognize cultural differences in doing business is the most frequently cited reason for failures experienced by multinational corporations (Pan and Zhang 2004). Knowing the cultural norms and business
practices in China is much more important for U. S. companies today,
when they are trying to get a piece of the fast-growing Chinese market,
than when they were mostly buying Chinese goods and services.
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CHINA’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The political system in China plays an important role in controlling business activities. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took
power in 1949 and has since had a strong hold on the central government. Not only does it control all political activities, it also controls all
commercial ones, and runs the All China Federation of Trade Unions
at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. Not recognizing and
understanding the important part played by the CCP and by central and
local government ofﬁcials and authorities may stall business progress
in China (Manners 2005).
Firms are expected to establish and maintain good relationships with
governmental ofﬁcials to ensure business transactions run smoothly.
The combination of centralized political power and emphasis on the
principle of the “rule of people” creates a potentially ripe environment
for government ofﬁcials to use public power for personal gain (Luo
2008). The principle of the rule of people is the opposite of the rule of
law. The rule of people refers to “society operating on cultural norms
rather than formal legal rules” (Chew 2005). Unpredictable and arbitrary human indiscretions are likely to enter into authoritative decisions
which are made and executed by people at the top of the hierarchy.
Therefore, whenever there is a shift in the power structure at the top,
there will be major changes in how decisions are made. The uncertain
nature of how things get done makes trade, foreign investment, and
economic development more difﬁcult than in societies that operate by
the rule of law (Chew 2005).
The CCP has tight control over the central government and military
and also has an iron ﬁst over business activities, in a way that goes
beyond regulation. It presides over large, wealthy, state-owned ﬁrms,
and it exercises control over the selection of senior executives of all
state-run ﬁrms, many of which are in the top tier of the Fortune Global
500 list. Multinational corporations are often confused and frustrated by
the dual roles of regulator and competitor assumed by the same Chinese
governmental agency. On one hand, foreign companies are mandated
to disclose information to comply with Chinese regulations, but on the
other hand, Chinese competitors can utilize this information to gain an
advantage in the market. This conﬂict of interest is impossible to sort
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out when dual roles are assumed by the same individuals (McGregor
2010).

CHINA’S LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
The Chinese legal tradition developed from both Confucianism and
Legalism, two inﬂuential, though adversarial, schools of thought. Confucianism assumes human nature is fundamentally good. Social order
can be achieved by observing customs, morals, and norms rather than
through governmental regulations and laws, which should be used minimally and only for the worst offenses against public well-being. Legalism assumes that moral order is inadequate in maintaining social order
because innate human malevolence would constantly drive people into
trouble. A well-ordered society can be established and maintained only
through a set of formally and publically announced harsh rules. Heads
of state had the duty to establish and enforce law with uniformity, certainty, celerity, and severity (Ren 1997). Unfortunately, the inﬂuence of
Legalism has often been overlooked historically because of its association with despotism and cruelty during the Qin Dynasty, which lasted
from 221 BCE to 206 BCE.
In the past, the legal system in China has not played an important
role in keeping social order. However, the legal landscape in China has
changed rapidly in recent years. More and more business legislation,
law ofﬁces, and attorneys have emerged in China in the past couple of
decades. This trend is due partially to an effort to present Western investors with an image of a stable and predictable business environment
with legal protection and security (China Knowledge Press 2004), and
partially to fulﬁll membership requirements of the WTO.
China has strengthened its legal framework and amended its intellectual property rights and related laws and regulations to comply with
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights. There have been important updates and amendments regarding intellectual property rights: patent, trademark, and copyright laws.
However, both patent and trademark laws adopt the “ﬁrst to register”
rule instead of the “ﬁrst to invent” rule, even if the ﬁrst ﬁlers are not
the original inventors. In a situation where an estimated 20 percent of

Bowen.indb 198

12/16/2013 2:14:23 PM

Entrepreneurial Initiatives in Chinese Markets 199

all consumer products in the Chinese market are counterfeit, companies
are encouraged to ﬁle trademark applications with the Chinese Trademark Ofﬁce and ﬁle patent applications with the Chinese State Intellectual Property Ofﬁce to register their products even when they don’t
have plans to sell their product in China (U.S. Department of Commerce 2003).
However, having intellectual property rights does not provide necessary protection from commercial piracy. For example, China has
more than 950 million mobile phone users. The demand for iPhones
is so strong that the smuggling of real iPhones and sales of fakes are
skyrocketing. Stores masquerading as real Apple outlets and selling
smuggled genuine Apple products have sprouted up everywhere from
Beijing in the northeast to Kunming in the southwest (Reuters 2011).
The Kunming government eventually ordered two of the fake Apple
stores to shut down for operating a business without a license, instead
of based on concerns regarding any copyright violation, piracy, smuggling or intellectual property theft (Today’s Zaman 2011).
In reality, no matter how modernized and Western-like the Chinese
legal system may appear, and how similar the structure and process
of business arbitration, dispute resolution, and mediation are, laws and
business contracts alone will not, in the foreseeable future, bring in
successful business deals for multinational corporations in China. The
social outcome of implementing a codiﬁed law is often determined not
by the form and language used in the statute or process that executes
law, but by people’s attitudes, expectations, and value systems regarding
what ought to be restrained and what otherwise ought to be rewarded or
compromised (Ren 1997). Legal rights and protections may mean very
little in practical terms when legislation in China tends to be vaguely
written and rarely enforced (Orts 2001). China’s legal system is considered to be underdeveloped (Parekh 2005) and inefﬁcient (Guvenli and
Sanyal 2003), and has been criticized for its vague, ambiguous wording
for decades (Lee 1999). To survive a weak, ambiguous, and inefﬁcient
legal system, the Chinese people tend to stay within a tightly connected
group to seek reassurance, support, and protection as well as to adhere
to the rule of people (ren zhi) principle.
Law in China bears the birthmark of its own history, culture, and
tradition. This heritage is sometimes a force more powerful than the rule
of law in foretelling the consequences of law and in dictating people’s

Bowen.indb 199

12/16/2013 2:14:24 PM

200 Bowen

thinking about the role of law and legal authority (Ren 1997). Even if
a company can convince the court and win a judgment, reluctance to
enforce arbitration from provincial or district courts is a long-existing
problem (Economist 2005; Kivela and Leung 2005). It is estimated
that, at best, only 60 percent of court rulings are enforced, and that can
drop to 10 percent when courts entrust ofﬁcers in other jurisdictions to
enforce rulings for them (Economist 2005).
In contrast, Americans tend to accept and, in a relatively large measure, to follow the principle of the rule of law (fa zhi) that legal rules are
publicly known, consistently enforced, and fairly applied (Orts 2001).
Law in the United States is designed to be applicable to everyone consistently. Laws and business contracts tend to be respected as well as
enforced in the U.S. business environment. Accordingly, reliance on
laws and business contracts guides business activities. The need for
clear and explicit business terms and conditions stems from core cultural values. Individualistic Americans are likely to behave in a selfserving manner to maximize their personal gains from business opportunities. Such individualistically oriented social norms allow a wide
range of acceptable behaviors for asserting persons’ own particular
rights (Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998). Under the assumption that
everyone will maximize their own self-interests whenever they can,
business transactions need to be regulated and sanctioned with explicit
legal terms to clearly deﬁne the boundaries of individuals’ rights and
responsibilities and to provide equal protection for all parties involved.
U.S. ﬁrms rely on legal protection and expect to follow contracts to the
letter in case of any business disputes (Coulson 1984).

CHINA’S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
In Chinese culture, the concept of the self is conceived as an integral part of the collective. This interdependent view grants primacy
to the relationship between the self and others. Traditionally, Chinese
people do not have an independent individual identity. Their selfidentity is heavily interdependent with their family, and this makes
them more likely to act in accordance with the anticipated expectations
of others (Chuang 1998).
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The Chinese are known to be highly favorable toward insiders and
extremely guarded toward outsiders. Friendships and trust are the foundations for doing business. Proﬁts may not be the only consideration
when making business deals. Extensive connections and trust building
with local and central government ofﬁcials seem to create proﬁtable
business opportunities at the right time (Economist 2004). Business
deals are much more likely to be made with friends or people within the
web of connections than with strangers solely based on mathematical
reasoning and proﬁt/loss analysis. Lam (2000) mentions that Americans
use mathematical reasoning and utility analysis in business negotiation,
but the Chinese use feelings, personal connections, and trust. Failing to
address these different concerns in doing business may very well leave
both sides empty-handed.
The collectivistic Chinese people tend to view themselves as
tightly connected in a social web of relations, in which their own selfinterests are suppressed and woven into the greater good of the group
with which they identify. Overtly self-serving behavior is thus likely
to be curbed by social sanctions. People who are perceived as acting
solely in their own interests tend to be ostracized for acting selﬁshly. A
narrow range of acceptable behavior is prescribed by one’s social roles,
and people act in unison to achieve order and harmony (Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998). Consequently, there is relatively little need for
laws and business contracts to protect individual rights in Chinese societies. Instead, cultivating, sustaining, and maintaining long-term reciprocal relationships with individuals who are a part of a web of relations
are guiding principles for business activities among the Chinese people.
The Chinese show more subordination to in-group hierarchy than to
outside authorities, which they often ﬁnd ways to circumvent or ignore
(Triandis, Brislin, and Hui 1988).
The rule of people principle depicts the basic Chinese social mechanism and can be described as a set of implicit and unspoken guidelines
governing social interactions and relationships, and serving as a social
control mechanism for survival in a legally, politically, and economically complex and uncertain environment. This set of rules allows
social actors to behave in a more or less predictable way, which minimizes unnecessary conﬂicts and enhances social harmony (Cheng and
Farh 2001). Davies et al. (2003) assert that, in Chinese business and
social life, rule of people is of paramount importance. This principle is
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composed of the following three highly related elements: 1) guanxi, 2)
renqing, and 3) mianzi. The boundaries among the three are blurred, as
can be seen in the overlapping of each one’s deﬁnition.
Guanxi
The Chinese characters for guanxi can be directly translated as connections and relationships. Guanxi is deﬁned as “the process of using
personal connections for political, social and economic beneﬁt” (Fan
2002, p. 551). It determines one’s place in the social structure and provides security, trust, and a prescribed role (Hammond and Glenn 2004).
The art of guanxi is deﬁned by Yang (1994, p. 109) as “involving the
exchange of gifts, favors and banquets; the cultivation of personal relationships; networks of mutual dependence; and manufacturing of obligation and indebtedness.” The Chinese are thus more likely to favor
insiders with whom they have developed guanxi than outsiders with
whom they have not.
Guthrie (1998) argues that guanxi is an inevitable characteristic of
most societies, while the stickiness of guanxi practice in China, given
modernization and globalization, is seen as arising from institutional
underdevelopment. The practice of guanxi helps form self-sufﬁcient
circles of reciprocity and obligations to protect people from state control and reduce their dependency on the state for material resources and
social sustenance during periods of political and economic uncertainty
or hardship (Yang 1994). Guanxi is commonly used as a means of survival as well as obtaining prosperity in Chinese societies.
Renqing
The two Chinese characters for renqing can be directly translated as
human and affection. Renqing is deﬁned as “a normative standard for
regulating social exchanges and a set of reciprocity rules to strive for
desirable outcomes within a stable and structured web of social relations” (Hwang 1987, p. 946). It is typically based on ingratiation and
contains affective components in addition to guanxi. To succeed in Chinese society, the receiver must understand and abide by the reciprocity
rule and the necessary commitment to pay back in similar kind and
extent.
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Because of the expectation of future return, the Chinese may dole
out renqing to others as a form of social investment, expecting to have
more effective interactions with the receivers in the future. Renqing
also implies a moral obligation to maintain the exchange relationship.
Renqing could be either concrete or abstract, such as money, gifts, services, information, and/or affection (Hwang 1987). Renqing involves
deliberated and calculated engineering of social interactions for future
personal gains.
Mianzi
The third element is mianzi, whose Chinese characters can be
directly translated as face. Mianzi is deﬁned as “an individual’s social
position or prestige, gained by successfully performing one or more
speciﬁc social roles that are well recognized by others” (Hwang 1987,
p. 960). It involves constant consciousness of one’s status in the web
of social relations, the probability of being accepted by others, and the
special power or privilege one enjoys for being recognized by others. In
Chinese social relations, maintaining face is essential because it translates into power and inﬂuence. A loss of mianzi would likely result in a
loss of prestige.
The common thread of these three elements is continuing and
complex social interactions. Guanxi, renqing, and mianzi not only are
unique and ubiquitous products of Chinese culture, they are also efﬁcient means to maintain social order. The rule of people principle is
philosophically in line with Confucius’s teaching to maintain relationships, help those in need, and fully reciprocate favors. It forms the basis
for collective pressure to maintain social harmony and thus sets the usually unspoken expectations of cooperation and lowers the transaction
costs of doing business. Through implicit mutual agreement, this principle establishes a restrictive, even coercive, power upon every member
of the web of social relations. These members enjoy privileges and at
the same time incur obligations. The Chinese rely on this concept when
conducting their daily activities.
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The Rule of Law, the Rule of People, and Governmental Inﬂuence
on Business Activities
The principles of the rule of law and the rule of people seem to
operate at the opposite ends of the spectrum, and it is thus assumed that
most people would use one as a substitute for the other. However, people function on different assumptions, traditions, customs, and values
in different cultures. It is prudent to rely on empirical evidence instead
of common sense when dealing with cross-cultural differences. Bowen
et al. (2009) conducted such an empirical cross-cultural comparison between U.S. and Chinese societies on the rule of law, the rule of
people, and governmental inﬂuence on business activities. The survey
respondents were university students from the United States and China.
The results, presented in Table 8.2, show that there are no differences between how Americans and Chinese perceive the rule of law or
the governmental inﬂuence on business activities. But signiﬁcant differences exist in the perceptions of the impact of the rule of people.
The Chinese perceive the rule of people to be more important than
do Americans. A possible explanation for this is that the Chinese are
known to be ﬂexible and highly adaptable. They have learned to function in a global environment in which the rule of law principle needs
to be respected and followed. In the attempt to modernize the Chinese
business environment, the Chinese did not totally abandon the rule of
people principle, either. As expected, the Chinese people’s daily life is
much more tied to the complex web of social interactions than is that
of Americans.
Also interesting is that the rule of law and rule of people principles
are found to be independent of each other, as illustrated by the correlation of these two principles, −0.04 among Chinese people and −0.08
among Americans. These nonsigniﬁcant correlations could be interpreted as the emphasis on trust, reciprocity, and long-term relationships
to encourage cooperation may either substitute for or complement the
equalizing and homogenizing power of laws and contracts. The empirical data indicate that the rule of law has not replaced the rule of people
in modern Chinese societies. In practice, both principles are used as
parallel systems to achieve business goals and objectives. The rule of
people has worked smoothly in Chinese societies for millennia, and
it is reasonable to expect such practice to persist into the future. It is
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Table 8.2 Perceptions of the Inﬂuence of the Rule of Law, the Rule of People, and Government Inﬂuence on
Business Activities, by U.S. and Chinese Respondents
Governmental
Rule of people
inﬂuence Chinese
U.S. mean
Chinese mean
Chinese correlation
correlation
Scale
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
t-value
(U.S. correlation) (U.S. correlation)
Rule of law
3.59
3.59
0.06
−0.04
−0.30***
(0.49)
(0.48)
(−0.08)
(−0.42***)
Rule of people
3.53
3.67
−4.50***
0.44***
(0.34)
(0.41)
(0.26***)
Governmental inﬂuence
3.30
3.32
−0.35
(0.57)
(0.63)
NOTE: U.S. sample size = 233. Chinese sample size = 449. Perceptions were measured by a 5-point Likert scale with higher numbers
representing more applicable the concept in the society. * = signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; *** = signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Primary data collected by the author.
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valuable for any company that wants to conduct business in China to
be familiar with this approach and to learn to practice the basic social
mechanisms of guanxi, renqing, and mianzi.
The signiﬁcant negative correlations in the perceptions of the rule
of law and governmental inﬂuence among both Chinese and Americans
support the belief that when laws are consistently applied to everyone
involved, there is little room for governmental inﬂuence on business
activities. However, the signiﬁcant positive correlations in the perceptions of the rule of people and the governmental inﬂuence on business
activities among both Chinese and Americans support the notion that
the perception of the rule of people and the perception of governmental
inﬂuence on business activities usually go hand-in-hand. This pattern
is stronger among Chinese than among Americans. The combination
of highly concentrated political power and the rule of people principle
makes navigating Chinese markets particularly confusing for foreign
companies. I will use two examples of big multinational corporations
to illustrate this point.
Two Contrasting Experiences
There are plenty of examples of successful multinational corporations that sailed into China with unshakable conﬁdence but were
defeated either by their Chinese competitors, the Chinese government, or both. One such tale involves Google pulling its operations
out of mainland China in 2010 (BBC News 2010). The other tale is
Box 8.1 Google and Star TV
Google. When Google.cn began operating in China in 2006, Google
agreed to self-censor and to remove sensitive information before it
reached Internet users. Google had to compromise the principle of freedom of speech in order to cash in on the fast-expanding Chinese market.
Four years later, in January 2010, Google’s Web site stated that the
company had decided to stop internal censoring of Internet search information so that it could provide unbiased and equal access to all of its
users. Google waged a public battle against the Chinese government’s
media censorship (Economist 2010).
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Box 8.1 (continued)
However, the Chinese government insisted that controlling media
content was one of its centralized strategic policies along with national
sovereignty, and it accused Google of violating a written agreement
and politicizing an economic issue. Whenever the Chinese government
responded to an event by citing controlling media content and national
sovereignty at the same time, it clearly had no intention of backing
down. At the end, even under pressure from U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, China refused to budge. “Foreign companies must abide
by Chinese laws and regulations when they operate in China” (China
.org.cn 2010). Two months after the standoff between Google and the
Chinese government, Google stopped its operation in mainland China
and moved it to Hong Kong.
The incident might have had a different outcome had Google executives taken the time and effort to enlist support from high-level Chinese
government ofﬁcials and to frame the win-win beneﬁts resulting from
free and open content on the Internet without exerting pressure from the
U.S. Secretary of State to evoke the national sovereignty concern.
Star TV. The success of another media mogul, Rupert Murdoch,
can serve as an exemplary model of doing business in China. His strong
ﬁnancial resources, patience, and adaptability to change proved to be the
key to his success in China.
Murdoch’s initial foray into China was disastrous. Shortly after he
purchased the satellite broadcaster Star TV in Hong Kong for nearly
US$1 billion in 1993, he made a speech in London that enraged the
Chinese leadership. He said that modern communications technology
had “proven an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere.”
However, the Chinese government promptly retaliated by outlawing private ownership of satellite dishes, which had proliferated on rooftops.
Star TV thereby faced a threat to its viability (Kahn 2007). Although it
took several years to repair the damaged relationship, Murdoch quickly
changed his way of doing business in China. He masterfully selected
partners with strong ties to the Chinese leadership and media regulatory
agencies. He cultivated political ties to insulate his business ventures
from regulatory interferences. Once he gained access to the web of complex social relationships, he abided by the principle of the rule of people
and earned social prestige by building trust, reciprocating favors, fulﬁlling obligations, and enjoying privileges.
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Box 8.1 (continued)
Murdoch cooperated closely with China’s censors and state broadcasters. Star TV mindfully overhauled its programming to suit Chinese
tastes. In 1994, it dropped BBC News, which had frequently angered
Chinese ofﬁcials with its reports on mainland China affairs (Kahn
2007). Murdoch adeptly provided highly desired access to Western news
media to the Chinese government to present its own face to the world.
He showed that Chinese media could become more sophisticated and
dynamic without threatening the Communist Party’s power. In exchange
for permission to broadcast foreign programming in China, he also
agreed to broadcast China-made English-language programming to the
United States and Britain. Murdoch’s helping hand in mentoring and
modernizing the Chinese news media was recognized and rewarded by
the government by granting him the ﬁrst “landing rights” to sell foreign
programs to cable system prime-time slots, and later, rights to provide
media content to its mobile users (Kahn 2007; McGregor 2005).

how Rupert Murdoch expanded Star TV from Hong Kong to Mainland
China (Kahn 2007).

LESSONS LEARNED
The stark contrasts between Google’s and Murdoch’s media ventures provide the following lessons for everyone who wants to initiate
entrepreneurial effort in Chinese markets.
•
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It is a good idea to enlist help from people who understand the
Chinese culture and have local connections. Neither the Google
Translate nor a self-paced international culture software program would be adequate in preparing an American professional
to do business in China. Hiring Chinese people educated in
the United States seems to be a popular and wise option for
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corporate executives in starting this process. Not only do such
individuals need to be ﬂuent in both English and Chinese, they
have to understand the business and be loyal to the company.
Their connections in China might provide an access point into
the complex web of social relationships.
•

It is important to pay attention to government regulations and to
understand that rules can change at any time and that they can
either work for or against a company. Politics should be left out
of business. Making negative comments about the CCP or the
Chinese government in public should be avoided, especially
regarding China’s sensitive issues such as media censorship,
human rights, the Tiananmen Square Incident, Fa Lun Gong,
and oppression in Tibet.

•

When conﬂicts arise, they should be dealt with quietly. It is
much better to try to solve the conﬂicts behind closed doors
by enlisting help from politically connected insiders privately
than it is to enlist help from high-level U.S. ofﬁcials. An all-out
public ﬁght with the Chinese government leaves no room for
compromise. The Chinese government is not known to back
down on central issues, such as media content censorship and
national sovereignty.

•

It is important to realize and to bear in mind that both the rule
of law and the rule of people are applicable in Chinese culture.
Americans who want to succeed in doing business in China
should be prepared to invest and cultivate long-term social relationships. Becoming familiar with the rule of people principle
and the complex web of social relationships is one of the best
ways to enhance opportunities, smooth business processes, and
lower transaction costs.

CONCLUSION
The fundamental business and economic principles for renewing prosperity in midwestern industrial cities are straightforward. The
opportunities to generate income and wealth occur through individual
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business transactions, some of which start with new products and innovations, and some of which start with identifying demands, producing
goods and services people value, and matching the demands with the
supply of goods and services. These goods and services are then traded
in exchanges in which both parties expect their well-being to improve.
Wealth and prosperity within midwestern urban economies will be
generated when production and exchange occur over and over again.
The top exports to China from midwestern states were crop production, machinery, chemicals, transportation equipment, and second-hand
scrap and recycled material, which are used in China for rebar steel
and packaging (U.S.-China Business Council 2013). The ascendency
of a vast and wealthy Chinese population brings tremendous possibilities for exports from the Midwest, but only if the basic Chinese social
mechanism is understood and accepted as a crucial factor in the social
and business environment.
Cultural differences can pose seemingly insurmountable obstacles
for those wanting to get into Chinese markets. The basic Chinese social
mechanism is a deeply ingrained part of daily life not likely to change
any time soon. Westerners seeking to do business in China may ﬁnd
out the hard way that the American business model will not achieve
their goals. While it takes relatively large up-front investments of time,
effort, and other resources to search out potential business partners,
negotiate trades, and close sales with Chinese ﬁrms, there is no other
path to success in that social environment. The associated costs may be
high, but the potential beneﬁts in terms of generating wealth and prosperity are even greater.
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Barriers and Opportunities
for Entrepreneurship in
Older Industrial Regions
Ziona Austrian
Merissa C. Piazza
Cleveland State University

Manufacturing served as the main source of economic activity in
many of the cities of the Midwest until its decline led to the creation
of the term “Rust Belt.” While entrepreneurship offers the promise
of economic growth, Midwest regions need assistance to foster a
sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystem and launch new businesses.

Postwar prosperity was built on the production of goods needed
to satisfy pent-up demand from Americans, who wanted to improve
their lives after World War II, and demand from Europe and Asia,
where the populations were physically rebuilding their countries. This
period of economic growth was concentrated in several leading industries—automobiles, steel, aluminum, tires, and chemicals—each with
large dominant companies with signiﬁcant market shares. The role of
small businesses and entrepreneurship was diminished during the postwar decades; small companies were found to be less productive and
innovative than larger corporations, and they offered lower wages. The
industrial revolution of the early twentieth century, characterized as an
entrepreneurial and individualistic era, had been replaced by an environment of large, structured, and hierarchical corporations. However,
even with these developments, U.S. policy still tended to preserve small
enterprises, and in 1953 Congress created the Small Business Administration. This policy was in stark contrast to Europe and the Soviet
Union, which discouraged such ventures in order to focus on national
industrial policies.
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The recovery of Japan and Europe and the ensuing movement of
labor to cheaper markets outside of the United States through globalization brought to an end the complete advantage the nation had enjoyed
after World War II. Since the 1970s, the United States and its regions
have been undergoing a dramatic transformation from manufacturing
to knowledge- and information-based economies, shifting the focus
from physical to human capital. By the 1980s, innovation and entrepreneurship emerged as the main components in the engine of economic
growth, causing many scholars and policymakers to look to the factor
of knowledge as a primary source of competitiveness. With this paradigm shift, national and regional decision makers needed to change
public policy to ensure a more hospitable and nurturing environment
for innovators and entrepreneurs.
This chapter links the assertion that entrepreneurship is associated
with regional growth to the need for public policy that stimulates entrepreneurship in declining industrial areas. The discussion reviews some
of the literature on the general role of innovation and entrepreneurship
in economic growth, the barriers to entrepreneurship in older industrial
regions, and the role that the nonproﬁt and public sectors play in accelerating entrepreneurship in these regions. Then examples are given of
how private-sector-led organizations encourage the development of
an entrepreneurial ecosystem and culture that could lead to economic
growth in older industrial regions.
Entrepreneurship has been investigated as a potential means for economic growth throughout economic history. But with the recent framework of endogenous growth theory showing that technology advances
lead to higher economic output, many people today are increasingly
looking to entrepreneurs to facilitate these advances. In addition, some
authors ﬁnd that higher participation rates of entrepreneurial activity
are strongly positively correlated with higher growth rates, even when
establishment size and agglomeration effects are statistically controlled
(Caree and Thurik 2010). Moreover, additional studies show that entrepreneurs are needed to bring new ideas to market because large existing
ﬁrms do not have the capabilities to take advantage of the innovations
that address market gaps (Audretsch, Bönte, and Keilbach 2008). With
this concept in mind, it is important to ask what happens to regions that
have been dependent on large ﬁrms throughout their recent economic
history and that do not have the entrepreneurial culture to take advantage of innovations because individuals are risk averse.
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These issues lead to the examination of the entrepreneurial makeup
of lagging regions in the United States, speciﬁcally older industrial
regions with a legacy of large and declining manufacturing ﬁrms. Much
has been written about this topic in the literature for economic development practitioners, but little has been published in the academic literature. It is the hope that this chapter will begin to bridge the divide in
order to provide adequate frameworks for practitioners implementing
entrepreneurial policies, as well as to contribute to the academic literature on entrepreneurship and regional growth.

INNOVATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
There is a vast amount of academic literature on entrepreneurship
and its ability to revitalize regions (Acs and Armington 2004; Audretsch
and Keilbach 2004; Baptista and Preto 2011; Caree and Thurik 2010;
Dejardin 2011; Fritsch and Schroeter 2011; Mueller 2007). The economic fundamentals of entrepreneurship stem from the building blocks
that economists have put forward over the last 200 years. In the beginning, neoclassical economic growth was the only model, and it was
based on the idea that development occurs through an increase in productivity, by making more goods in a given amount of time. As economists began to investigate this relationship, they found a phenomenon
that was spurring growth but could not be explained by neoclassical
theory (Lerner 2009). It was not until 1956, when Abramovitz examined
gross output in the U.S. economy from 1870 to 1950, that it became
evident that 85 percent of the growth experienced during this period
was due to innovation and increased productivity (Abramovitz 1956;
Lerner 2009). According to Lerner (2009), Abramovitz showed, “there
are ultimately only two ways of increasing the output of an economy:
1) increasing the number of inputs that go into the productive process
(e.g., by having workers employed until the age of sixty-seven, instead
of retiring at sixty two) or 2) developing new ways to get more output
from the same inputs” (p. 44). In other words, Abramovitz’s work indicated that it was the innovation and knowledge that transformed the
economy, not traditional productivity increases.
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Building on the work of Abramovitz, Solow (1956) found that
economic growth is determined by the use of classical factors of production, especially capital and labor (Lerner 2009; Solow 1956). What
Solow found was that “classical factors of production barely explained
half the variance in national economic growth” (Stough, Desai, and
Nijkamp 2011, p. 3).
Later in the 1980s, Romer (1988) and Lucas (1994) developed the
endogenous growth theory, showing that innovation and technological
progress have regional dimensions (Stough, Desai, and Nijkamp 2011),
and may also be connected to entrepreneurship (Taylor 2008). Since
knowledge and innovation are endogenous to the individual, entrepreneurship is a way in which there is a spillover of knowledge through
commercialization (Thurik 2009). Stough, Desai, and Nijkamp (2011)
state, “Only recently has the entrepreneur been envisioned as agent of
regional economic growth” (p. 6). Through the entrepreneur as an individual actor, demonstration of innovation can take place and therefore
build and spawn collective economic growth within regions. There
has been a long tradition of examining the beneﬁt of entrepreneurs as
contributors to economic development, as in The Theory of Economic
Development (Schumpeter 1934).
The Concept of Entrepreneurship
Even with this extensive entrepreneurial literature, there are multiple ways of deﬁning who is an entrepreneur and what is entrepreneurship. In addition, there are confounding deﬁnitions of how to measure
and deﬁne entrepreneurship. McQuaid (2011) discusses the perplexing
deﬁnitions of entrepreneurship. He ﬁnds that entrepreneurs as individuals are absent in the theory, and that there are ﬁve perspectives on entrepreneurship: 1) entrepreneurship as new business creation, 2) entrepreneurship as the role of the owner/manager of a small or medium-sized
company, 3) entrepreneurship as an economic function to allocate
resources and capitalize on opportunities, 4) entrepreneurship as a personal behavior of an individual in the quest of a prospect, and 5) characteristics of entrepreneurs. This chapter is based on McQuaid’s deﬁnition
of entrepreneurship as new business creation, since a large amount of
the literature focuses on business starts as entrepreneurship, and these
provide a quantiﬁable metric.
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The act of creating a new ﬁrm is risky for individuals because many
times they leave behind the security and known career paths at existing
companies. These factors make entrepreneurs unique. They do not only
become engines of economic growth through their start-ups, but they
facilitate knowledge growth by doing something that would not otherwise be accomplished (Audretsch, Bönte, and Keilbach 2008). Entrepreneurs are set apart from the common person by the act of taking risk
in their ventures, and through this risk they enhance the economy by
functioning to diffuse knowledge, innovation, and change (McQuaid
2011). “The reason for this positive assessment of entrepreneurial
activity is the belief that entrepreneurship does not only create jobs and
wealth for entrepreneurs but that there are substantial societal spill-over
effects” (Rønning, Ljunggren, and Wiklund 2010, p. 195).
Spillover Effects
The risk taken by entrepreneurs beneﬁts not only themselves, but
also society through knowledge spillovers. It is important to begin to
understand these spillovers, because they are the vehicle through which
entrepreneurial processes can take root. According to Harris (2011),
spillovers were ﬁrst identiﬁed by Marshall, Arrow, and Romer (and are
thus known as MAR spillovers), and they stem from efforts to minimize
transaction costs attributable to ﬁrms that collocate near other ﬁrms of
similar nature, in an agglomeration effect. Harris (2011) shows that
these spillovers are greatly related to industrial specialization.
Many articles have built on the Knowledge Spillover Theory of
Entrepreneurship (Audretsch 1995), which shows that individuals start
a new ﬁrm because they are not able to translate their new idea into a
product within their current ﬁrm, and therefore they start their own ﬁrm;
and the spillover of knowledge from the old ﬁrm to the new ﬁrm takes
place. In addition, knowledge spillovers created outside the ﬁrm allow
the entrepreneur to capitalize on opportunities (Acs et al. 2009). This
theory has evolved to show that spillovers of interﬁrm and intraﬁrm
knowledge are important agents in the regional economy. Audretsch
and Lehmann (2005) demonstrate that the presence of young high-tech
ﬁrms in close proximity to a university advances the knowledge capacity in the region.

Bowen.indb 219

12/16/2013 2:14:27 PM

220 Austrian and Piazza

Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant amount of literature that links the
entry of ﬁrms in the economy to positive regional growth within the
United States (Acs and Armington 2004; Mueller 2007) and in international cities (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004; Baptista and Preto 2011;
Dejardin 2011). It is these new companies, and the entrepreneurs that
run them, that take on the risk. Lerner (2009) points out that large ﬁrms
do not provide incentives to innovate, while new entities may choose
riskier projects than established ﬁrms. Mueller (2007) examines the
impact of entrepreneurship on growth and ﬁnds that existing ﬁrms do
not fully take advantage of new knowledge and that innovative startups are more effective effective at capturing this knowledge.
Examining start-up rates in the United States and internationally
demonstrates that they contribute to a more vibrant regional economy.
In a path-breaking article, Acs and Armington (2004) study business
birth rates in 394 local market areas and ﬁnd that “higher rates of
entrepreneurial activity were strongly associated with faster growth of
local economies” (p. 924). Their results provide strong evidence of the
importance of regional entreprenuership in the United States. The solid
positive association between entrepreneurship and economic growth
points to the importance of looking at how entrepreneurship can help
lagging regions, primarily in the Rust Belt, where manufacturing has
been such a predominant industry sector. Moretti (2012) makes the
argument that if the economic market were based solely around cost,
then lagging regions would attract jobs because places like San Francisco would be hindered by their high costs. But he suggests that this is
not the case, rather the opposite. It is a multitude of actors and agents
within an ecosystem that helps commercialize knowledge into products
(Fritsch 2011; Moretti 2012).
There have been a few academic articles written on entrepreneurship in the Great Lakes region. Using county-level data in Ohio, Acs,
Plummer, and Sutter (2009) examine the role of new and incumbent
ﬁrms in terms of translating “new knowledge (produced by research
activities) into economic knowledge. This translation process has been
referred to as the ‘knowledge ﬁlter’” (p. 994). They ﬁnd that new ﬁrms
are more able to pass through the knowledge ﬁlter, turning ideas into
products. Additionally, Faberman (2002) analyzes Rust Belt metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), looking at employment and wages from
1992 to 2000. He ﬁnds that high-growth MSAs tend to be comprised
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of establishments that are larger and younger, while MSAs with low
growth have establishments that are older and smaller. Faberman’s
results show a different entrepreneurial culture in the Rust Belt region.

BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN OLDER
INDUSTRIAL REGIONS
As we have shown, the economic literature reveals strong connections among technological progress, innovation, and growing economic wealth. The linkages are especially impressive when innovations
include both scientiﬁc discoveries and incremental changes in the way
manufacturers and service providers work. However, the literature is
inconclusive on whether innovations have primarily been created by
large or small companies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the size
of highly innovative companies may differ by industry. In some cases,
the enabling processes—such as in biotechnology and the Internet—
were developed at universities with federal funding, but it is the
entrepreneur and his or her small company that saw the potential for
commercialization.
The Regional Impact of Entrepreneurship
A study conducted for the U.S. Small Business Administration
(2005) ﬁnds that the most entrepreneurial regions in the nation experience greater growth in employment, wages, and productivity when
compared with the least entrepreneurial regions. Moreover, that research
noted that since innovation may be portable, by itself it is not sufﬁcient
for economic growth. Moreover entrepreneurship culture is place-based
and can be inﬂuenced by local and regional policies. In other words,
entrepreneurship enhances the regional economic impact of investments in innovations, and commercializing activities undertaken by
local entrepreneurs are necessary to convert a region’s innovation assets
to long-term economic gain. This suggests that interventions aimed at
increasing entrepreneurial activities, especially in regions where the
birth rate of new start-ups is low, could contribute to increased economic growth.
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The Regional Dashboard of Economic Indicators’ framework,
based on a study of 136 MSAs, suggests a positive relationship between
entrepreneurship and growth in regional per-capita income, gross
regional product, and productivity (Austrian, Yamoah, and Clouse
2009). This research compares the performance of Leading, Midwest,
and northeast Ohio MSAs and monitors the economic performance
of regions.1 Austrian, Yamoah, and Clouse (2009) address the vitality of regions by including two entrepreneurship metrics (two of nine
factors): 1) individual entrepreneurship, containing the percentage
of self-employed among total employment and the share of business
establishments with under 20 employees; and 2) business dynamics,
encompassing the ratio of business openings and closings. The factor on individual entrepreneurship for the Midwest and northeast Ohio
MSAs consistently ranks in the third and fourth quartiles from 2005
to 2007 (Austrian, Yamoah, and Clouse 2009). The business dynamics
factor displays northeast Ohio MSAs solidly in the fourth quartile from
2005 to 2007, and the other Midwest MSAs scattered from the second
quartile to the fourth. This study empirically illustrates that, in entrepreneurship metrics, localities in northeast Ohio and other Midwest
regions lag behind the remainder of the cohort MSAs.
Regional Variations in Entrepreneurship
Globally, the entrepreneurial environment varies among countries, and within the United States, it varies signiﬁcantly across regions
(Caree and Thurik 2010). Why has the Midwest Rust Belt region been
slow in the creation of start-ups? The Midwest was known for its innovation and entrepreneurship in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.
As a result, many ﬁrms were established in the Midwest, and some
grew to become among the country’s largest corporations, primarily in
manufacturing industries. These companies were able to mass-produce
record numbers of goods by taking advantage of economies of scale,
with very high levels of efﬁciency. The dominance of large manufacturing companies in the Midwest provided lifelong job opportunities
to both low-skilled and high-skilled employees. As a result, economic
and social norms did not encourage individuals to see entrepreneurship
as a career option. Therefore, over the past several decades many in
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the Midwest may have lost the spark, energy, and resources needed for
innovation and entrepreneurship.
Several factors may have contributed to the relatively weak entrepreneurial environment in the Midwest during the second half of the
twentieth century:
•

the ability to get a job in large, established companies allowed
individuals to have a comfortable standard of living;

•

cultural and social norms did not favor postsecondary education
since many manufacturing jobs available to high school graduates offered economic success;

•

risk aversion discouraged potential entrepreneurs, employees,
and the ﬁnancial system from starting new companies (Booth
1986);

•

culture in which one business failure was seen as an indication
that an individual was not capable of starting a new ﬁrm, which
prevented entrepreneurs from establishing additional companies;

•

the lack of large numbers of start-ups and experienced entrepreneurs to encourage and assist future entrepreneurs;

•

the difﬁculty of recruiting individuals, especially for leadership
and professional positions, to work in start-ups when not many
start-ups exist;

•

the unwillingness of employees who work in large ﬁrms to leave
their jobs for start-ups because of unfamiliarity with young companies and the higher risk of not being compensated;

•

lack of a strong business support system for entrepreneurs,
including banks, equity ﬁnancing, and business services; and

•

insufﬁcient access to capital for start-ups in their different phases
of development.

Access to capital is deemed by many to be one of the primary barriers to a successful start-up, and it merits more discussion. Generally,
sources of ﬁnancing for entrepreneurs include family and friends, owner
equity, the Small Business Administration through its Small Business
Innovation Research grant program, bank lending, angel investors, and
venture capital. Traditionally, the wealth assembled and inherited in the
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Midwest has been based on the success and proﬁts of manufacturing
companies. Many of the regions’ afﬂuent individuals have been less
knowledgeable about the technologies being developed on the East and
West Coasts, and thus, have been less inclined to become angel investors in these types of start-ups.
Angel investors are people who make investments from their
own funds in private companies.2 They not only provide an important
source of early stage funding to start-ups, but they also provide value
by having access to key stakeholders, offering strategic advice, providing operational assistance, and serving as conﬁdants to entrepreneurs.
Angels, individually or in groups, invest mainly in companies located
in their region. Historically, Midwest regions had fewer angel investors
than on the coasts, where angel groups grew organically as a result of
a rich entrepreneurial ecosystem; in the Midwest, angel groups needed
to be organized by either the public or the nonproﬁt sector. The relationship between angel investors and entrepreneurs is like “the chicken
and the egg”; entrepreneurs need angel investors, but angel investors
prefer to invest in companies that are located in a region with seasoned
entrepreneurs, a relevant industrial base, strong universities, an entrepreneurship culture, and talent experienced with start-ups. Thus, in the
Midwest region, the development of angel networks did not happen by
market forces alone and required special policies or jump-starting.
Venture capital ﬁrms bring with them funds as well as knowledge
and management expertise of how to grow start-up companies. However, being actively involved in the company’s management or sitting
on its board requires the venture capitalist to be in close proximity. As
a result, an area has to achieve a critical mass in terms of deal volume
before a venture capital ﬁrm will visit the region or locate a partner
there. Even though some venture capital ﬁrms have opened ofﬁces in
midwestern states and venture capital has started to ﬂow to these regions,
the industry has changed following the Great Recession. Venture capital is increasingly concentrated in a few industries and geographic
regions, and it began funding companies in the latter phases on the continuum of seed money. In 2011, venture capital investments at the seedfunding stage in the United States declined about 48 percent over the
prior year, and investments were concentrated in social media and software and less in biotechnology, genomics, and clean technology, par-
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ticularly solar (Holstein 2012). Venture capital companies invest more
in companies that do not require equipment or physical infrastructure so
that the time to bring products to market is shorter. Consequently, with
the early stage funding system in turmoil, the Midwest regions have
suffered even more than the two coasts.
In addition, traditionally there has been imperfect information
between banks and entrepreneurs when applying for credit, because
entrepreneurs know the risk of their projects but banks do not (Stiglitz
and Weiss 1981). This has been even more prevalent in the Midwest.
The more such professionals become familiar with speciﬁc high-tech
industries and early stage ﬁnancing mechanisms, the better assistance
and advice they can offer nascent entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers.

OLDER INDUSTRIAL REGIONS LAG BEHIND LEADING
REGIONS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP METRICS
Older industrial regions are believed to lag behind leading regions
in terms of entrepreneurship because of their legacy and historical costs.
An investigation of entrepreneurship and innovation metrics reinforces
this argument empirically.
Thompson and Walstad (2012) have created the State Entrepreneurship Index, which includes information on income of entrepreneurs,
business formation, innovation, and the increase in the number of entrepreneurs. This research is a continuation of previous analysis conducted
on the state of Nebraska (Thompson and Walstad 2012; Tran, Thompson, and Walstad 2011). To create the index, the authors combined ﬁve
components: 1) percent growth in employer establishments, 2) percent
growth in employer establishments per person, 3) establishment births
per person, 4) patents per thousand persons, and 5) average income per
nonfarm proprietor (Thompson and Walstad 2012).
Table 9.1 shows the State Entrepreneurship Index for states considered to be innovative coastal states and industrial states for the years
2008, 2010, and 2011. The overall index value reveals that the raw
scores between groups of states differ. In 2011, Washington had the
lowest index value among the innovative coastal states (1.38), which
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Table 9.1 State Entrepreneurship Index, 2008, 2010, and 2011
2008
Rank
California
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New York
Texas
Washington

4
9
12
1
34
3

Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

11
39
33
23
27
28
38

2010
Index
value

Rank

2011
Index
value

Innovative coastal states
1.81
6
1.77
1.54
1
2.46
1.40
4
2.13
2.04
3
2.24
0.82
11
1.61
1.88
2
2.38
Industrial states
1.42
12
0.73
45
0.93
42
1.14
24
1.06
40
1.06
15
0.73
34

1.60
0.59
0.62
1.12
0.68
1.39
0.90

Rank

Index
value

3
1
7
4
8
13

2.39
3.01
1.68
2.23
1.61
1.38

9
40
49
5
22
11
18

1.59
0.75
0.10
1.79
1.09
1.54
1.19

SOURCE: Rankings produced by Thompson and Walstad (2012); Tran, Thompson,
and Walstad (2011).

was higher than four of the Industrial States. In the cases of Indiana,
Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, their 2011 index values
were the best performance they have marked.
There is no doubt that the economic crisis hit hard in the industrial
states, as seen in the entrepreneurial index data between 2008 and 2010.
The Great Recession caused some of them to slide backwards; Michigan is an example. Ranking 33 in 2008, Michigan had an Entrepreneurial Index score of 0.93, but by 2011, it showed an index of 0.10 with a
ranking of 49. In contrast, between 2010 and 2011, all of the industrial
states, except for Michigan, improved their rankings. As shown later in
the chapter, some of these states have intermediaries tasked with building regional entrepreneurial ecosystems, and they may have contributed
to the observed rise in rankings. More than ever, continued efforts to
increase economic development capacity through entrepreneurial facilitation are needed.
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Evaluating all metrics in Table 9.1 shows that the industrial states
lag behind innovative costal states for entrepreneurship and innovation
indices. Illinois in 2008 and 2011 and Minnesota and Pennsylvania in
2011 are exceptions to the lagging midwestern trend. One might infer
that this shows the importance of dedicated policies to overcome the
barriers resulting from the legacy costs of older industrial regions. One
way to accomplish this is through tax policy and tax incentives, and
another is through the development of intermediaries in these regions
to help facilitate entrepreneurship. The following two sections of the
chapter will examine tax policies in states and best practice approaches
that foster and enhance entrepreneurship in older industrial regions.

TAX POLICIES AFFECTING ENTREPRENEURSHIP
In Chapter 11 of this book, David Elkins examines the overall role
of taxation in entrepreneurial behavior. In regard to the Great Lakes
region, Elkins concludes that policymakers must address the issue of
high tax burdens and the low proportion of foreign born because these
policy mechanisms spur entrepreneurship. In order to make the Great
Lakes region more attractive to entrepreneurs, policymakers need to
address the issue of high tax burdens (Elkins 2014). A study from the
Goldwater Institute also shows that at a state level, a high percentage
of taxes as a percentage of personal income lowers the rate of entrepreneurship (Slivinski 2012). This section presents a different aspect of
taxation, as it looks speciﬁcally at state policies pertaining to investment
tax credits targeted at enhancing investments in start-up companies.
States, like businesses, must remain competitive in luring investments so that entrepreneurs can obtain the early stage funding that is
critical to facilitate business growth. Many states look to tax policy
to help facilitate this investment since the environment for early stage
lending has increasingly become risk averse.
Entrepreneurs looking for funding for their start-up companies face
a different situation than existing small businesses; there is a heightened
sense of risk on behalf of the investor, which in turns makes standard
ﬁnancing difﬁcult for startups. As Keuschnigga and Nielsen (2002)
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state, “Financing early stage businesses involves special problems and
is fundamentally different from ﬁnancing mature and well established
companies. Because of the lack of collateral and the absence of any
past track record, and due to their informational advantages, pioneering entrepreneurs often face severe difﬁculties in convincing banks to
ﬁnance projects with potentially high returns but high risks as well”
(pp. 175–176).
Investment tax credits are a policy instrument used to foster investment and risk capital within a state. An examination of early stage
investment tax credits by states shows that 22 states offer tax incentives to investors (Table 9.2).3 Many states established these policies
in recent years; ﬁve states initiated these tax credits in 2010, with three
more in 2011. The earliest enactment was by Maine in 1988. Tax credit
policies vary by state, but most are not for the full investment amount.
Generally, states reimburse 25–50 percent of the investment, and this
amount may be subject to a cap.

THE ROLE NONPROFIT INTERMEDIARIES PLAY IN
ACCELERATING ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The shift from investment in physical capital to human and knowledge capital was not as seamless as the new growth theory implies.
Despite investments in scientiﬁc research, many regions in the United
States fell behind in economic growth, and not all of the newly created knowledge resulted in commercialized innovations. Many barriers
prevent individuals from bringing their products to market. In order to
overcome these hurdles, lagging regions need mechanisms and infrastructure to link ideas, knowledge, and creativity.
Four elements have contributed to the early lead in technologybased entrepreneurial activity on the East and West Coasts: 1) access
to cutting-edge research, 2) access to early stage funding and venture
capital, 3) a culture that encourages experimentation and risk taking
versus looking down at failure, and 4) a national regulatory structure
that enables ﬁrms to start up and enter new markets while making it
possible for less-productive ﬁrms to exit (Council on Competitiveness
2007). Entrepreneurship is an activity that feeds on itself. In some parts
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Table 9.2 Early Stage Investment Tax Credits, by State
Name of tax credit
Arizona
Arizona Angel Investor’s Tax Credit
Arkansas
Arkansas Equity Investment Tax Credit Incentive
Program
Connecticut
Connecticut Angel Investor Tax Credit
Georgia
Georgia Angel Investor Tax Credit
Illinois
The Angel Investment Tax Credit
Indiana
Venture Capital Investment Tax Credit
Iowa
Community-Based Seed Capital Funds
Kansas
Angel Investor Tax Credit
Louisiana
Angel Investor Tax Credit
Maine
Maine Seed Capital Tax Credit Program
Maryland
Biotechnology Investment Tax Credit
Michigan
Michigan Small Business Investment Tax Credit
Minnesota
Angel Tax Credit
Nebraska
Nebraska Angel Investment Tax Credit Act
New Mexico
Angel Investment Tax Credit
North Carolina Qualiﬁed Business Tax Credit Program
North Dakota Angel Fund Investment Credit
Ohio
Technology Investment Tax Credit
Rhode Island Rhode Island Innovation Tax Credit
Virginia
Virginia Qualiﬁed Equity and Subordinated Debt
Investment Credit
West Virginia High Growth Business Investment Tax Credit
Wisconsin
Wisconsin Angel Investor Tax Credit

Credit
Year
(%) established
30–35
2007
33.3
2007
25
35
25
20
20
50
35
50–60
50
25
25
35–40
25
25
45
25–30
50
50

2012
2010
2010
2010
2011
2005
2011
1988
2005
2003
2010
2011
2007
2002
2003
1996
2006
2003

50
25

2004
2002

SOURCE: Individual state Web sites (accessed September 2012).

of the country, entrepreneurship developed organically, which may provide support to the view that capitalistic mechanisms offer the greatest
promise of prosperity.
However, because of the economic history of other regions, such
as those in the Midwest, and the barriers to entrepreneurship that have
resulted from that legacy, these locations arguably need public tax dollars and philanthropic funding to “jump-start” the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Lerner (2002) highlights two arguments on why public investments in start-up companies are required: the certiﬁcation hypothesis
and the presence of R&D spillovers. Innovations and entrepreneur-
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ship create knowledge spillovers that are critical to regional economic
growth and beneﬁt the public at large. Start-ups bring new products
and services to the market and often create industries that result in a
social beneﬁt beyond the returns to the individual ﬁrms. These social
advantages, which many times happen down the road, justify public
investments in innovation and entrepreneurship: the social beneﬁts are
not accounted for in the market price of the new company and are often
greater than the private return of the individual ﬁrm. The development
of a vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem requires a long-term horizon.
In recent years, several states and regions have implemented initiatives designed to accelerate the ﬁrst three of the four elements listed
above. These approaches have an important role in cultivating a network to stimulate entrepreneurship that has not developed naturally.
The objectives of these initiatives, which were established through
nonproﬁt organizations, are to promote and support innovative startup companies by providing pre–seed funding, developing networks of
angel investors, and connecting new companies with follow-on funding through either private equity and/or venture capital ﬁrms. Many of
these programs also provide technical assistance and support by helping
entrepreneurs develop business plans, connect to mentors, and ﬁnd the
talent to manage and grow their company.
Table 9.3 highlights three nonproﬁt entrepreneurial-intermediary
organizations that promise to help ﬁll the gap the market left behind.
They are JumpStart Inc., located in Cleveland, Ohio; Innovation Works
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Ann Arbor SPARK, in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
JumpStart Inc. is tasked with increasing the economic impact and
sustainability of northeast Ohio’s diverse entrepreneurial ecosystem
(JumpStart 2012). JumpStart delivers vital, focused resources to entrepreneurs and accelerates the growth of early stage businesses and ideas
into venture-ready companies with the hope of transforming northeast Ohio into a nationally recognized area of entrepreneurship and
innovation.
JumpStart was modeled after Innovation Works. The mission of
Innovation Works is to increase growth in the technology economy of
southwestern Pennsylvania through direct investments and business
expertise, and its goals are to help hundreds of entrepreneurs, researchers, and small manufacturers create new markets through ideas and
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innovations (Innovation Works 2012a). Innovation Works has a range
of partners in government, business, investment, research, law, and
academia.
Operating in another Rust Belt city, Ann Arbor SPARK is an intermediary in the greater Ann Arbor, Michigan, region aiming to advance
innovation-based economic development. Ann Arbor SPARK has several goals: to be known as a “hot spot” for high-value, knowledgeintensive, and diverse talent; to build a uniﬁed region working together
to achieve common economic objectives, without duplication of effort,
utilizing the Open Source Economic Development concept; to be on a
“short list” for site selectors and other inﬂuencers as a sought-after location; to be known as an innovation hub with access to funding and business creation/development support; to have national and international
brand recognition; and to be recognized as one of the nation’s best
regions for innovation-based business retention and growth through a
proactive business development effort (Ann Arbor SPARK 2012a).

CONCLUSION
As suggested, the transformation to knowledge-based economies
has not occurred uniformly across the country. The academic literature offers plenty of evidence that innovation and entrepreneurship are
strongly correlated to economic growth. Moreover, regions with high
levels of research and development, patents, start-ups, and venture capital develop faster than other areas. The missing link for many regions
is the component of entrepreneurship; it is the entrepreneur who brings
fresh ideas forward, commercializes these innovations, and brings them
to market.
Economic history and industry specialization differ among regions
within the United States. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s entrepreneurship developed organically on the East and West Coasts, while it
stagnated in the Midwest. During the initial development of high-tech
industries on the two coasts—especially of semiconductor, information technology, and bioscience companies—Midwest regions were
still focusing on large, hierarchical, traditional manufacturing industries, and neither paying attention to the barriers to entrepreneurship nor
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JumpStart, Inc.
Cleveland, Ohio

Innovation Works (IW)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Ann Arbor SPARK
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Mission and goals

Increase the economic impact and
sustainability of northeast Ohio’s
entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Increase growth in the technology
economy of southwestern
Pennsylvania through direct
investments and business espertise.

Advance innovation-based
economic development in the
greater Ann Arbor region.

Why established?

Established in 2003 by the region’s
civic, community, and philanthropic
leaders to address the declining
economy, employment losses, and
lack of entrepreneurial growth.

Established in 2000 as part of the
Benjamin Franklin Technology
Partners to take Pittsburgh to where
it was a century ago, when entrepreneurs came to start companies, ﬁnd
investors, and produce goods sold
worldwide.

Created in 2005 by community
leaders as a public-private
partnership (business, government,
and education to meet the needs
of innovation-based companies at
every stage of development.

Services provided:
entrepreneurial,
business, and
funding assistance

• Providing one-on-one intensive

• Investing directly (through

• Providing business accelerator

•
•

12/16/2013 2:14:30 PM

assistance to entrepreneurs
leading high-potential companies
by experienced and successful
entrepreneurs.
Establishing and achieving
milestones of rapid growth.
Investing a minimum of $250,000
in companies with breakthrough
and protectable technologies in
high-opportunity markets. The
portfolio companies are located
across the region, but must have

•

•

IW Seed Fund) in early stage
technology companies focused on
high-opportunity markets.
Assisting entrepreneurs in
developing a business plan,
researching market opportunities,
and attracting investment capital.
Launching (in 2007) a business
accelerator specializing in
rapid product development and
commercialization—AlphaLab.
Offering a 20-week program to

•

services that enable companies
to move quickly through the
initial stages of business (idea,
business formation, proof of
concept, marketability, and
commercialization).
Providing SPARK Business
Accelerator engagement to
qualifying start-ups. Startups receive up to $50,000
of consulting and business
development services.
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than $5 million
in revenues.
•less
Operating
inclusion-speciﬁ
c

programs for minority, women,
and inner-city-based entrepreneurs
offering intensive hands-on
assistance, access to capital, and
connection to ﬁrst clients.

•

•

Services provided:
talent attraction

• Matching entrepreneurial job

• Operating the SPARK Regional

•

Incubator Network, which
includes two business incubators
and one wet lab. Located
in three different cities, the
incubators offer physical space,
business services, and business
development guidance.
Administering several statefunded programs for start-up
companies in Washtenaw
County. Grants are available
to companies from $1,000 to
$10,000. Microloans are available
for product development,
commercialization, and hiring.
Equity investments of up to
$250,000 are available through the
Michigan Pre-Seed Capital Fund
to fund product commercialization
and growing the business.

• Assisting entrepreneurs to ﬁnd the • Connecting start-ups seeking
right talent.

• Placing undergraduate engineering
and MBA studnets as interns in
early stage technology companies
and manufacturers. More than half
of the companies hired or planned
to hire their interns.

•

managerial and technical talent
with job seekers.
SPARK created a job portal for
high-value, knowledge-based
positions, where job seekers
and employers can post without
charge.
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•

seekers with opportunities in
start-up companies (advertising
for opportunities, screening
applicants, and introducing
candidates to the start-ups).
Tranining entrepreneurs on how to
retain talent.

launch start-ups in the software,
entertainment technology, and
Internet-related industries.
Helping accelerate the
development of alternative
energy efﬁciency technologies
in universities, national labs,
and companies. Also provides
investments and business
assistance to start and grow
energy-related companies.
Providing manufacturing
companies with up to $50,000 to
develop new technologies.
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JumpStart, Inc.
Cleveland, Ohio

Innovation Works (IW)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

• Guiding entrepreneurs in the

Ann Arbor SPARK
Ann Arbor, Michigan

• SPARK issues a weekly Talent

development and management of
their boards
Services provided:
other

Search newsletter, featuring new
postings and career events.

Mentoring

University-related programs

• Program established in 2012 was • Working with local universities
•

•
•
•

created in partnership with MIT’s
Venture Mentoring Service.
Mentors include founders
and presidents of Fortune 500
companies, leaders of national
high-tech companies, and venture
capitalists.
Marketing
Generating publicity and creating
marketing materials for start-up
companies.
Writing press releases and
developing relations with media.
IdeaCrossing
Developed and maintained by
Jumpstart, the Web-based Idea
Crossing connects and matches

•

to cultivate research ideas and
help speed commercialization.
Providing $25,000 grants for
technology validation, market
research, prototype development,
and evaluation of intellectual
property.
Accelerating commercialization
of technologies developed by
local universities and small
businesses through the i6 agile
innovation system. The program,
funded by a federal grant, was
developed in 2010 by IW and
Carnegie Mellon University.
The system includes workshops,
mentors, funding, and space.

•

•
•
•
•
•

Entrepreneurial education
and training
Organizing a 2-day Entrepreneur
Boot Camp, offering advice about
entrepreneurs’ business model,
management team, and market
strategy.
Offering a full-day of training on
how to start a business.
Providing one-on-one sessions
with entrepreneurs.
Organizing monthly networking
programs for entrepreneurs,
investors, and others.
Offering a 9-session Business
Law and Order Legal series.
Offering 10 monthly marketing
sessions.
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entrepreneurs, investors, mentors,
and providers
of business
services.
Network
Resources

• Connecting entrepreneurs to
the Entrepreneurial Network,
which includes incubators and
accelerators, seed funds and pre–
seed funds, venture capital and
angel funds, educators, advisors,
and other service providers.
Types of industries
served

• Health care
• Cleantech (advanced materials
and advanced energy)

• Information technology
• Electronics
• Business and consumer products

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Advanced electronics
Consumer electronics
Enterprise software
Network infrastructure
Information technology
Internet
Robotics
Sensors
Advanced energy
Biotech and pharmaceuticals
Health information
Life sciences
Materials
Medical devices
Medical diagnosis

• Information technology
• Cleantech (advanced materials
and advanced energy)

• Life sciences
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JumpStart, Inc.
Cleveland, Ohio
Impact
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From inception in July 2004 through
June 2012, JumpStart made 98
investments totaling over $26
million in 65 companies. These
companies created and retained
1,305 direct jobs, held 144 patents
with additional 344 patents pending, and raised $495 million in
follow-up funding. The 2011 economic impacts of the companies
assisted by JumpStart are: value of
all goods and services produced in
the region rose by $220.5 million,
value added rose by $143.6 million, household income increased
by $89.4 million, and 12,640 jobs
were created. Tax revenues increased by $29.8 million, of which
$19.5 million was added to the
federal government and $10.3 million to state and local governments.
JumpStart received awards from
the State Science and Technology
Institute, the International Economic
Development Council, and the

Innovation Works (IW)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
From its inception, Innovation
Works invested over $50 million in
150 companies, which raised more
than $1.2 billion in follow-up ﬁnancing. In 2011, IW invested $4.9
million in companies that created
and retained 454 high-skilled jobs.
IW assisted its portfolio companies
to attract $218 million in followon investment from other sources.
Many of the region’s largest technology companies count IW among
their earlier funders. AlphaLab assisted in the launching of 45 companies and was selected among the top
15 accelerators in the United States.

Ann Arbor SPARK
Ann Arbor, Michigan
By the end of the ﬁfth year managing the Michigan Pre-Seed Capital
Fund, Ann Arbor SPARK has invested $15 million in technology startups that are just prior to the commercialization phase. SPARK incubator graduated several companies
that moved to other locations within
the region and hired new employees.
Between 2006 and 2011, companies
assisted by SPARK created nearly
11,000 jobs and received $1.3 billion in new follow-up investments.
Ann Arbor was in the headlines of
major media outlets. It received top
rankings in job growth, education attainment, turnaround city within the
Midwest, and among the best cities
to ﬁnd a job.
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Economic Development
Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce.
JumpStart and its work were featured in many national media outlets, including Parade Magazine,
the Chronicle of Philanthropy,
VentureBeat, Fast Company, and the
New York Times.
SOURCE: Ann Arbor SPARK (2012); Austrian and Cloose (2012); Encyclopedia of Cleveland History (2012); Innovation Works (2012b).

237

12/16/2013 2:14:30 PM

238 Austrian and Piazza

encouraging risk taking in their localities. Due to their history, regional
economies in the Midwest ranked lower on measures of innovation and
entrepreneurship and experienced lower rates of growth. As a result,
many bright and talented people worked for established companies or
moved to the East or West Coasts, where innovation and starting a company were encouraged (Cortright 2005).
Over time, with the understanding that entrepreneurship is a critical element of economic growth, public policy has shifted from only
investing in physical capital to also supporting risk capital, mentoring,
and other support services that entrepreneurs need to foster job growth.
In the 1990s and 2000s, more regional decision makers began to address
the barriers to entrepreneurship caused by industrial history and the culture that discouraged risk taking and starting new businesses. Since the
economies of the Midwest regions were lagging, state and local public
policy intervened in the market in order to grow the entrepreneurship
ecosystem. Many states, including those in the Midwest, instituted tax
credits for early stage investments in order to create or increase the ﬂow
of available capital to invest in new companies.
In addition, many regions supported the formation of nonproﬁt
intermediaries to promote and support innovative start-ups, providing
them with access to capital as well as technical assistance and mentoring to help them accelerate the development of nascent ideas into
successful companies. JumpStart and Innovation Works are both active
seed-stage investors in start-up companies located in their respective
regions. They offer similar programs, including technical assistance,
mentoring, and talent attraction. JumpStart has a unique focus on inclusion that promotes funding and other services to women- and minorityowned businesses. Innovation Works has an accelerator that specializes
in rapid product development and commercialization, working with
a select group of individuals to launch the next generation of companies. Ann Arbor SPARK, also offers business accelerator services, but
does not have its own seed fund. SPARK’s funding activities are conducted as an administrator of several state-funded programs for start-up
companies.
All three intermediaries affect their respective regions through the
companies they mentor and the companies in which they invest, helping to overcome the legacy costs and economic history of their lagging industrial regions. The impacts include establishing new compa-
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nies, creating and retaining jobs, raising follow-on funding from other
sources, and generating revenues. Moreover, these organizations are
changing their local entrepreneurial ecosystems by networking and
referring, promoting new ideas and start-ups, increasing the availability
of pre–seed capital, recruiting talent and creating a pool of individuals
who can lead and work in start-up companies, and generally advocating
for entrepreneurs. Direct impact is already observed, but future research
will demonstrate whether these intermediaries have had lasting effect
on their regions’ economic growth.
Notes
1. The Leading MSAs include Baltimore-Towson, Maryland; Bridgeport-StamfordNorwalk, Connecticut; Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, Connecticut; and
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, Rhode Island-Massachusetts. The selection
of leading MSAs was based on several criteria, including minimum level of employment, rank in the top quartile in short-term and long-term growth, and improvement
in ranking over time. The Midwest MSAs include Cincinnati-Middletown, OhioKentucky-Indiana; Columbus, Ohio; Indianapolis-Carmel, Indiana; Kansas City,
Missouri-Kansas; Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, Wisconsin; MinneapolisSt. Paul-Bloomington, Minnesota-Wisconsin; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and St.
Louis, Missouri-Illinois. The northeast Ohio MSAs include Akron, Ohio; CantonMassillon, Ohio; Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, Ohio; and Youngstown-WarrenBoardman, Ohio-Pennsylvania.
2. People become angel investors for different reasons, including ﬁnancial returns,
supporting their community, creating and growing companies, making use of their
expertise, and even for personal enjoyment.
3. Early stage investment tax credits are tax credits provided by state governments
to private entities or investment ﬁrms for investing in early stage companies, early
stage investment funds, angel investment funds, venture capital funds, or other
investments toward businesses in the initial level. Each state has its own legal
criteria on what it considers an “early stage investment” and each state has a set a
cap on the dollar amount it will enumerate toward these investments.
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10
Reasons for Misgivings about Local
Economic Development Initiatives
William M. Bowen
Chang-Shik Song
Cleveland State University

Local and regional economic development efforts consisting of
public subsidies for business and public support for promoting
increased local consumption are based on the “market failure”
approach. Such activities are attempts to correct the operation of
nonfunctioning private markets. This approach, while still widely
touted and utilized, also presents questions as to its effectiveness,
especially in Rust Belt cities.

From the time of the Industrial Revolution through the middle of
the twentieth century, the enormous capital investments made in cities such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, St.
Louis, and Detroit helped the industries within them to become preeminently competitive.1 High levels of immigration, to supply their
demands for largely blue-collar labor, were another contributing factor.
As a result, these and similar cities became globally dominant industrial powerhouses. Fabulous wealth was created. But as the end of the
twentieth century unfolded, knowledge and technology advanced, and
the world economy changed.
Today these same places have earned reputations as lackluster, Rust
Belt cities with serious problems. Large numbers of talented people
have, for the past several decades, steadily out-migrated from them
for better opportunities elsewhere, leaving behind obsolete production facilities built for early to mid twentieth century manufacturing,
a public infrastructure in poor condition, relatively high taxes, and a
strongly unionized workforce.2 The large and now deteriorating investments in capital and infrastructure have become increasingly difﬁcult to
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maintain with continuously declining populations and correspondingly
smaller tax bases. Population loss has also brought reduced capacity
for local and county government agencies to provide public services, as
well as lessened representation in national-level political decision processes. Figure 10.1 shows the population decline over recent decades.
The public and to some degree nonproﬁt sectors in these cities
have responded to the deterioration in part by enacting a range of local
economic-development initiatives. These include public or quasi-public
interventions into local markets through various forms of incentives and
subsidies designed to change the respective city’s local economic growth
paths. They include industrial parks, tax abatements, enterprise zones,
aquariums, artist incubators, river walks, casinos, festival marketplaces,
and many others. There are many examples of these initiatives.
In Cuyahoga County, Ohio (home of Cleveland), for instance, the
three county commissioners decided in 2007 to expend well in excess
of $465 million of taxpayer money for a privately owned and operated
“Medical Mart” (Nichols 2009). The decision was ostensibly predicated
on the promise of a one-stop shop in which major medical vendors,
such as GE, Phillips, and Siemens, would have ﬂoor space upon which
to sell medical products to hospitals and doctors from around the world
visiting Cleveland and looking to buy the latest in medical technology
and cutting-edge equipment. A powerful local coalition of advocates
alleged that this would attract a steady stream of conferences and conventions, bringing hundreds of thousands of physicians and hospital
administrators to the city each year, creating a huge number of new
jobs, generating major new local revenues, and otherwise revitalizing
the region.
Insofar as public deliberation occurred at all, it was not widespread
or robust. It did not include anything vaguely resembling judicious
consideration of the expected value of returns to the public coffers
from the expenditure, much less of the research showing that municipal outlays for purposes of attracting conventions in the past have not
always yielded positive results for local economies (Fenich 1992;
Hovinen 2002; Isler 2008; Laslo and Judd 2004; Noll and Zimbalist
1997; Sanders 2004, 2005). To support the mart, the county commissioners, in closed meetings purportedly held to protect the owner operator’s trade secrets, without a vote of the county’s citizens, and without
a publicly available cost-beneﬁt analysis, decided to fund the Medi-
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Figure 10.1 Changing Population in Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1990–2010
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (1990, 2000, 2010).

cal Mart from a 20-year $0.0025 sales tax on every dollar spent in the
county.
Similarly, throughout the industrial Midwest and beyond, elected
and other urban authorities have supported and committed public funds
to construct and operate major sports-related and other facilities that
would supposedly raise the respective city’s growth paths. Examples
include stadiums, arenas, and training centers in Buffalo, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. Virtually all
were designed and built using public funds, but privately owned and
operated, ostensibly to stem decline and renew prosperity by creating
jobs (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The costs of constructing and running
these facilities have been funded primarily through broad-based general
taxes.3 Speciﬁc illustrations of initiatives justiﬁed by local economic
development objectives include the America’s Center Convention Complex in St. Louis, the Detroit Creative Business Accelerator, the Detroit
Economic Growth Corporation for Business Retention and Attraction,
the Team Northeast Ohio (NEO) Minority Business Attraction Initiative
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in Cleveland, the National Underground Railroad Freedom Center and
the Queensgate Terminals in Cincinnati, the Forest Hills Community
Development Corporation in Pittsburgh, and the Niagara Convention
Center in Buffalo, among many others.
Use of local economic development initiatives characteristically
involves the exercise of public authority and the taxing power to claim
some portion of the total local resource base for declared purposes of
economic and job growth. The policies are supposed to affect consumer
or ﬁrm behavior, or both. Generally, they involve tax abatements or
public expenditures for the stated goals of providing public beneﬁts
within the urban or regional economic system.4 They comprise a range
of public subsidies and direct cash aid for businesses, such as ﬁnancial incentives for branch plant recruitment, capital market programs,
information and education, export assistance, and centers for businessrelated research. The approaches include property and income taxes
that are reduced or credited to selected private interests. They also consist of public ﬁnancial support for purposes of increasing levels of local
consumption spending on items such as publicly ﬁnanced tourism and
art facilities, casinos, and outdoor recreation activities. All constitute
one form or another of a “nonmarket allocation mechanism” (Arrow
1985).
In the following pages we focus speciﬁcally on the market failure rationale for these and similar local economic development initiatives (Bartik 1990). In this line of reasoning, economic development
initiatives are justiﬁed in terms of standard neoclassical microeconomics by the effort to restore economic efﬁciency. The rationale for them
assumes that they will have the effect of correcting impediments to the
formation or operation of private markets. Such obstacles are widely
considered to include external costs and beneﬁts, imperfect information and the existence of various monopolies, such as public utilities.
On Bartik’s (1990) account, they also consist of involuntary unemployment and underemployment, imperfect capital markets attributable to
suboptimal regulation, distorted ﬁscal beneﬁts, improperly set social
discount rates, underinvestment in human capital, imperfections in
knowledge and information markets, and spillovers from research and
development activities. Each of these forms of market failure has its
own corresponding means of policy evaluation. The presence of any
of them within a regional market could justify the use of an economic
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development initiative. Several forms of market failure may also occur
simultaneously, in circumstances of multiple market failure.
We ﬁrst consider some reasons to have reservations with this
approach, speciﬁcally based on principles espoused by members of the
Austrian school of economics (Hayek 1944; Ikeda 2004; O’Toole 2004;
Sautet 2004). As the following pages describe, Austrian economic theory stipulates that competition in free markets is virtually the only real
way to create local prosperity. Then we consider further reasons for such
reservations based on the theory of the second best (Wolf 1979). The
theory of the second best stipulates that, under conditions of multiple
market failure, the outcomes of economic development initiatives are
inherently unpredictable. Finally, we assess the implications of these
considerations for the use of local economic development initiatives to
renew prosperity in midwestern industrial cities today.

AUSTRIAN CRITIQUES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
The Austrian critiques of local economic development initiatives
differ markedly from popular knee-jerk misgivings about the growth in
public spending and taxation that have occurred over the past decades
(Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000). This is not to say that these popular concerns have no basis in fact. The growth in public spending and taxation
is real, but the Austrian misgivings are in no way knee-jerk. One way
to look at the trends within Rust Belt cities is in terms of change in percapita locally generated general revenue.5 Figures 10.2 and 10.3 illustrate these trends for the ﬁnal decades of the twentieth century vis-avis selected cities from this group. Figure 10.2 indicates that per-capita
locally generated general revenues incrementally have increased for time
period 1977–2002. Figure 10.3 shows similar trends on a constant
income basis, adjusted for the cost of living.6 It may be noted that while
Detroit is out of sync with the trends in the other cities, it is the only one
that has recently gone bankrupt.
The Austrian critiques also differ from scholarly misgivings about
local economic development initiatives that stem from the mixed and
largely inconclusive results of analysis from the applied social science
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Figure 10.2 Locally Generated General General Revenue per Capita in
Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1977–2002
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NOTE: Tax revenues are shown in 2002 dollars, which are adjusted at a constantly
inﬂated rate of base year 2002. Data for all cities are based on county-level information for the county containing the central city. A linear regression through these data
ﬁt well and have positive slopes. The slopes and R2 statistics are ($290.09, 0.7612),
($215.19, 0.6771), ($244.23, 0.7116), ($174.69, 0.6378), ($23.53, 0.0219), ($105.03,
0.4520), and ($156.33, 0.6015) for Cleveland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit,
Milwaukee, and St. Louis, respectively.
SOURCE: Population numbers are from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1977, 1982, 1987,
1992, 1997, and 2002; locally generated general tax revenues are from Annual Survey
of Governments of the U.S. Census Bureau, which are produced by Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and available at http://www
.icpsr.umich.edu.

research community. Some of this social science research shows that
local economic development initiatives have had at least some shortterm positive effects (Bartik 1991; Reese and Ye 2011). Other studies
ﬁnd that economic development initiatives have either not induced the
promised improvements, did not have any discernible effects at all, or
led to less economic prosperity (Hissong 2003; Ikeda and Staley 2004;
Peters and Fisher 2003, 2004; Reese and Ye 2011; Swetkis 2009).
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Figure 10.3 Locally Generated General Revenue per Thousand Dollars
of Personal Income in Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1977–2002
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NOTE: General revenues and personal income are all adjusted to constant 2002 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). All cities are based on county-level data
for the county containing the central city. Locally generated general revenues per
$1,000 of personal income represent the ﬁnancial burden of county residents to pay
taxes. Though the regression lines in Figure 10.3 do not all ﬁt as well as do the lines
in Figure 10.2, with the exception of Detroit the slopes on the regression lines for all
of the cities remain positive. The slopes and R2 statistics are ($5.10, 0.4835), ($0.96,
0.0398), ($3.13, 0.2303), ($2.30, 0.1895), (−$1.62, 0.0453), ($0.84, 0.0254), and
($0.59, 0.0246) for Cleveland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, Milwaukee,
and St. Louis, respectively.
SOURCE: Locally generated general revenues are from the Annual Survey of Governments of the U.S. Census Bureau produced by ICPSR, which is available at http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu); personal income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for
time period 1977–2002 and is available at http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm.
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The Austrian critiques instead are based conceptually in disputes
over the realism of the assumptions made in neoclassical microeconomics, particularly the supposition that decision makers are rational and in
possession of complete information (Caplan 1999). Austrian economic
theorists speciﬁcally reject the realism of any assumption that market
decision makers can ever act on the basis of anything remotely similar
to omniscience about their situations. Instead, these theorists maintain
that all decisions that create wealth and prosperity, or not, including
those involving local economic development initiatives, are made by
ordinary people. Accordingly, these people are fallible. They possess
imperfect knowledge, and seldom if ever make fully rational choices.
Their characteristics are those of Homo sapiens, not homo economicus.
When in positions of authority to make public initiative decisions, they
are at times seriously threatened by moral hazards, misaligned incentives, special interest groups, and political inﬂuences.
The Concept of Catallaxy
Much of the Austrian critique centers on the concept of catallaxy.
This term describes the origin of wealth and prosperity, stipulating speciﬁcally that they must emanate at least in part from spontaneously arising circumstances beyond the capacity of any given ﬁnite set of human
decision makers to design. The concept is rooted in Frederick Hayek’s
philosophy of social order (Hayek 1944, 1945, 1976a,b).
Hayek assumed the order that we as humans ﬁnd in the world is
given to it at least in part by our own minds (Gray 1982). Humans, he
thought, are active and organic, albeit “constrained” choosers of purposes and means to achieve them (Sowell 1987). We make our choices
and earn our living in the world not so much on the basis of primarily
abstract or theoretical knowledge as on the basis of practical knowledge. Hayek used “special knowledge of circumstances” to refer to the
knowledge with which we do this. Accordingly, special knowledge of
circumstances is the understanding of concrete situations, local conditions, people, and opportunities. It has both abstract and practical
dimensions. It is abstract in that all of it is explicitly or otherwise predicated upon assumptions, some of which are explicit but most are tacit,
for instance, about human nature, language, and reasoning, through the
relationships among elements of sensory perceptions. At the same time,
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such knowledge is practical in that it is embodied in habits of thought,
perception, and behavior that allow us to act so as to survive, adapt
to our ever-changing circumstances, and achieve our purposes.7 At its
best, this knowledge allows us to act so as to create wealth and prosperity, primarily through market exchanges.
The Limitations of Decision Makers
Because special knowledge of circumstances is always at least in
part attributable to the active ordering structures of our own minds, it
is at best limited and idiographic. Social and economic reality, Hayek
contended, is far too complex to be comprehended by a single mind.
While any one person or group may possess enough knowledge to successfully provide answers for the full range of questions that can be
asked within the context of a given set of assumptions, only a limited
range of questions may be asked from within that same set. The knowledge required to make sound decisions about how to improve prosperity for an entire urban economic system exists only in widely disbursed
form among all of the members of that system, each of whom knows
his or her own situation and purposes better than does anyone else. This
information greatly exceeds that available to any single political authority or business leader, economic development planning committee, or
government agency.
Accordingly, no decision maker, group of decision makers, or agency
involved with a local economic development initiative can possibly be
sufﬁciently well informed and rational to be able to calculate and coordinate all the variables that contribute to the creation of wealth and
prosperity in an urban economic system. Therefore, it is not feasible
for them to reliably predict the full range of outcomes from any such
initiative. When social norms nevertheless routinely accept the use of
local economic development initiatives as substitutes for market decisions, the likely effects include excessively large and unaccountable
local governments, untrustworthy urban governance processes, waste
of resources, retardation of the creation of wealth and the renewal of
prosperity, and disrespect for the preferences, if not individual liberties,
of those who are either unwilling or unable to exert political inﬂuence
on the allocation decisions.
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The Importance of the Market
The concept of catallaxy suggests that, in capitalistic markets, social
and economic order and prosperity emerge from the chaos of myriads of
human decisions in “the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market” (Hayek 1976b, pp. 108–109). Prosperity arises spontaneously through the coordinated interactions and mutual adjustments
of multitudes of unfettered market exchanges, each of which occurs on
the basis of price signals and the partial knowledge of the participants,
not as a result of economic development initiatives. To be sure, some
participants are more knowledgeable than others, and some are more
resourceful. But none conduct their exchanges within the context of a
fully integrated and orchestrated social system known as “the market,”
especially not one that produces any sort of deﬁnable public interest
or overall product that local economic development authorities might
optimize in the manner of a linear program. The idea that the purpose
of an urban economy is to maximize one form or another of a social
objective function or total social product, such as the number of new
jobs, and that local economic development decision makers can make
reliable decisions to improve or increase it is simply a misconception.
Following this line of reasoning, the idea that economic development decision makers know enough to somehow maximize a social
objective function for the whole of an urban economy, or even at the
margin to nudge things in their intended direction, is little more than
hubris. The limitations on their knowledge imply that they could never
conceive, much less design and orchestrate, the array of exchange most
conducive to prosperity within a city of any size with anywhere near the
degree of balance and nuance as can the market. Instead, the greatest
feasible degree of decentralized, bottom-up decision making will lead
to the greatest increases in prosperity. To reliably design and deliver a
mechanism for changing a midwestern industrial city’s economic path,
authorities would have to know not only the entire range of relevant
facts and relations, but also how all individuals would mutually accommodate each other as a result of its implementation. Even the very best
theories of social planning, human behavior, and economics are not
adequate for the requisite tasks.
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Implications for the Role of Government
The concept of catallaxy also has implications for the institutions
used to govern local market behavior, especially in terms of democratic
values and individual rights. Hayek, in particular, was concerned about
the reach of governmental power into economic affairs. He maintained
that, when governmental power is held and exercised by those who do
not recognize or care about the limitations of their own knowledge, or
by those who are intent primarily on further enhancing their own power
and authority, one of the likely effects is to unduly restrict individual
freedoms and effectively violate the rights of others. The use of local
economic development initiatives to change urban economic growth
paths may thus at times conﬂict with the core values of freedom, equality, and private property on which the potential renewal of prosperity
must be judged. Anyone who has gone before a zoning commission or
an architectural review board, or who has attempted to change the mind
of a determined county commissioner understands and knows that local
governments can wield sweeping and at times even seemingly tyrannical powers.8
In the case of Cleveland’s Medical Mart, by 2011, after project cost
escalations of over $150 million, and after construction had started,
it became evident that the concept had failed to attract large, multinational or national vendors who wanted to display their products.
Instead, it was announced that the mart would house primarily local
vendors, including hospitals, universities, and ﬁrms in the information
technology, security system, and aromatherapy business (Campbell
2011). The stated purpose also morphed from the attraction of hundreds of thousands of doctors and hospital administrators from outside
the region, looking to purchase high-tech medical devices, to a largely
locally oriented center for continuing medical education (Campbell
2011; Gomez 2011). Rather than housing major national medical supply ﬁrms, the main tenants were local and included small medical businesses, universities, and other medical interests from the area, not outside vendors that would attract a steady stream of medical conventions.
In summary, the Austrian critiques argue that local economic development initiatives are no substitute for the verdicts of unfettered capitalist markets. There is moreover every reason to believe that private
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investors placing their own money at risk will make better decisions
than will economic development authorities. Thus, if a medical mart,
convention center, stadium, or other local initiative is predicted to generate net positive revenues for an urban economy, let private markets
make the full investment and reap the full proﬁts, or take the full losses
it brings. Only unfettered markets can rationally coordinate the demand
and supply of land, labor, capital, and technology so as to create widespread prosperity. Had the $465 million or more tax dollars spent on the
Cleveland Medical Mart otherwise not been taxed, and had the funds
instead remained in free markets, those dollars would have been used
in other ways, some of which might have generated genuine prosperity
for a range of the region’s citizens.

LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
AND THE THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST
On these conceptual foundations, Austrian economic theorists argue
that, of all feasible alternatives thus far conceived, the activity of voluntary exchange in unfettered capitalist markets alone has the greatest
potential to generate widespread wealth and prosperity. This process is
hampered by substituting the purposes and conceptions of imperfectly
informed and cognitively limited economic development authorities for
those of the vastly larger number of ﬁrms and individuals who would
otherwise participate with the same resources in free markets. Insofar as
such policies are rationalized by market failures attributable to imperfect knowledge and information, they may not be so much a solution to
economic decline as a contributing cause of it.
Markets fail for reasons other than imperfect information and sometimes for more than one reason at a time. Monopolies, for instance, are
widely considered to constitute a source of market failure, as are nonrival and nonexcludable goods and services, market transactions involving costs and beneﬁts that accrue to third parties not directly involved in
the transaction, and transactions costs that are so high that markets are
not economically viable and therefore do not exist (Arrow 1985; Bator
1985). Setting aside for the moment all considerations about imperfect
knowledge, it is widely recognized that when instances of any one of
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these other forms of market failure occur, increases in prosperity cannot
be properly incentivized by unfettered capitalist market activity alone.
The concept of catallaxy as a basis for a critique of local economic
development initiatives applies only to those market failures caused
speciﬁcally by imperfect knowledge and information; it has very little
if any direct bearing upon any of these other sources of market failure.
Less widely acknowledged, however, is that in instances when
more than one market failure occurs simultaneously, actions taken to
improve some of the conditions will not necessarily improve the efﬁciency of the urban economy as a whole. Indeed, exactly this point—
that under conditions of multiple market failure the use of any sort of
public policy intervention will not necessarily improve the efﬁciency
of an economic system as a whole—was made formally in the general
theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956; Wolf 1988).
The theory of the second best stipulates that the existence of an efﬁcient market is not possible in the absence of the simultaneous fulﬁllment of a set of preconditions, all of which are jointly required to ensure
that every participant in the market is a price taker. These preconditions
speciﬁcally include zero entry and exit barriers, perfect information,
perfect factor mobility, zero transactions cost, nonincreasing returns to
scale, and homogeneous products across suppliers (Stigler 1957). Each
precondition is necessary, because for a market to be efﬁcient it must be
impossible for any given participant to inﬂuence prices in the market. If
any one of the preconditions is not fulﬁlled, some market participants
are apt to become price makers, and market failure is likely to occur.
Moreover, if in any given market more than one of the preconditions is
not fulﬁlled, multiple market failure occurs. In turn, when the existence
of an efﬁcient market is not possible, the best remaining outcome is the
“second best.”
The theory of the second best has the important negative corollary that the public policy implications of multiple market failure are
inherently ambiguous (Wolf 1979). That is, under conditions of multiple market failure it cannot be determined a priori exactly what the
second-best outcome would look like or how to attain it. Moreover, a
situation in which more, but not all, of the preconditions necessary for
fully efﬁcient markets are satisﬁed is not necessarily better than one
in which fewer are satisﬁed. The removal of any one of the constituent failures through a local economic development initiative may affect
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overall urban economic efﬁciency by raising it, lowering it, or leaving
it unchanged. But according to the theory of the second best there is no
theoretically sound and reliable way to tell which. The only thing certain is that the result will vary on a situation-by-situation basis. Local
economic development initiatives under multiple market failure conditions may be as likely to have a deleterious effect on the efﬁciency of
the overall urban economy as they are to have a positive one.
This line of reasoning begs the question: do midwestern industrial
urban economic systems contain multiple market failures? Certainly,
pioneering urban economist Wilbur Thompson (1968) thought so, as
have numerous subsequent urban scholars.9 As an illustration, land use
decisions in any given urban market are apt to be subject to a combination of market failures. Some of these failures are attributable to collective action problems (Foster 2011).10 Others are due to discrimination
in local housing markets (Herbert and Belsky 2008) and labor markets
(Brueckner and Zenou 2003), to externalities in local housing markets
(Dietz and Haurin 2003; Ewing 2008; Odland 1985), to capital market
imperfections and positive external effects on the local educational systems (De Fraja 2002), to congestion on nearby roads (Arnott and Small
1994; Downs 1962; Timilsina and Dulal 2011), to urban air pollution
(Kahn 2006), and to high information and transactions costs in ﬁnancial
systems (Levine 1997), among countless other challenges.
Both the concept of catallaxy and the theory of the second best thus
lead to a similar general conclusion: the existence of market failure does
not guarantee that local economic development initiatives designed and
implemented to correct such a problem will succeed. Decisions to use
local economic development initiatives in midwestern industrial cities
may or may not lead to outcomes that include greater prosperity. The
outcomes of using any given local economic development initiative
can be assessed only approximately and ideographically on the basis of
each individual case, and only using carefully designed and analyzed
empirical evidence.
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THE GOVERNMENT-FAILURE APPROACH TO LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Uncertainty and unpredictability are not only basic characteristics
of markets but also fundamental aspects of government failure. By
deﬁnition, this failure occurs in situations in which government has
“created inefﬁciencies because it should not have intervened in the ﬁrst
place or when it could have solved a given problem or set of problems more efﬁciently” (Winston 2006, pp. 2–3). Government failure
has to our knowledge not been widely considered in the local economic
development literature. With this type of failure, the goal of increased
prosperity would have been better served by analysis and application of
fundamental economic principles of free markets rather than by leaving decisions to the tacit knowledge of circumstance possessed by local
economic development authorities.
Both Austrian economic theory and the theory of the second best
lead to the inference that local economic development initiatives cannot as a rule be counted upon to reduce waste or to stimulate wealth
creation for average citizens. Nor can they be relied on to improve
efﬁciency in the allocation of resources beyond the level that would
otherwise have been feasible had the resources remained circulating in
the market. Accordingly, this provides a theoretical framework within
which misgivings about these initiatives are rational, logical, and consistent with evidence. The basic consideration is that the full range of
outcomes is and must remain uncertain and unpredictable until well
after the go-no-go decision is made with respect to any given local economic development initiative.
Intervention May Not Be the Answer
It is of signiﬁcance to note that in any situation in which a market failure is shown to exist, its presence alone does not necessarily
imply that intervention into the market can improve the situation. For
one reason, market failures may correct themselves. For another reason,
governments can fail, too. This could occur, for instance, in circumstances in which the decision to use a nonmarket allocation mechanism
is based upon ﬂawed or incomplete knowledge and shortsightedness,
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or when the relevant economic development authority, regardless of
any conscious intentions, is subjected to the inﬂuences of local growth
coalitions or other powerful special interests.
Logically, to be consistent with the market failure approach to economic development, decision makers deliberating a proposed initiative
must ﬁrst establish that a market failure exists. But this is not enough to
rationally justify the use of a proposed local economic development initiative. The decision makers must also ensure that all expected beneﬁts
of the proposal are at least equal to all the expected costs.
The existence of a market failure means that properly functioning
price signals are absent. In this situation, markets left alone will not
yield the most efﬁcient use of resources, and therefore will not generate the greatest feasible levels of prosperity. Demonstration of the
existence of a market failure is necessary for a local economic development initiative to be rational, because in situations in which there is no
market failure, reliance upon the unfettered market without government
intervention is the most likely way to create new wealth or prosperity.
At the same time, the existence of market failure is not a sufﬁcient condition for such an initiative to be rationally justiﬁed because of government failure. Much as the absence of the preconditions for an efﬁcient
market accounts for market failure, so the absence of the preconditions
for sound public sector decision making accounts for government failure. These preconditions include knowledge and information necessary
for economic calculation on behalf of economic development authorities, appropriate incentives, adequately conceptualized decision processes, no unanticipated behavioral responses, and no abuses of political power.11
If while considering a local economic development initiative decision makers fail to thoroughly consider both market failure and government failure, they cannot possibly tell in advance of its implementation
whether or not the costs of the initiative will or will not exceed the corresponding beneﬁts (Bartik 1997; Peters and Fisher 2004).
The Need for Beneﬁt-Cost Analysis
One of the best known ways to protect against situations in which
the costs of an initiative exceed the beneﬁts is through careful beneﬁtcost analysis. Beneﬁt-cost analysis is an underutilized framework for
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the planning and appraisal of policies and projects (Little and Mirrlees
1996). While there is little doubt that this type of analysis is imperfect,
if it is done properly it nevertheless makes the bases for decisions systematic and explicit. It thus forces decision makers to think clearly and
carefully about their choices and to make the rationale for them transparent and subject to wide public scrutiny and discussion. This occurs
through prescribing a set of steps by which decision makers carefully
consider all of the possible consequences or outcomes of a decision,
evaluate them, and determine whether the total beneﬁts promise to outweigh the total costs, and for whom.
Decision makers would, for example, explicitly deﬁne the objectives of a proposed local economic development initiative, specify the
alternative approaches to achieving the growth objectives, and estimate
the costs associated with the entire range of outcomes from each of
the alternative approaches, including all of the capital, operating, and
intangible factors, such as dislocations, aesthetic alterations, etc. The
beneﬁts would include any improvements in the efﬁciency of the urban
economic system, as well as changes in valuation of existing facilities
or businesses due to shifts in markets. A proposed initiative would be
undertaken only if its beneﬁts are at least as great as its costs.
In this light it is notable that neither massive out-migration from
cities nor the presence of too few jobs to support a population within a
city in and of itself constitutes evidence of market failure. Rather, even
in the presence of out-migration, markets may be working perfectly.
People and ﬁrms may simply be moving to avail themselves of greater
satisfactions, opportunities, or proﬁts at other locations. People tend to
migrate their residences to places at which, all else equal, the amenities
are better, the quality of life is higher, or the present value of increased
income in the new region is greater than the increased cost of living in
that area. Similarly, ﬁrms may migrate out of an urban core area to avail
themselves of greater potential proﬁts attributable to changes in production, communication, or transportation technology; relative prices of
factor inputs; or large-scale shifts in the location of service-consuming
populations. Observed out-migration only constitutes evidence of market failure when it can be shown that in its absence some people would
be better off without anyone else being made worse off, and that this is
not happening on its own. Thus, Pﬁster (1985) labeled the use of local
public policy to stem urban out-migration “pathological.”
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UNFATHOMABLE AND UNCERTAIN ASPECTS OF LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
Some of the decline in twentieth-century midwestern industrial
cities has undoubtedly been attributable to macro-scale economic and
geographical change, driven by recent advances in technologies and
over which urban policymakers have little or no control. Insofar as
these large-scale shifts were the primary cause of such decline, there is
no apparent a priori reason to suppose that market failures exist. And
insofar as no market failures exist, there is no good, theoretically sound
reason to think that the use of economic development initiatives will in
any signiﬁcant way stem further decline. Indeed, two causes of decline
that cannot be altered through local economic development initiatives
come immediately to mind.
Changing Preferences Enabled by Technology
The ﬁrst is that technological progress has made it increasingly
possible for people to realize their seemingly innate preferences for
living in places with relatively mild winters and under more satisfactory conditions. As noted by Andrew Thomas in Chapter 7, beginning
shortly after air conditioning became widely accessible, the population
of the United States has been steadily migrating from the Northeast
and Midwest to the South and West (Rappaport 2003). These preferences, and the associated large-scale migration, have also been enabled
by the changing composition of industry from heavy manufacturing to
services, since service industries are freer than manufacturing to locate
throughout the country. Also, the preferences of relatively afﬂuent residents to live under more satisfactory conditions, in conjunction with
comparatively inexpensive transportation, have led them to suburbs
and beyond, where the infrastructure and schools are in better condition, commercial corridors are available, housing stock is adequate,
and many of the problems of the inner city can be left behind. At least
insofar as the recent decline of twentieth-century midwestern industrial
cities has been driven by behaviors based on innate preferences and
enabled by technology, the use of local economic development initiatives is not likely to make much difference.
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Globalization
The second is globalization. Technological advancements, together
with relaxation of legal and other institutional restrictions on international trade, have forced ﬁrms in midwestern industrial cities to compete today as never before with businesses in other cities around the
country and the world (Amendola and Gaffard 1988; Antonelli 2001,
2003; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Geroski 1995; North 1991; Scotchmer 2004; Searle 2005). First and foremost among these cities are
those in China, as is described by Chieh-Chen Bowen earlier in this
book. Among other things, newly globalized competition means that
midwestern industrial cities are inextricably affected by inclusion in
or exclusion from global networks of information and ﬁnancial control
(Cohen 1981; Friedmann 1986; Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Neal 2011;
Sassen 1996). The levels of wealth and prosperity within these cities
have thus arguably become closely linked to, if not completely determined by, their positions in these networks.12
Moreover, ﬁrms in these cities must vie with companies in places
that have lower labor, energy, environmental compliance, and other
costs of production. They must thus compete within the context of vast
worldwide disparities in factors such as savings rates and rates of return
on capital investments, population size, wages, levels of migration, natural endowments, regulatory environments, and investment in research,
development and education, all of which in part determine the success
of rivals. Firms in midwestern industrial cities are in many ways at a
competitive disadvantage relative to similar businesses located in other
areas around the world. To the extent that the relative decline in the
preeminence of these cities has been attributable to globalization, the
use of local economic development initiatives cannot be reasonably
expected to signiﬁcantly ameliorate the corresponding urban problems.
It is somewhat easy to recognize and accept that historical and geographical drivers of change are of a scale that goes beyond anyone’s
complete comprehension. But we also tend to think that, even when
focusing only on events within local urban economic systems in the
Midwest, complete knowledge of the effects of many local economic
development initiatives is beyond the capacity of the human mind. This
argument is not only intuitive but it is consistent with considerable
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research on human psychological limitations and capacities (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Miller 1956; Simon 1974; Warﬁeld
1988). Thus, we ﬁnd ourselves inclined to suppose that the full range of
the causes of some of the perceived problems in Rust Belt cities is simply unfathomable. Local economic development initiatives responding
to these issues would, upon closer examination, be found to be attributable not so much to market failure as to the interests of political and
economic regimes, in combination with cultural and institutional traditions in which the intrinsic limitations on human knowledge are not
recognized. A moment’s reﬂection will reveal that this is not trivial.
It implies that problems of renewing prosperity are inseparable from
political and economic aspects of society as well as from human psychological incapacities and biases that characterize virtually all other
choices made under uncertainty. Decisions to use economic development policies are thus tied to the possibility of human error, not to mention undue political inﬂuence.
The Nature and Incidence of Beneﬁts
Do local economic development initiatives lead to a greater abundance of resources and a fuller life for average people and whole urban
populations, or only for a relatively small and exceptionally fortunate
segment thereof? Given that public revenues are used to fund nonmarket
allocation mechanisms, one might reasonably suppose that the taxpayers who bear the costs would have some legitimate claim to a commensurate portion of the rewards. What constitutes the basis upon which
legitimate claims to these beneﬁts does and should rest? What is the
minimally tolerable share of the gains due to any given taxpayer? These
and similar questions seem to us to be among the most difﬁcult and
complex in any serious consideration about using these mechanisms.
Especially when the levels of public funding for economic development initiatives are relatively large, they will have positive effects on
at least some segment of the local taxpaying population. But what if
this includes primarily or only a relatively limited subset of the relevant
taxpaying population, composed of, for instance, local landholders, real
estate ﬁrms, and companies with business and other ﬁnancial linkages
to the particular funding channels through which the public expenditures are provided?
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It is not always clear exactly who the beneﬁciaries of local economic development initiatives are and whether the incidence of the
beneﬁts reﬂects the incidence of costs. Proponents predictably assert
that the initiatives are conducive to the renewal of prosperity, but it is
rarely made clear how the validity of their assertions can be determined,
and it is rarer still that net beneﬁts over costs are actually demonstrated
in a thorough and impartial manner through an independent beneﬁtcost analysis. Seldom are clear and compelling arguments made that the
policies will lead to a greater abundance of resources and a fuller life
for average people within an urban system. Moreover, use of local economic development initiatives is not always consistent with the spirit
and principles of democratic governance, in which individual freedoms
and rights are core values and great weight is placed on local institutions that exercise public authority, leadership, and representation of
the interests of all citizens rather than only some (Selznick 1957, 1984).
Probably the most viable way to renew prosperity in midwestern
industrial cities is to rely as fully as possible on capitalist markets to
make allocation decisions. This is not to say that this approach would
always be wise or equitable. Rather it is to say that such reliance draws
to the greatest feasible extent on the use of prices for making allocations, puts the information in the hands of the dispersed individuals
most directly impacted by the decisions, and puts the proper incentives
on innovators and entrepreneurs competing in markets. It also provides
feedback about success and failure. These are all powerful systemic
factors in renewing prosperity. Moreover, it also puts individuals in situations in which their choices to participate or not in market exchanges
are voluntary.
At times, uncritical use of local economic development initiatives
has incurred huge costs in situations where no market failure has been
demonstrated. At other times, when market failures have clearly existed,
different approaches might have improved resource allocation in a much
more efﬁcient manner. This raises the practical difﬁculty of both identifying circumstances in which the use of local economic development
initiatives will improve efﬁciency and distinguishing them from those
in which it will not. Indeed, it may raise this difﬁculty beyond analytical
tractability. Nevertheless, because resource allocations must be decided
in some manner, and because the ways they are decided will with virtual certainty affect the renewal of prosperity in these cities, there is
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no choice but to exercise a value judgment on the matter. Accordingly,
our preference would be for less uncritical and unevaluated reliance
on local economic development initiatives, and more performance of
careful beneﬁt-cost analysis. Our suspicion is that given such scrutiny,
many of the policies would be very difﬁcult to justify.
In light of these considerations we would propose that prosperity
in midwestern industrial cities would be renewed most effectively by
establishing local rules and institutional arrangements whereby all proposed new local economic development initiatives must be accompanied by statements indicating their purpose, evidence that their design
will lead to the fulﬁllment of this purpose at acceptable cost, and a
clear rationale for why such a policy should be employed. Rather than
placing excessive reliance on local economic development initiatives
to renew prosperity in midwestern industrial cities, we would generally favor directing public funds primarily toward efﬁciently supplying
public goods and services and protecting the rights of individuals. Local
governments should, in our view, consider investing fewer resources
in economic development initiatives and more in areas such as establishing appropriate levels of centralization of authority in the public
sector, achieving an adequate degree of collective trust in public authority, and deﬁning and enforcing functional ownership arrangements and
property markets. Efforts to renew prosperity in these cities should be
directed toward creating and sustaining institutions that encourage the
fullest possible range of initiative and responsibility on behalf of private economic agents acting in pursuit of their own individual purposes.
Appropriate goals include developing and implementing institutional
arrangements that provide individuals with the greatest possible discretion about how they will use their private property (and to hold them
accountable for their choices), incentivizing the formation of competitive markets, ensuring low tax rates, and setting appropriate limitations
on the use of nonmarket allocation mechanisms.
Insofar as local governments get involved in renewing prosperity
past this point, the guiding principle should be to establish the conditions necessary for the operation of efﬁcient markets. These conditions
notably include adequate schools. Markets alone will not provide for
the lower strata of society to acquire sufﬁcient levels of the essential
skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Without these competencies,
a segment of the population in any urban economy will not be educated
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enough to make sound political judgments as participants in local democratic governance processes. In turn, without a suitably functioning
democratic system, autonomy, benevolence, trust, and free exchanges
are more likely to cease; human relations are more apt to assume the
sort of dominance/subordination relationships that characterize serfdom or slavery; and overall prosperity is more likely to decrease than
to increase.

CONCLUSION
Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that markets can fail
and that sometimes local economic development initiatives conceived
and implemented in the name of correcting the malfunction actually
improve efﬁciency. This poses a practical difﬁculty of evaluation in
that, while the list of market failures is long, the roster of successful
government interventions taken to correct them is somewhat shorter.
Moreover, while the difference between these inventories can be discussed in abstract terms, the effect of government action taken in
response to a market failure in any given situation can only be assessed
with empirical evidence.
But data and evidence alone will not resolve some of the basic public policy issues raised in this chapter. On the one hand is a popular
and widely accepted perspective that local ﬁscal policy should take an
active role in renewing prosperity, such as through efforts to reverse
out-migration from central cities, lower unemployment rates, stabilize
economies, and generally to intervene in markets when doing so arguably leads to improved collective welfare. On the other is an Austrian
economic perspective in which public ﬁscal policy cannot and should
not as a rule intervene in the market, and the theory of the second best,
according to which, under conditions of multiple market failure, the
outcomes of such intervention are unpredictable. These divergent perspectives are not resolvable on the basis of available empirical evidence
alone, due in large measure to the conceptual and theoretical nature of
the differences between them. At the same time, until these disagreements are satisfactorily resolved, no a posteriori ways will be available
to answer the question: what mix of public and private activities is most
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likely to lead to renewed prosperity in midwestern industrial cities?
The only remaining viable option is one of trial, error, data acquisition,
analysis, and adjustment.
If the use of economic development initiatives is to be consistent
with the spirit and principles of democratic governance, in which local
institutions exercise public authority, leadership, and representation of
the interests of all citizens rather than only some, these questions must
be considered seriously and at length in public discourse. Decisions
to use local economic development initiatives are thus not only about
production and consumption, but also about ethics and values. Is the
increment to economic output generated by a local economic development initiative worth more to society than what it displaces? How
greatly does the population value democratic governance? These are
but a couple of the wide range of ethical questions indissolubly tied up
with the use of these policies. Thus, in our view, the problems involved
are far too important and complex to be left only to economists of any
ilk, largely because they involve a great deal more than what is typically
considered to be “economic.”

Notes
1. While Buffalo may not be a midwestern city, it is clearly a Rust Belt city and is
thus included in the chapter.
2. Walters (2010) argues that any satisfactory explanation of the decline of U.S. cities must start with the treatment of capital and the security of property rights
within them, with particular emphasis on labor unions that reduce the returns to
capital.
3. Considerable evidence indicates that the lion’s share of the beneﬁts inure to the
highly paid players and team owners, concession suppliers, some nearby local
businesses, and businesses that buy season tickets as a means of increasing their
own ticket sales. Despite gross overestimates of newly created job numbers contained in promotional studies heavily funded by affected cities or teams, such
facilities are evidently built only with substantial net economic cost to the public
(Zimbalist 2006).
4. Many tax incentives are really public spending in disguise (Toder 2002, p. 66), but
it is easier to enact ineffective or unnecessary programs in the form of tax incentives than in the form of direct spending.
5. According to the deﬁnition used by the Census of Governments (2002), locally
generated general revenues are divided into three categories: 1) local taxes, 2)
charges, and 3) miscellaneous general revenues. Local taxes contain property,
individual income, general sales and use, motor fuel, corporate income, other

Bowen.indb 268

12/16/2013 2:14:40 PM

Misgivings about Local Economic Development Initiatives 269

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.
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selected sales, vehicle license, utility, and other taxes. Current charges include
higher education, hospital, sewerage, and other current charges. Miscellaneous
revenues include interest and other miscellaneous revenues. All were used for this
study. We did not include taxes on utility revenues such as electricity, water, and
other utility revenues, and insurance trust revenues. We calculated per-capita revenues by dividing locally generated total revenue in a county by that county’s
total population. Locally generated general revenue per $1,000 of county personal
income was calculated by dividing locally generated total revenues by total county
personal income and multiplying that value by $1,000. The data were from the
U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the 31 percent population loss in Detroit
between 1990 and 2010 was relatively greater than the population loss in any of
the other cities (Buffalo, 17 percent; Pittsburgh, 17 percent; St. Louis, 20 percent;
Cleveland, 22 percent; and Cincinnati, 18 percent). To the extent that this translated into correspondingly greater losses of property values and other components
of locally generated general revenues in Detroit vis-à-vis these other cities, this
would contribute to, if not completely account for, the slightly negative slope in
Detroit’s trend.
Hayek’s conception of knowledge in its practical aspect is much akin to what we
have variously heard referred to as “know how,” “tacit knowledge,” or “traditional
knowledge.”
The circumstances that reﬂect this concern are clearly illustrated in Bolick’s
(1993) description of the ways both liberals and conservatives miss the central
point about individual liberties that the framers of the U.S. Constitution had in
mind in the Bill of Rights as well as in the 9th and 14th Amendments. In providing
this description he cites speciﬁc examples in which actions of local governments
have wasted or misused tax dollars, imposed a particular set of social values on
people who do not subscribe to those values, interfered with voluntary, nonharmful economic activities, violated private property rights, and rearranged “opportunities for the beneﬁt of some and to the detriment of others” (p. 97).
Thompson (1968) argues that urban markets are in many ways profoundly distorted by widespread failure to rely sufﬁciently on price signals. He primarily
considered collectively consumed public goods, merit goods, and payments to
redistribute income.
Collective action problems occur when an individual’s contribution to the attainment of a common interest is unlikely to have sufﬁcient impact on the advancement of that interest to warrant the costs of political engagement. These problems
tend to give way on the demand side to the capture of the governance process by
special interests or rent seekers. On the supply side, they are associated with shorttermism and the monopoly characteristics of the political market.
The logic of government failure from a decision-making point of view is spelled
out clearly by Dörner (1996). It stems largely from unintended consequences that
tend to occur as a result of failure or neglect on behalf of government decision
makers to fully recognize and adequately consider the complexity involved in
their decision situations. The general set of circumstances may be described as
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follows. If two aspects of a given decision situation are interdependent, this means
that they are correlated. So let us suppose aspects A and B within a given city’s
economic system are correlated. Let us further suppose that an economic development authority wants to alter B to change a city’s growth path. B and C are known
to have a causal relationship, and B can be manipulated and changed at will. This
means that by altering the level of B, the ofﬁcial can alter the level of C, thereby
changing the growth path. But if the decision maker is not aware of the correlation
between A and B, in manipulating B to alter C she will also unknowingly alter A.
The change in A is indirect, and may not be recognized until much later, if ever.
However, the change in A is an unintended consequence of manipulating B to alter
C. If the consequences of changing A are signiﬁcant in some other aspect of the
urban economic system, and perhaps even deleterious, the actions taken to change
the growth path in one way may unintentionally create other, new problems, some
of which are as serious if not more serious than the original one.
12. Neal (2011) ﬁnds that the direction of the causal relationship between a city’s position in the global urban hierarchy and levels of employment goes from the position
in the hierarchy to urban employment growth, not vice versa.
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Lost a Step
The Great Lakes Region and Entrepreneurship
David R. Elkins
Cleveland State University

The Great Lakes region is often synonymous with the Rust Belt.
Those tracking the vitality of cities such as Buffalo, Chicago,
Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee see economies and populations that are now just fractions of what they once were. But is
this really the case? During the Second Industrial Revolution, the
Great Lakes region was the focus of intense entrepreneurial activity. Today, while it has lost some of that earlier dynamism, entrepreneurs remain a part of the region’s economy. With aggresive
and thoughtful policy actions, the region may reclaim some of its
former stature as a region attractive to entrepreneurs.

“Lost a step” is an adage directed at the older football player who
misses a well-thrown pass, the tennis player who fails to return a serve
with the ball just short of her racquet, the athlete who just doesn’t appear
to be the star he or she once was. A New York Times Magazine article
ruminated on the nature of the aging athlete, sports, and the New York
Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter. The article concluded with a quote from
the Yankees general manager, Brian Cashman, “‘He’s not the same
player he used to be,’ Cashman said. ‘But I think he’s above average at
that position, despite his age’” (Sokolove 2011).
“Lost a step” is apropos to the issue of entrepreneurialism in the
Great Lakes region, which once produced some of the major industries and fortunes that fueled the Gilded Age. Today that entrepreneurial
energy and dynamism appear to have drifted to other regions of the
United States and the world. For instance, in the high-technology ﬁeld
the most lionized entrepreneurial activities are associated with the West
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Coast and not with the industrial Midwest. Today, the entrepreneurial
image of the Great Lakes region, to the extent it has one, appears worn
and tattered. Is it an empirical reality that the Great Lakes region lacks
an entrepreneurial dynamic?
This is the central research question posed by this chapter, which
will ﬁrst explore the nature of entrepreneurship and what it means for
an economy. Next, it will present descriptive evidence tackling the issue
of whether the Great Lakes region has lost its entrepreneurial vigor.
Finally, statistical tests are performed to examine whether, controlling
for critical variables, the Great Lakes region has lost a step. The short
answer to this ﬁnal question is that it largely depends on how entrepreneurialism is measured. In one sense, the Great Lakes region has,
indeed, lost a step. However, like many seasoned athletes, it remains in
the game and competitive.

ENTREPRENEURS AND THE ECONOMY
Who is an entrepreneur and what does the entrepreneur do? Joseph
Schumpeter (1939) deﬁned the entrepreneur as an individual who carries out innovations. He suggested that an entrepreneur is neither a
profession nor a social class (p. 104; 1949, p. 78). Schumpeter argued
that “entrepreneurs come from all classes which at the time of their
emergence happen to exist” (p. 104). He also contended that entrepreneurs do not assume ﬁnancial risk; the entrepreneur risks reputation
but “loses other people’s money” (p. 104). By contrast, Knight (1921)
suggested that the assumption of risk and uncertainty was one of the
deﬁning features of the entrepreneur. In fact, Schumpeter’s notion that
entrepreneurs do not assume risk has been one of the most frequently
challenged of his contentions (Hébert and Link 1982, pp. 82–84).
Multiple streams of scholarship have developed in this area, typically contrasting entrepreneurs with nonentrepreneurs (Lundstrom
and Stevenson 2005). While at least one scholar suggests that entrepreneurs share distinct personality pathology (Gartner 2005), another
stream of literature submits that “special types of individuals create
entrepreneurship” (Thornton 1999, p. 22). Scholars have found that
entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to achieve (McCelland 1961)
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and by other nonpecuniary beneﬁts of entrepreneurial activity (Evans
and Leighton 1989; Hamilton 2000) and that they have higher tolerances for risk (Brockhaus 1982; Lazear 2004, 2005; Van Praag and
Cramer 2001). In general, entrepreneurs start their ventures at the point
at which they have reached maturity in both their careers and their lives.
Entrepreneurs with professional and educational training opt for such
training that reﬂects a managerial generalist approach (Lazear 2004,
2005). Access to capital is important for entrepreneurs, and research has
shown that individuals with greater access to funding are more likely to
be not only entrepreneurs but successful ones (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
and Rosen 1994). Some work suggests that inheritances are an important source of entrepreneurial capital (Branchﬂower and Oswald 1998),
while other research implies that inherited wealth has a limited effect
on entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004). Additional exploration
indicates that, although parental wealth has a positive impact on entrepreneurial self-employment, it is the parent’s self-employment, particularly successful parental self-employment, that may be the deﬁning
feature associated with the adult child’s trend toward entrepreneurial
self-employment (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000).
What do entrepreneurs do? The Schumpeterian notion is that the
entrepreneur is an innovator who brings ideas to markets. However,
after a lengthy survey of economic literature, economic historians
Robert F. Hébert and Albert N. Link suggest in their book The Entrepreneur (1982) that the entrepreneur varies by the theoretical context into which that individual is thrust (Hébert and Link 1982, pp.
107–110). At its basic level, the entrepreneur is engaged in both the
assumption of risk and innovation. Stated more simply, Shackle, in his
introduction to Hébert and Link’s book, notes, “the entrepreneur is a
man whose characteristic act is a gamble on his imagination” (Shackle
1982, p. viii). Acs and Armington (2006) suggest that entrepreneurship
is “what happens at the intersection of history and new technology”
(p. 7). Baumol (2010) underscores this idea by noting that there are
innovators and replicators. He deﬁnes the innovative entrepreneur as
one ﬁtting the Schumpeterian model, whose job is “to locate new ideas
and to put them into effect” (p. 18). The role of the entrepreneur in
the economic system is that of a destabilizing catalyst for economic
growth, who “sparks” the economic system and thereby generates
economic expansion. The entrepreneur thus acts to transform knowl-
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edge into “economic knowledge that otherwise would have remained
uncommercialized” (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004, p. 608).

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION
During the Second Industrial Revolution roughly between the 1840s
and the early part of the twentieth century, the Great Lakes region was
ﬁlled with entrepreneurial activity. Landes (1969) characterizes this
period as having been shaped by “electric power and motors; organic
chemistry and synthetics, the internal-combustion engine and automotive devices, precision manufacture and assembly-line production—a
cluster of innovations that have earned the name of the Second Industrial Revolution” (p. 235). Schmookler (1966) argues that invention and
innovation are not the mere happenstance of noneconomic actors but
that they are central to economic enterprise. Further supporting Schumpeter’s (1939) argument, Shane’s (1996) empirical analysis prompts
him to observe that “rates of technological change drive rates of entrepreneurship” (p. 773). Figure 11.1 illustrates the rapid expansion of
technological innovation, as shown by the number of U.S. patents per
100,000 population for each year between 1840 and 20000.1 Around
1850, coinciding with the start of the Second Industrial Revolution,
there was a sharp increase in the number of patents, and this level of
innovative activity remained high for nearly 100 years. While drawing
ﬁrm conclusions about economic activity from patent data is problematic (Schmookler 1966; Worgman and Nunn 2002), the statistics are
suggestive of the economic expansion taking place in the United States.
It just so happens that this surge in invention and innovation coincided
with a rapid expansion of the population of the Great Lakes region.2
Figure 11.2 illustrates the scope of the Great Lakes regional population expansion. The solid line indicates the decade-to-decade percentage change of the total U.S. population, and the dashed line depicts the
decade-to-decade percentage change in the population for the counties
containing ﬁve major Great Lakes cities.3 For many decades the decennial growth of these counties far exceeded the growth of the United
States. According to U.S. Census ﬁgures, these ﬁve counties had fewer
than 250,000 persons combined in 1840, but by 1930 they had well over
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Figure 11.1 Patent Rate, 1840–2000
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8 million, accounting for over 7 percent of the total U.S. population.
It is worth noting that prior to 1860, no Great Lakes city was ranked
in the nation’s top 10 by population. However, beginning in 1860 and
for decades thereafter, Great Lakes cities would emerge as some of the
largest in the country (Gibson 1998). McClelland (1961) ﬁnds that the
surge in his measure of “achievement motivation” coincided with the
jump in patent issuances. It seems plausible that the growth in population, invention and innovation, and the desire to achieve found fertile
entrepreneurial ground in the Great Lakes region. Certainly, between
1840 and the start of the Great Depression, cities in the area thrived,
as did the entrepreneurs who called these places home. Indeed, some
scholars have compared the dynamism of the Great Lakes region
to that which occurred during California’s high technology boom
(Klepper 2009; Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokoloff 2006).
In recent years, this area has been viewed as home to old manufacturing centers enduring steep declines in production and employment
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Figure 11.2 Percentage Change in Population for the United States and
Selected Great Lakes Counties, 1850–2000
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(Hill and Negrey 1987). As depicted in Figure 11.2, the decennial percentage growth for the region either kept pace with or exceeded that of
the nation for nearly a century. However, since 1960 the trend shows a
region lagging substantially behind the rest of the nation in population
growth, a phenomenon that has led some to describe the area as decaying and abandoned. For instance, in 1985 the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago (FRBC) (1985) suggested that too many observers think of
the Great Lakes states as the “sick old man” of the United States (p. v).
Still, the FRBC underscored that this was not an entirely accurate image.
Later, for instance, Negrey and Zickel (1994) noted that the region is
home to metropolitan areas that are both “stable transition centers” and
“innovation centers” (p. 35). More recently, Acs and Armington (2006)
have commented, “The South and the West have the strongest new ﬁrm
start-up rates, while the Northeast and the Midwest, which were formerly characterized by large-scale manufacturing, generally continue
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to lag behind the rest of the country” (p. 53). Clearly, the region trails
in many areas. Its population is growing more slowly than is that of
much of the United States. Many of its central cities have lost signiﬁcant population due to out-migration to either nearby suburban areas or
other parts of the country. The nature of this long-term decline raises the
chief question for this chapter: Relative to other regions of the United
States, is entrepreneurship lagging in the Great Lakes region?

DATA AND METHODS
Proximity to the Great Lakes directly affects the region and its
population. From commerce to leisure, this connection is fundamental.
For the purposes of this chapter, the Great Lakes region is inclusive
of both urbanized and rural areas and is deﬁned here as any county
that is contiguous to one of the Great Lakes and any county bordering
that county. For example, Wayne County, Michigan, adjoins Lake Erie.
Wayne County is deﬁned as part of the Great Lakes region, along with
its two neighboring counties, Oakland County and Washtenaw County.
In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides a list of counties that are relevant to this list.4 According to the
deﬁnition used in this chapter, the Great Lakes region consists of 178
counties across 8 states. For this analysis, however, because of missing or otherwise unreported data, only 146 of these 178 counties are
included in this designation.5
This regional deﬁnition is unambiguously narrow. It is used to identify the core of the region and to exclude those areas that are geographically peripheral. This approach avoids some of the pitfalls of deﬁning
regions by the states that they contain. For instance, if all of New York
State were included in a deﬁnition of the Great Lakes region, the region
would include New York City and Buffalo.
Three measurements of entrepreneurial activity will be used: 1)
business establishments per 1,000 labor force (business density); 2) percent self-employed individuals (percent self-employed; Branchﬂower
and Oswald [1998]); and 3) business establishment “births” per 1,000
labor force (business birth rate; Acs and Armington [2004, 2006]). Each
method covers some feature of the conceptual notion of entrepreneur-
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ship. For instance, business density provides a generalized notion of
commercial activity and, perhaps, reﬂects the idea that members of
the business community perceive opportunity. The number of business
establishment births provides a direct indicator of entrepreneurial activity. The ratio of business births to business deaths is not included in
this analysis because the key issue is an examination of entrepreneurial
business starts and not entrepreneurial success. Stated another way, this
chapter explores whether entrepreneurialism occurs and not whether it
is successful. Finally, percent self-employed provides a measure of the
degree to which individuals alone are engaged in entrepreneurial activity. The data for business density and business establishment births are
derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns, and
the data for self-employed individuals are derived from the U.S. Social
Security Administration (2011).
Table 11.1 provides the means and standard deviations for each
of the three indicators of entrepreneurship. Several points are established in the table. First, the regions vary in entrepreneurial activity.
For instance, the Great Lakes region’s business density has a mean of
4.71 (standard deviation [sd] = 1.09), which means 4.71 business establishments per 1,000 members of the labor force. This places the business density of the counties of the Great Lakes region above that of
the counties in the South but below that of every other region. Second,
the variation among the regions for each of these variables is statistically signiﬁcant.6 Third, a pattern emerges that places the counties of
the Great Lakes region at or near the bottom among these measures
and the West’s counties at either the top or near the top. Finally, the
Great Lakes’ counties, for every measure, fall below the average for all
the counties. For example, the Great Lakes’ counties mean for percent
self-employed is 10.5 (sd = 0.04); however the total for all counties,
including the Great Lakes’ counties, is 12.4 (sd = 0.05). This snapshot
of the nature of the Great Lakes region depicts an area that, while still
engaged in entrepreneurial activity, lags behind the nation as a whole
and most all other regions. Despite these apparent regional differences,
it is important to determine, once controlling for variables linked to
entrepreneurship, whether the Great Lakes region lacks the same degree
of entrepreneurship as do other regions in the United States.
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Table 11.1 County Business Density, Percent Self-Employed, and
Business Birth Rate by Region, 2008
Region
Business density
% self-employed Business birth rate
Great Lakesa
4.71
10.49
3.99
(n = 146)
(1.09)
(0.04)
(1.19)
Northeastb
5.03
11.32
4.14
(n = 183)
(1.25)
(0.04)
(1.28)
Midwestc
4.80
13.06
3.66
(n = 509)
(1.07)
(0.06)
(1.06)
Southd
4.60
12.41
4.15
(n = 884)
(1.37)
(0.04)
(1.40)
Weste
5.71
13.03
5.74
(n = 249)
(1.92)
(0.05)
(2.31)
Total
4.83
12.41
4.21
(N = 1,971)
(1.40)
(0.05)
(1.57)
NOTE: Means are reported, with standard deviations in parentheses.
a
Includes all counties bordering the Great Lakes and their contiguous counties across
eight states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin.
b
Includes all counties in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont. New York and Pennsylvania counties not deﬁned
as Great Lakes counties are deﬁned as Northeast region counties.
c
Includes all counties in Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South
Dakota. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin counties not
deﬁned as Great Lakes counties are deﬁned as Midwest region counties.
d
Includes all counties in the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
e
Includes all counties in the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008); U.S. Social Security Administration (2011).

Analysis of Entrepreneurship
Scholars have found a number of variables associated with entrepreneurship. Age is one of these factors. The notion behind entrepreneur’s age is that over time individuals develop knowledge (both formal and experiential), reputations within their ﬁelds, and a degree of
communication acumen. At a point in life, a person may view a propitious moment to leverage these traits and go into an entrepreneurial
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venture. By contrast, as individuals become older they are less willing
to bear risk: “[A]ge has a curvilinear relationship with the exploitation
of opportunity,” as noted by Shane (2003, p. 95). For the purposes of
this analysis, it is anticipated that there will be a positive relationship
between the median age of a county’s population and entrepreneurial
activity.
Secondly, most empirical research on entrepreneurs ﬁnds that they
have relatively extensive formal education. While formal schooling is
not required to engage in entrepreneurial efforts, those entrepreneurs
who are successful frequently have higher levels of education (Brüderl,
Preisendörfer, and Ziegler 1992; Van Praag and Cramer 2001). As part
of a theoretical approach advocating the importance of human capital,
education has been linked empirically with measures of U.S. economic
growth (Hoyman and Faricy 2008). I expect that the proportion of a
county’s population that is college educated is positively associated
with entrepreneurial activity and measure the college-educated population as the percentage of people aged 25 years or older in a county who
have at least a bachelor’s degree.7
A third variable is immigration. A number of scholars have noted that
some immigrant groups trend toward entrepreneurial self-employment
and that this is a signiﬁcant feature of the immigrant experience (Borjas 1986). Researchers suggest several reasons immigrants are involved
in entrepreneurial self-employment. For instance, they may do so
because of their lack of adequate English language skills, the possibility to reduce labor costs by recruiting family members as employees,
the potential absence of host-country recognition for their educational
credentials, and a more generalized host-country hostility (Bonacich
1973; Evans 1989; Portes and Jensen 1989; Sanders and Nee 1996;
Wilson and Portes 1980). While some immigrant groups may be drawn
toward self-employment, it may also be that as self-selected migrants
they have a greater degree of entrepreneurial spirit than others. For
example, Saxenian (2002) ﬁnds that immigrant labor is a vital component of the Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial success. Also, it is not clear
that immigrants are prompting greater entrepreneurship; immigrants’
location decisions may be driven by a desire to locate in areas of the
country where they believe they will have the most economic opportunity. Unlike native-born residents, who may have familial obligations
and attachments that increase domestic relocation costs, immigrants
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may have comparatively lower costs and be freer to select where to live.
I anticipate that the percentage of foreign-born population in a county
will be positively associated with entrepreneurship.8
Another variable associated with entrepreneurship is taxation.
There is a debate in the literature regarding taxation’s role in entrepreneurial behavior. One stream of research suggests that a higher marginal
tax rate in a progressive tax system depresses entrepreneurialism (Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Shane 2003). Shane (2003) suggests, “Higher
marginal tax rates make people less willing to accept variable earning,
thus decreasing the likelihood of self-employment” and they “reduce
people’s perception of the proﬁtability of exploiting opportunities”
(p. 153). Additional scholars have found that tax rates affect other features of entrepreneurial behavior. For instance, one study suggests that
when the marginal tax rates of self-employed entrepreneurs increase,
they are less likely to hire more employees (Carroll et al. 2000, p. 349).
Bartik (1985) ﬁnds that higher marginal corporate tax rates are linked
with a slight decline in new manufacturing plants among the states.
By contrast, a separate stream of literature suggests that higher
marginal tax rates compel individuals toward self-employment, a measure of entrepreneurship, to avoid tax obligations (Blau 1987; Bruce
2000; Schuetze 2000). As Blau (1987) states, “The main effect of
higher tax rates is expected to be an increase in self-employment due
to the increased attractiveness of underreporting income at higher tax
rates and the presumed greater ease of underreporting self-employment
income relative to wage-salary income” (p. 457). Clearly, to the extent
that entrepreneurs are less risk averse, pursuing tax avoidance represents a risk-taking venture. For the purposes of this analysis, no position is taken on the underlying theoretical motivations of entrepreneurs
and taxation. However, the expectation is that taxation will have some
inﬂuence on the degree of a county’s entrepreneurship. Taxation will be
measured as a statewide variable of per-capita individual income tax as
of 2008 (Council of State Governments 2010).9
An economically related variable is unemployment. Some suggest
that joblessness may prompt individuals toward self-employment. The
argument is that should an individual become unemployed, a reasonable response might be to form a new business (Reynolds 1994). To
that extent, it is anticipated that counties with higher levels of unemployment will see higher levels of entrepreneurial behavior. Still, other
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research has strongly indicated that capital is a critical element of the
entrepreneurial effort. To the extent that unemployment suggests a lagging economy, there may simply be less start-up capital available to
initiate an entrepreneurial venture, no matter how much a potential
entrepreneur may desire to do so. To that end, an alternative expectation is that unemployment will be inversely associated with entrepreneurialism. The variable used here is the county’s unemployment rate
for 2008, derived from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area
Unemployment Statistics.
Because many counties have varying degrees of an urban-rural
split, I include a variable depicting the percentage of rural population
for each county. The reasoning is that in more rural areas one may ﬁnd
entrepreneurialism captured by self-ownership of family farms and
other enterprises. The variable is an eight-year extrapolation between
the census counts of the years 2000 and 2010 for the percentage of
urban population.
Finally, region is measured as a dichotomous dummy variable. For
instance, the analysis will identify those counties deﬁned as part of the
Great Lakes region as 1 and all others as 0. This method will be used
for all other regions as well (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West).
The following ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations examine each
region separately. If the assumption that the Great Lakes region is lagging in its entrepreneurial activity is correct, it is expected that each
of the following OLS estimates will be both statistically signiﬁcant
and negative. Before proceeding to that feature of this analysis, a brief
examination of the descriptive statistics is in order.
Reported in Table 11.2 are the summary statistics for the control
variables by the ﬁve regions. Among the control variables, the Northeast counties have the highest mean value for median age and the West
has the lowest value. By contrast, the Northeast counties, on average,
have a high proportion of their populations with bachelor’s degrees. For
example, among the valid data used for this analysis, nearly one-quarter
(24.6 percent, n = 45) of Northeast counties have populations where
one-third has bachelor’s degrees. In comparison, only nine of the Great
Lakes counties report such a statistic. The counties of the West show
populations that are nearly as well educated.
Counties of the West and the Northeast have the greatest proportion of foreign-born population, while the Midwest and the Great Lakes
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Table 11.2 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables by Regional Counties
Variables
Median age, 2008 (est.)
Percent bachelor’s degree,
2006–2010
Percent foreign born,
2006–2010
Unemployment rate, 2008
State-level per-capita
income tax, 2008 ($)
Percent rural, 2008 (est.)

Great
Lakes
N = 146
39.20
(3.14)
21.04
(7.74)
3.55
(3.41)
7.29
(1.76)
1,009.95
(416.77)
51.40
(26.89)

Northeast
N = 183
40.14
(2.73)
26.97
(9.73)
7.26
(8.18)
5.49
(1.05)
1,256.39
(531.17)
41.70
(29.80)

Midwest
N = 509
38.54
(3.85)
20.18
(7.90)
2.86
(3.08)
5.47
(1.59)
930.60
(289.66)
50.81
(25.55)

South
N = 884
37.41
(3.69)
19.21
(9.10)
4.95
(5.29)
5.87
(1.80)
648.75
(449.32)
50.34
(27.48)

West
N = 249
36.89
(4.91)
25.15
(10.37)
9.74
(7.80)
6.09
(2.54)
848.58
(551.97)
35.42
(25.89)

NOTE: Means are reported with standard deviation (in parentheses).
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2009, 2011a,
2012); U.S. Department of Labor (2008).

counties have the lowest values. To provide some further perspective,
this variable is divided into three categories. According to 2010 census
ﬁgures, 12.9 percent of the population is foreign born (Grieco et al.
2012). Using the 12.9 percent ﬁgure, three foreign-born population categories were created: 1) 6.5 percent and less (half the 12.9 percent ﬁgure); 2) between 6.5 and 12.9 percent; and 3) 12.9 percent and greater.
More than 9 out of 10 Midwest counties (90.0 percent, n = 458) have
less than half the U.S. average for foreign-born population. The proportions are nearly identical for Great Lakes region counties (88.4 percent,
n = 129). However, over a quarter (26.9 percent, n = 67) of the West
region counties have proportions of foreign-born populations above the
national average.
Turning to economic variables, this cross-sectional analysis depicts
the Great Lakes region with the highest mean unemployment rate at
7.28 percent (sd = 1.75). By contrast, the Midwest and Northeast counties have the lowest mean unemployment rates. Finally, the per-capita
personal income tax is greatest in the Northeast counties and lowest in
the South.
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Regression Findings
In Tables 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5 the OLS results are presented for each
of the dependent variables. Table 11.3 depicts the OLS outcomes for
business density with the control variables and the regional dummy variables, which conﬁrm many of the ﬁndings of previous scholars studying
entrepreneurship. The data indicate that counties with higher median
ages and larger proportions of their populations with bachelor’s degrees
are positively associated with business density. In addition, the analysis
suggests that unemployment is inversely associated with the business
density variable. This offers some support for the notion that economic
challenges depress entrepreneurship rather than inspiring it. Among the
regional variables, the Northeast, the South, and the West show statistically signiﬁcant results. The Northeast and the South regions report
inverse relationships with the business density variable, −0.537 and
−0.183, respectively. This suggests that these regions’ counties have
lower business densities than other regions’ counties, all other things
being equal. By contrast, the West regional variable shows a positive,
statistically signiﬁcant result (0.937), indicating that this region’s counties have greater business density. Finally, in the Great Lakes region the
estimate is negative, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 11.4 illustrates the regression data for the percent selfemployed. As with the business density variable from the previous table,
the results depicted in Table 11.4 provide support for much of the previous scholarship in this ﬁeld. Across most categories depicted in Table
11.4, the control variables are statistically signiﬁcant. Age and percent
foreign born are positively associated with percent self-employed. By
contrast, the unemployment rate and a state’s tax burden are inversely
associated with percent self-employment. The percent of population
with bachelor’s degree fails to attain statistical signiﬁcance. According
to these ﬁndings, a county’s percent self-employed is independent of
its population proportion of college educated. Finally, the percent rural
variable has a positive, statistically signiﬁcant result, indicating that the
greater the rural proportion of a county, the greater the proportion of
self-employed residents.
Table 11.4 indicates that counties in both the Great Lakes and Northeast regions have statistically signiﬁcant, inverse associations with percent self-employed. These results suggest that, in general, a county in
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Table 11.3 Multivariate Linear Regression Results for Business
Density, 2008
Regional analysis
Control
Variables
variables
Constant
−0.828***
(0.320)
Median age, 2008
0.123***
(est.)
(0.007)
Percent bachelor’s
0.062**
degree, 2006–2010 (0.004)
Percent foreign born,
0.009
2006–2010
(0.006)
Unemployment rate, −0.045***
2008
(0.016)
State-level income
−0.106
tax, 2008
(0.059)
Percent rural, 2008
−0.028
(est.)
(0.122)
Great Lakes

Great
Lakes
−0.889***
(0.322)
0.124***
(0.007)
0.062***
(0.004)
0.008
(0.006)
−0.039**
(0.017)
−0.099
(0.059)
−0.031
(0.122)
−0.157
(0.108)

Northeast

Northeast
−1.209***
(0.325)
0.131***
(0.008)
0.064***
(0.004)
0.011**
(0.006)
−0.046***
(0.016)
0.030
(0.060)
−0.035
(0.121)

Midwest
−0.807**
(0.322)
0.123***
(0.007)
0.062***
(0.004)
0.008
(0.006)
−0.046***
(0.016)
−0.101
(0.060)
−0.031
(0.122)

South
−0.537
(0.333)
0.120***
(0.008)
0.060***
(0.004)
0.010
(0.006)
−0.048***
(0.016)
−0.163***
(0.062)
−0.003
(0.122)

−0.537***
(0.101)

Midwest

−0.039
(0.065)

South

−0.183***
(0.059)

West
Adjusted R2
N

West
−0.798***
(0.310)
0.124***
(0.007)
0.059***
(0.004)
−0.005
(0.006)
−0.061***
(0.016)
−0.093
(0.057)
−0.005
(0.118)

0.258
1,971

0.259
1,971

0.269
1,971

0.258
1,971

0.262
1,971

0.937***
(0.083)
0.303
1,971

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009,
2011a,b, 2012); U.S. Department of Labor (2008).

either the Northeast or Great Lakes regions will report nearly 2 percent
fewer self-employed. By contrast, positive coefﬁcients are associated
with both the Midwest and West dummy variables. This indicates that
counties in the Midwest and the West regions are likely to have moderately greater levels of self-employment than are those counties not
in these regions. While the West dummy variable’s positive coefﬁcient
is as anticipated, the Midwest variable’s positive relationship is unex-
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Table 11.4 Multivariate Linear Regression Results for Percent SelfEmployed, 2008
Regional analysis
Control
Variables
variables
Constant
−0.015
(0.011)
Median age, 2008
0.003***
(est.)
(0.000)
Percent bachelor’s
0.000
degree, 2006–2010 (0.000)
Percent foreign born,
0.002***
2006–2010
(0.000)
Unemployment rate,
−0.003***
2008
(0.001)
State-level income
−0.009***
tax, 2008
(0.002)
Percent rural, 2008
0.074***
(est.)
(0.004)
Great Lakes

Great
Lakes
−0.023*
(0.011)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
−0.002***
(0.001)
−0.008***
(0.002)
0.074***
(0.004)
−0.020***
(0.004)

Northeast

Northeast
−0.029**
(0.011)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
−0.003***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.002)
0.074***
(0.004)

Midwest
−0.020
(0.011)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
−0.003***
(0.001)
−0.010***
(0.002)
0.075***
(0.004)

South
−0.011
(0.011)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
−0.003***
(0.001)
−0.009***
(0.002)
0.075***
(0.004)

−0.019***
(0.003)

Midwest

0.009***
(0.002)

South

−0.003
(0.002)

West
Adjusted R2
N

West
−0.015
(0.011)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
−0.003***
(0.001)
−0.008***
(0.002)
0.075***
(0.004)

0.257
1,971

0.266
1,971

0.266
1,971

0.261
1,971

0.255
1,971

0.015***
(0.003)
0.265
1,971

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009,
2011a,b, 2012); U.S. Department of Labor (2008).

pected. To some degree, the prevailing stereotype is that this region
is not associated with exceptional entrepreneurial activity. Part of this
result may be explained by the way the Great Lakes dummy variable
has been created. That is to say, other deﬁnitions of the Midwest region
frequently include counties of the Great Lakes. The deﬁnition used in
this chapter creates a discrete Great Lakes counties variable. By excluding those counties from the Midwest variable designation, the Midwest
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dummy variable’s results suggest that the drag on the Midwest’s economic dynamism may be associated with those counties in and around
the Great Lakes. The result of the Great Lakes dummy variable does
support the notion that the counties of this region are lagging in entrepreneurial activity.
Table 11.5 depicts the OLS results for the ﬁnal dependent variable,
the business birth rate. Among the control variables, age, education,
and foreign-born population are statistically signiﬁcant and positively
associated with the business birth rate. While the unemployment rate
is not statistically signiﬁcant in these results, the variable representing
the tax burden is statistically signiﬁcant with across-the-board negative
coefﬁcients. As with the percent self-employment dependent variable,
the percent rural variable’s positive coefﬁcient indicates that the less
urbanized a county is, the more business births that county is likely to
experience. The regional variables depict results consistent with previous analyses. First, the Northeast dummy variable has a negative coefﬁcient with the business birth rate. Second, the West dummy variable has
a positive coefﬁcient with the business birth rate. Unlike the Midwest
dummy variable’s positive association with percent self-employment,
the variable has a statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient with the
business birth rate. By contrast, the South and the Great Lakes dummy
variables do not achieve statistical signiﬁcance with the dependent variable. The South dummy variable has a positive but not statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. The Great Lakes dummy variable is negative, but it
is not a statistically signiﬁcant result.
Table 11.6 provides a summary of the various statistical tests for
each of the dependent variables. In general, the results depicted in these
statistical tests conﬁrm much of the scholarship examining entrepreneurial activity. The consistent or near-consistent outcomes for many
of the control variables suggest that in counties with relatively better
educated and older populations there is greater probability of entrepreneurial activity. A relatively larger foreign-born population is also associated with entrepreneurial activity, and rural areas report consistent
degrees of entrepreneurial activity. By contrast, the economic and tax
burdens can, according to this cross-sectional analysis, depress entrepreneurial activity.
Turning to the regional analysis, there are some consistent results
that comport with both previous research and conventional wisdom.
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Table 11.5 Multivariate Linear Regression Results for Business Birth
Rate, 2008
Regional analysis
Control
Great
Variables
variables
Lakes
Constant
−0.728** −0.805**
(0.352)
(0.355)
Median age, 2008
0.086*** 0.087***
(est.)
(0.008)
(0.008)
Percent bachelor’s
0.083*** 0.084***
degree, 2006–2010 (0.004)
(0.004)
Percent foreign born,
0.042*** 0.041***
2006–2010
(0.006)
(0.006)
Unemployment rate,
0.002
0.009
2008
(0.018)
(0.018)
State-level income
−0.557*** −0.548***
tax, 2008
(0.065)
(0.065)
Percent rural, 2008
0.291**
0.287***
(est.)
(0.134)
(0.134)
Great Lakes
−0.198
(0.119)
Northeast

Northeast
−1.257***
(0.357)
0.098***
(0.008)
0.087***
(0.004)
0.046***
(0.006)
0.000
(0.018)
−0.451***
(0.066)
0.281**
(0.133)

Midwest
−0.425
(0.349)
0.087***
(0.008)
0.081***
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.006)
−0.019
(0.018)
−0.476***
(0.065)
0.244
(0.132)

South
−0.881**
(0.367)
0.088***
(0.008)
0.084***
(0.004)
0.042***
(0.006)
0.003
(0.018)
−0.527***
(0.068)
0.277**
(0.134)

−0.744***
(0.110)

Midwest

−0.567***
(0.070)

South

0.096
(0.066)

West
Adjusted R2
N

West
−0.682**
(0.331)
0.088***
(0.008)
0.079***
(0.004)
0.021***
(0.006)
−0.022
(0.017)
−0.536***
(0.061)
0.326***
(0.126)

0.285
1,971

0.286
1,971

0.308
1,971

0.308
1,971

0.286
1,971

1.445***
(0.089)
0.369
1,971

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009,
2011a,b, 2012); U.S. Department of Labor (2008).

Across all three dependent variables, counties of the West are positively
associated with business density, self-employment, and business births.
To the extent that the three dependent variables represent features of
entrepreneurship, the strong impression is that the West is leading in
entrepreneurial efforts. By contrast, a different result is apparent for
Northeast counties. For the Northeast, the evidence indicates that business density, self-employment, and business births are relatively lower
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Table 11.6 Summary Results of Statistical Tests for Business Density
Rate, Percent Self-Employed, and Business Birth Rate
Business
Percent
Business
Variables
density rate self-employed
birth rate
Median age, 2008 (est.)
+
+
+
Percent bachelor’s degree,
+
+
2006–2010
Percent foreign born,
+
+
2006–2010
Unemployment rate, 2008
−
−
State-level individual
−
−
income tax, 2008
Percent rural, 2008 (est.)
+
+
Great Lakes
−
Northeast
−
−
−
Midwest
+
−
South
−
West
+
+
+
SOURCE: Tables 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5.

than found in non-Northeast counties. However, the interpretation of
the results for the counties of the Great Lakes must be guarded. In
only one of the dependent variables, percent self-employed, does this
regional variable report statistical signiﬁcance.

ENTREPRENEURIAL POLICY AND THE GREAT LAKES
What strategies may be offered given the mixed empirical results
for the Great Lakes region? As stated by Eisinger (1995), entrepreneurial policies, particularly state-based ones, are “designed to foster indigenous ﬁrms and local entrepreneurial capabilities” (p. 147).
Eisinger (1988) once argued that entrepreneurial economic development policies were emerging as an important feature of a state’s overall
portfolio of developmental initiatives and as a movement away from
the strategy of industrial relocation policies. However, a few years after
making that claim, Eisinger (1995) suggested that as policy learning
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took place, state development policy evolved in other directions. Saiz
(2001) argues that the underlying motive for this policy shift was one
of context. He suggests that states strategically retreated from entrepreneurial policies once confronted with the possibility of losing business
to neighboring states competing for industrial relocation.
Another reason for this shift among state policymakers is that they
have few tangible incentives to initiate entrepreneurial policies. As Hart
(2008) observes,
[T]he puzzle for political scientists is why entrepreneurial state
ED [economic development] strategies have caught on. Their economic and programmatic promise notwithstanding, their political
logic seems to contain neither rent seeking nor credit claiming.
At least at ﬁrst glance, the direct beneﬁciaries of entrepreneurial
strategies appear to be far more widely diffused and poorly organized than those of locational strategies. In fact, in the case of
future start-ups, the individual beneﬁciaries are unknown and the
corporate beneﬁciaries, nonexistent. Most of the economic gains
that these beneﬁciaries produce will emerge long after those who
instigated the policies have left ofﬁce. The credit for this economic
success, if it can be claimed by any policy makers at all, will not
accrue to the instigators of the strategy, but rather their successors
in ofﬁce. (p. 154)

A full examination of state-based entrepreneurial policies is beyond
the scope of this chapter. However, one place to start would be to analyze the degree to which the variables empirically associated with
entrepreneurship may be used to capture some features of the regions,
an approach that may help policymakers identify strengths and weaknesses they may wish to address. Logistic regression is used, with each
region deﬁned as a binomial dependent variable. A county is assigned
to its constituent region, coded one if it is in a region and otherwise a
zero. Next, each independent variable associated with entrepreneurship
regression analysis is used to detect regional features.
As depicted in Table 11.7, the Great Lakes region, in the ﬁrst column, indicates with its positive coefﬁcients for median age and education that it is presumably well positioned for entrepreneurship. However, the Great Lakes region is also deﬁned by its unemployment,
and to that extent unemployment may act as a drag on entrepreneurial
activities. For policymakers, the inverse coefﬁcient with percent for-
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eign born strongly suggests that the region’s public and private sector
leaders should attempt to ﬁnd ways to make the area more attractive to
immigrants. It is clear that some of the region’s leaders are moving to
address this issue.
Recently, the city of Chicago passed what its ofﬁcials call a “Welcoming City” ordinance. In addition, Mayor Rahm Emanuel declared
his desire to make Chicago the most immigrant-friendly city in the
United States (City of Chicago 2012). The largely symbolic ordinance
was seen as a response to the anti-immigrant measures being adopted
in some states (Hufﬁngton Post 2012). Still, the underlying desire on
the part of ofﬁcials in the Great Lakes region to attract immigrants is to
be encouraged. For example, the National League of Cities identiﬁes a
number of proposals to assist with immigrant integration (Gambetta and
Gedrimaite 2010). Many of the strategies focus on administrative coordination between and among federal, state, and local authorities. More
concrete recommendations are targeted toward the creation of mayoral
Table 11.7 Logistic Regression Results for Regional Variables
Variables
Constant
Median age, 2008 (est.)
Percent bachelor’s degree,
2006–2010
Percent foreign born, 2006–2010
Unemployment rate, 2008
State-level income tax, 2008
Percent rural, 2008 (est.)
−2 log likelihood
Cox and Snell adjusted R2
N

Great Lakes Northeast Midwest
−11.180*** −13.490*** 1.294
(0.700)
(1.194)
(1.210)
0.221*** −0.008
0.071***
(0.016)
(0.027)
(0.014)
0.044*** −0.005
0.092***
(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.014)
−0.254***
0.010
−0.195***
(0.026)
(0.017)
(0.034)
−0.252***
0.609*** −0.053
(0.037)
(0.062)
(0.057
2.085*** 0.934***
1.169***
(0.140)
(0.212)
(0.231)
−0.678***
−0.686
−0.581
(0.253)
(0.365)
(0.413)
935.928 1,974.009
855.592
0.130
0.134
0.087
1,971
1,971
1,971

South
5.409***
(0.611)
−0.091***
(0.014)
−0.042***
(0.007)
0.019
(0.011)
−0.077***
(0.029)
−1.512***
(0.119)
0.644***
(0.225)
2,373.771
0.157
1,971

West
−2.838***
(0.785)
−0.022
(0.18)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.079***
(0.012)
0.147***
(0.042)
−0.184
(0.143)
−0.467
(0.318)
1,343.403
0.076
1,971

NOTE: The values in the table represent logistic regression coefﬁcients, with the standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05
level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009,
2011a,b, 2012); U.S. Department of Labor (2008).
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advisory boards and addressing language issues. The National League
of Cities report identiﬁed 20 cities engaged in meeting the challenges
of immigrant populations. To be globally competitive in an entrepreneurial world, the Great Lakes region must more vigorously engage in
immigration outreach and support.
Separately, policymakers may need to address issues related to their
region’s less-than-competitive tax burden. The statistically signiﬁcant
positive coefﬁcient in Table 11.7 indicates that the counties of the Great
Lakes region are characterized, relative to the counties of most other
regions, as having a relatively higher tax burden. Recently, many of the
region’s policymakers, most notably led by recently elected conservative Republican governors, have been moving to adjust their state’s tax
structures. From the perspective of stimulating entrepreneurial development, the challenge for these ofﬁcials is to ﬁnd the means to provide appropriate entrepreneur-oriented tax relief while not undermining
the region’s educational advantage. The analysis depicted here clearly
links an educated population with some forms of entrepreneurial activity. Cutting state education budgets to provide tax relief may not work
in the long-term interest of developing an entrepreneurial environment.
Still, as Hart (2008) observes, providing for a future long-term developmental payoff may be less compelling than a more immediate political
one.
Beyond the central focus of this chapter, it is worth brieﬂy commenting on the nature of the results relative to the other regional designations. The counties of the Northeast region are distinctly urban and
deﬁned by their relatively low rates of unemployment, older populations, and high percent of foreign born. They are also deﬁned by statelevel tax burdens that may depress entrepreneurialism. The Midwest
region beneﬁts from its relatively low levels of unemployment, but is
deﬁned by its very low rates of immigration and its state-level tax burden, which is greater than either the West or South. Indeed, perhaps
the signature characteristic of the Midwest counties is the low levels of
foreign born. The Southern counties can be identiﬁed by their relatively
low tax burdens. However, this region is also deﬁned by its youth and
relative lack of college-educated adult citizens. Southern policymakers
continue to struggle with their education systems and making them
competitive in a global economy. To the extent that education plays
a signiﬁcant role in entrepreneurship, that region’s policymakers will
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need to address these issues. Finally, the counties of the West are deﬁned
by their relatively higher degrees of education and large foreign-born
populations. Still, the counties of the West lead in entrepreneurialism.
The challenge public and private actors may need to address is that it
remains deﬁned by a degree of unemployment.

CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurialism is a driver of economic growth. Historically, the
Great Lakes region has been linked with the entrepreneurial development of many major companies in the United States. However, today
there is a strong sense that this region, like an aging star athlete, has
lost a step in its entrepreneurial dynamism. The results depicted in this
analysis support elements of that assumption. To be clear, this analysis
is a snapshot of a time prior to the enduring economic slump beginning
in the fall of 2008. The region is still productive and competitive in a
number of ways, but, in several factors related to self-employment, all
things being equal, it lags behind other U.S. regions. In addition, this
analysis is consistent with the current and widely held view of the western United States as a driver of U.S. entrepreneurial activity.
For policymakers in the Great Lakes region, some features of their
locales are signs of hope. They are advantaged by the degree to which
they have an educated population relative to other places. Given the
notion that entrepreneurialism links innovation to the market, an educated workforce is an important asset, particularly in a digital information age. However, to the extent that the region is also deﬁned by its
relatively high tax burdens and its relatively low proportion of foreign
born, these elements need to be addressed. In the Great Lakes states,
recently elected Republican governors and Republican-controlled state
legislatures have made it part of their agenda to address noncompetitive
features of their states’ tax codes. For the purpose of entrepreneurial
economic stimulation, this is a worthwhile endeavor. However, these
groups must use caution not to undermine the quality of their states’
educational institutions. In addition, some regional leaders are making strides in ﬁnding methods to make the Great Lakes area a magnet for highly educated immigrants. This is important. During the
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region’s boom years it was a major destination for many migrants and
immigrants. They brought their energy and inventiveness and spurred
unprecedented industrial development.
To the cities and counties that comprise the Great Lakes region,
this is a marketing opportunity to showcase the advantages of the area’s
many unique and shared attributes, such as direct access to a stable, natural fresh-water resource. The communities of this region may wish to
shape their appeals to educated potential immigrant populations. Such
a campaign may wish to express that this region offers, for the right
entrepreneurs, an overlooked opportunity.

Notes
1. Figure 11.1 includes data illustrating patents issued to both domestic and foreign
patent holders. While the potential implications of the growing disparity between
domestic and foreign patent holders are interesting, they are beyond the scope of
this chapter to explore more fully.
2. By contrast, Wilken (1972) places the surge of U.S. economic growth between
1810 and 1880.
3. The counties include Cook County (Chicago, Illinois), Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio), Erie County (Buffalo, New York), Milwaukee County (Milwaukee,
Wisconsin), and Wayne County (Detroit, Michigan). The data for Figure 11.2 are
derived from U.S. Census Bureau (1996).
4. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration coastal counties are identiﬁed in U.S. Census Bureau (2011c).
5. Missing data occur among all of the regions, with the Northeast and the Great
Lakes regions having the most valid observations and the Midwest, South, and
West having many more counties not reporting self-employment data. There are
3,140 counties among the 50 American states, but because of missing or otherwise unreported data among the Social Security ﬁgures, the valid number is 1,971
counties. The vast majority of the missing data come from sparsely populated
rural counties. For example, the counties with missing self-employment ﬁgures
have mean estimated 2008 populations of 10,380 persons, with nearly four-ﬁfths
of their 2000 population deﬁned as rural (mean = 0.79). By contrast, the valid
data’s 2008 estimated population is 147,735 persons, with over half of these counties’ populations deﬁned as urbanized (mean = 0.52).
6. Business establishment rate: F = 35.796, signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level [MSBW=
65.594 (df=4), MSWI= 1.832 (df=1967)]; percent self-employed: F = 12.42, signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level [MSBW= 0.026 (df=4), MSWI= 0.026 (df=1967)];
business birth rate: F = 89.515, signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level [MSBW= 187.695
(df=4), MSWI= 2.097 (df=1967)].
7. This variable is derived from data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011a).

Bowen.indb 300

12/16/2013 2:14:46 PM

Lost a Step 301
8. The data for this variable are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011b).
9. It should be stressed that much of the literature relating to taxation and entrepreneurial behavior is about the effect the marginal rate has on behavior. This analysis
uses a far less sensitive measure related to the tax burden.
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonproﬁt research
organization devoted to ﬁnding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications.
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research
program by providing ﬁnancial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the
research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in the ﬁeld; and
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions
to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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